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On 1 June 1976, Syrian army units rolled into Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil War. They 
fought against the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the left-wing Lebanese 
National Movement (LNM). Both Syria and the PLO were important clients of the Soviet 
Union (USSR), which was locked in a Cold War competition with the USA. The Soviet 
leadership became critical of the invasion and asked the Syrians to withdraw. However, Syria 
kept on fighting and only agreed to a ceasefire after Saudi Arabian mediation in October 
1976. The Soviet-Syrian relationship was normalized in April 1977 when the Syrian president 
visited Moscow. This thesis investigates the Soviet response to the Syrian invasion of 
Lebanon from June 1976 to April 1977, and details why it reacted the way it did.  
 
Existing scholarship disagrees about whether the USSR knew about and supported the 
invasion. There are also different views about how much political, diplomatic, military and 
economic pressure Moscow exerted towards the Syrian regime.  
 
WikiLeaks and CIA documents from the period are used to shed new light on this very tense 
period in Soviet-Syrian relations. Patron-client theory, focusing on the patron’s goals and the 
client’s threat level, is applied to analyse the Soviet-Syrian relationship. The USSR had 
political and strategic goals to keep Syria as a client. The Kremlin did not support the Syrian 
invasion; nevertheless, it was afraid Syria would shift side in the Cold War. Seeing the 
superpower struggle as a zero-sum-game, such a loss was unacceptable for the USSR. Syria 
on the other hand was dependent on the USSR for military support, but its military threat 
level was low during 1976-77, and this increased Damascus’s influence over Soviet policy. In 
addition, Syria relied more on the Arab Gulf States than the USSR for economic aid. 
  
The Soviet leaders put a political, diplomatic, military and economic pressure on Damascus. 
To not lose Syria as a client, the pressure was limited. Meanwhile, to keep the PLO as an 
independent client, Moscow gave a restrained support to the PLO-LNM by political, 
diplomatic and military measures, directly and through Egypt, Iraq and Libya.  
 
By backing the PLO-LNM’s attempt to gain power in Lebanon by force, the Soviet strategy is 
seen as offensive. The PLO-LNM was weakened by the Syrian invasion, and the USSR’s policy 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between Syria and the Soviet Union and its successor state Russia, is a 
relatively long-lasting phenomenon in a politically unstable Middle East. Since the Soviet 
Union (USSR) allowed its satellite state Czechoslovakia to sell weapons to Syria in 1954, the 
two countries have mostly been close. Both the USSR and Syria sought to influence events in 
the Middle East, and often found themselves on the same side in regional conflicts. The 
USSR faced the United States of America (USA) in the Cold War, and Syria became an 
important Soviet client in the superpower struggle. Nonetheless, the USSR and Syria openly 
expressed their disagreements with each other on certain topics. The Palestinian issue, one 
of the region’s most difficult and controversial, turned out to be one of these.  
 
In the early 1970s both the USSR and Syria were supporting the Palestinians in their conflict 
with Israel. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) became a Soviet client receiving 
political, economic and military support. The PLO had established itself firmly in Lebanon, 
where the Maronites, a Catholic Western-oriented group, had played a dominant political, 
economic, military and cultural role for decades. Muslim and left-wing groups claimed more 
influence and political reforms and united into the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). The 
PLO supported the LNM, but the Maronites refused to give any concessions, and fighting 
erupted into the Lebanese Civil War 1975. Syria, ruled by President Hafez al-Assad’s, assisted 
the PLO-LNM alliance, and the USSR backed this policy. In the first half of 1976 the PLO-LNM 
were on the offensive and pushed the Maronites back to their core areas. 
 
On 1 June 1976, Syria intervened in the Lebanese Civil War and soon fought against the PLO-
LNM coalition. The USSR initially remained relatively silent and in the opinion of some 
observers even seemed to support Assad. Soon, the Soviet leadership grew increasingly 
critical of the Syrian invasion and asked Assad to withdraw from Lebanon.3 In spite of this, 
the Syrians pressed on, the Soviet criticism and pressure increased during the autumn. The 
relations turned sour and the dispute developed into the most serious strain in Soviet-Syrian 
relations during Assad’s 30 years in power.  
                                                          





The Arab League mediated in the conflict, and made a ceasefire agreement with Assad and 
the PLO at the end of October 1976. Fighting in Lebanon scaled down, nonetheless, relations 
between Moscow and Damascus first normalized when Assad visited Moscow in April 1977.4 
The Syrian army stayed on in Lebanon as a so-called peacekeeping force securing Syria 




To better understand the limits of Moscow’s influence and Damascus’ autonomy, this thesis 
investigates the period immediately following the Syrian invasion of Lebanon in June 1976. 
The Lebanese Civil War and Syrian invasion have been thoroughly analysed in the research 
literature. On the other hand, Moscow’s policy towards the events has not been the sole 
focus of any research since the late 1970s. With new sources available through WikiLeaks 
and downgraded CIA-documents, a fresh view of the events is taken in this thesis.  
The research question is: What was the Soviet response to the Syrian invasion of Lebanon in 
June 1976, and why did it react in this way? 
 
Limitation of time, actors and themes 
 
The Soviet and Syrian policies towards the PLO seemed to be relatively well aligned at the 
start of the Lebanese Civil War. Diverging goals became apparent soon after the Syrian army 
rolled into Lebanon on 1 June 1976 to stop the alliance of left-wing Muslim-PLO groups from 
winning over Christian militias. This makes June 1976 a natural starting point for the study. 
The Soviet political and diplomatic pressure decreased after the Arab-League mediated 
agreement in late October. Nevertheless, Soviet coercion continued in the military relations 
until April 1977, and this marks the end point of this thesis. 
 
The advantage of going deeper into a short time period is the possibility to analyse more 
closely the leaders’ handling of specific situations and re-evaluate earlier research. Analysing 
reactions to some singular events gives hints and sometimes evidence of the parties’ 
                                                          
4 The Lebanese Civil War continued with until the Taif agreement ended hostilities in 1989. 
5 The Syrian army left in 2005 after huge demonstrations protested against the alleged participation of Syria in the murder of the Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005. 
3 
 
interpretations of the situation, and this again gives indications of their overall policy 
thinking. The USSR supported the PLO and leftist alliance, but could have done much more 
to back them up. On the other hand, one may wonder why the Russians chose to assist an 
armed liberation movement instead of an important Arab state. The Kremlin’s decisions 
were naturally affected by its considerations regarding the regime in Damascus. However, 
the USSR was in a Cold War with the US and Soviet concerns for that relation naturally 
affected the Kremlin’s reactions. By looking at the most tense period of Soviet-Syrian 
relations this may point to limits of influence and clarifying the main priorities. The focus is 
on the parties’ strategic political goals and how they used diplomacy and political pressure, 
military force or economic measures to achieve these. This thesis investigates policies of the 
Soviet era; however, to vary the language the adjective Russian will be used 
interchangeably.6 
 
The Lebanese Civil War was a complex conflict with many parties who changed alliances over 
the years. The war started as a Christian-Muslim fight, progressed to a Leftist-Rightist 
struggle and was portrayed as a Syrian/Rightist-Palestinian conflict.7 The Civil War functions 
as a backdrop for this thesis and the general development of the fighting will be described. 
The focus will be on the specific interactions between the Soviet Union, Syria and the PLO.  
 
Why is this topic important? 
 
There are at least two reasons to study the events of 1976 more closely. On one hand, as we 
will see in the research literature, there is disagreement about what actually happened 
between the USSR and Syria, and some of the circumstances have not been fully disclosed. 
On the other hand, some of the conflicts from 1976 continue, although in a different form 
today. To solve them, there is a need to better understand what the parties’ actions and 
goals were, and what influenced them.  
 
After the Lebanese Civil War, the Palestinians in Lebanon were weakened, and are still split 
and struggling for statehood. Nevertheless, a new political party and militia, Hezbollah grew 
                                                          
6 It is common in the literature about the Soviet Union to use of the term Russian. Moscow and Kremlin are other terms used. 




to become a strong actor. Hezbollah, made up of local Shia Muslims, has taken over some of 
the features of the PLO. They have a strong position in Southern Lebanon, are allied to 
Damascus and clearly opposed to the US and Israel.8 There are also claims that Russia is 
linked to Hezbollah.9  
 
After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moscow’s interest and capacity of dealing with 
the Middle East decreased. After Hafez al-Assad died, his son Bashar al-Assad became 
president and maintained the Syrian troops in Lebanon. However, when the Syrian regime 
was accused of murdering the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, Assad came 
under strong local and Western pressure to withdraw from Lebanon. The Cold War between 
the USSR and the US was over, and Moscow was too weak to hinder a humiliating Syrian 
withdrawal. Nonetheless, in a characteristically unstable region, the situation soon turned 
full-circle. In 2011 an uprising in Syria turned into a war in which 400,000 people have been 
killed and over 11 million forced to flee their homes.10  
 
As rebel forces seemed close to defeat the Syrian army in September 2015, Russia sent in its 
air force and combat troops, saving the regime in Damascus.11 However, in 2017 Moscow 
withdrew parts of its forces from Syria. This made it hard for the government to gain a 
complete victory and in practice ensured the conflict to rage on.12 The Russian role is 
particularly interesting, as it seems calibrated to keep Assad in power at the same time as 
President Vladimir Putin says he is willing to pull the troops out «quite quickly» if it is to 
Russia’s advantage.13 Assad claims that in spite of different opinions, the Russians have 
never in their 60-year long relationship tried to dictate Syria.14 Moscow’s has interests in 
Syria, but how much influence it has over Damascus is not fully known and important to 
clarify. Getting a better understanding of the historical interests, goals and limits of 
Moscow’s involvement may be helpful to understand its role in the Syrian war today.  
                                                          
8 Iran, which is distinctly allied to both Syria and Hezbollah, has also been purchasing advanced Russian weapons. Stratfor, «Iran: S-300 
Missile System Deployed To Fordow Nuclear Site». 29 August 2016.   
9 Nizameddin, Talal. «Squaring the Middle East Triangle in Lebanon: Russia and the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah Nexus». The Slavonic and East 
European Review, Vol. 86, No. 3 (2008): 475-500. The Daily Beast, «Russia Is Arming Hezbollah, Say Two of the Group’s Field 
Commanders». 1 November 2016. Elbaz, Michel. «Dangerous liaisons: Covert ''love affair" between Russia and Hezbollah». 24 May 2005.  
10 United Nations News, «Syria conflict: 2017 deadliest year for children, UN aid official reports». UN News, «Syria in numbers». 
11 This was only the second Russian foreign intervention since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The USSR invaded Afghanistan to 
save a communist regime friendly to Moscow. The Russians met strong resistance from US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan-backed guerilla 
groups and fought a costly war until Mikhail Gorbachev withdrew the Soviet forces in 1988. In 2008, Russia intervened in Georgia. 
12 Sputnik News, «Putin Orders Withdrawal of Russian Troops from Syria». 11 December 2017. 
13 Al Jazeera, «Putin: Russia military 'will stay' in Syria - but not long-term». 8 June 2018. 
14 Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), «President al-Assad interview given to Mail on Sunday – VIDEO». 6 June 2018. 
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Method: Sources and the use of sources 
 
Primary sources 
This thesis is based on English-language sources as Russian and Syrian sources are difficult to 
access and need translation. WikiLeaks and declassified CIA documents are the main 
sources. A document collection made by the Institute of Palestine Studies has been used to 
review political leaders’ speeches and statements from the period.15 In addition, I conducted 
interviews with Palestinian and Lebanese academics and political activists in Lebanon during 
the autumn of 2017. Newspaper articles from Western media like The New York Times have 
also been used.16   
 
WikiLeaks is a non-profit multi-national media organization and associated library that has 
published more than 10 million documents since 2006.17 A huge part of the material is from 
US embassies, the oldest dates back to 1966.18 The organization has won several awards and 
had been cited in more than 28 thousands academic papers and US court filings by 
November 2015.19 Similar leaks have been made earlier; however, never before has the 
public had access to documents on this scale and with the ease that the Internet provides.  
 
The huge amount of documents presents another challenge. Just to get an overview of what 
exists, skim, read and piece the information together is a large task. Because of the vast 
number of documents, the need to search and sort required a solution. WikiLeaks’ has its 
own search engine on its website with a possibility to search for documents by words, 
phrases and dates of production. I have systematically used a combination of search words 
like «Syria», «Assad», «Soviet», «pressure», «invasion», «Lebanon» and PLO». 20 When I 
found an interesting topic like «Tartus», the Syrian port which the USSR required access to, I 
went further by searching for «Tartus» combined with «Soviet» etc. The resulting files 
                                                          
15 The Institute of Palestine Studies in Beirut publishes a yearbook of international documents dealing with Palestine.  
16 The New York Times of 1976-77 is accessible on the Internet.  
17  WikiLeaks was founded by its publisher Julian Assange in 2006. The 10 million documents are published on its own website. WikiLeaks, 
«What is WikiLeaks». 3 November 2015.  
18 Shane and Lehren, «Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy». In WikiLeaks’ «Syria files», there are more than two million emails 
from Syrian sources, however, they are dating from August 2006 to March 2012 and have not been relevant for this thesis. WikiLeaks, 
«Syria Files». 5 July 2012.  
19 The Economist New Media Award (2008), The Amnesty New Media Award (2009), TIME Magazine Person of the Year, People's Choice 
(highest global vote) (2010) among several others. WikiLeaks, «What is WikiLeaks». 3 November 2015. 
20 By using WikiLeaks’ search engine with the words «Soviet, influence, Syria, Lebanon» 3,840 hits came up. These were distributed on 15 
different groups of sources, which is possible to select between. The largest, by a clear margin, were e-mails from the private US 
company Stratfor with 3,171 documents. WikiLeaks, «Advanced search.»  
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appear in chronological order, and it is also possible to narrow down the findings to any 
period by setting start and final dates for the search. The documents appear in an electronic 
format, which facilitates specific searches for key words. The search engine works 
satisfactorily and it has not been necessary to use other methods to find or sort the 
documents.  
 
The CIA has downgraded approximately 930,000 documents, with a total of more than 12 
million pages since 1999. The documents were previously only available to the public by 
visiting the National Archives in Maryland. In January 2017, they were released online on the 
CIA's website.21 They cover many topics and activities from the 1940s to the 1990s, including 
the issues approached in this thesis. A declassification review of 25-year old records is 
regulated by an Executive US order. Consequently, new batches of documents are regularly 
released and posted online to the public’s access. Some of the latest declassified documents 
used in this thesis were approved for release relatively recently, in July 2016. The President’s 
Daily Brief, classified as Top Secret at the time, has been one of the main sources. Although 
other important international events took place in June and July of 1976, Lebanon figures on 
or close to the top in these briefs every day. As the superpower-rival the USSR was involved, 
we can assume that the conflict had top priority for Moscow as well. The search function on 
the CIA-website does not result in a chronological list of documents, and the documents are 
in pdf-format. This makes it more time-consuming to find the relevant information. 
 
In addition, six interviews were conducted with Palestinian and Lebanese academics and 
political activists in Beirut and Sidon, Lebanon on 6-16 November 2017.22 Some of them 
were present at the events in 1976, others heard about them from people who were there. 
The interviews were conducted face-to-face and each lasted 1-2 hours. They were semi-
structured in the way that I had a list of questions and at the same time let the interviewed 
people talk freely. All were willing to have their names published. As will be evident in the 
                                                          
21 The documents are in an Electronic Reading Room. CIA, «The CIA’s Secret History Is Now Online», 2017. The search results on the CIA 
page do not appear in chronological order, and this makes it more time-consuming to find relevant the documents. 
22 A list with names of the interviewed, date and location is given in the appendix of sources. At the time of the interviews, the time-scope 
of the thesis was from the Syrian invasion of Lebanon to the fall of the Soviet Union, 1976-91. Therefore, the questions asked were 
broader than the present research question.  
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following chapters, some of the questions asked became redundant as the research 
progressed, thus some of the interviews provided somewhat limited information.23 
 
Finally, I visited the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut, which provided access to a book 
with a collection of relevant documents for 1976.24  
 
Source criticism  
Some of the critical questions are: Who has produced the source, and what was the 
intention of sharing the information? Can we trust that the documents are real and the 
information trustworthy? We will take a closer look at the main sources. 
 
WikiLeaks: There are several uncertainties regarding WikiLeaks. Who originally leaked the 
documents to WikiLeaks, why did they do this, and did they make any selections? How has 
WikiLeaks treated them? What we have is only a part of all the documents produced, for 
instance in June 1976 there are almost no documents available. The people leaking the 
documents may have published everything they got access to, or consciously selected what 
we can see. It may not be representative of what happened, and the trustworthiness and 
reliability is up for discussion.  
 
The WikiLeaks material from 1976-77 is all from the USA, and it may have been published to 
present the US government in a bad light. The founder of WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, is 
known to be critical of US foreign policy and he or others in the organization may have 
selected certain documents while keeping others. There have also been speculations that 
Russia may have been behind the leaks.25 However, I have not found criticism about the 
authenticity of the documents.26 Still, one should keep in mind the possibility that some 
reports may have been created or edited. On the other hand, by manipulating documents 
WikiLeaks would run the risk of losing credibility.  
                                                          
23 The original time-scope for this thesis was from 1976 until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
24 Institute for Palestine Studies, International documents on Palestine 1976. Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1978.  
25 «In the present case, WikiLeaks has a history of releasing information that — whatever you may think about how it was acquired — 
proves authentic and often reliable. We know that because, to my knowledge, no one has proved any of their documents fraudulent 
despite having great incentive and opportunity to do so. People and agencies whose documents have been leaked have, in arguing over 
them, conceded (usually tacitly) that they are what WikiLeaks purports them to be. For example, when Snowden leaked information 
showing that U.S. intelligence agencies were monitoring German chancellor Angela Merkel’s cellphone, President Obama reportedly 
apologized — he didn’t tell Merkel not to believe everything she reads in the papers». McCarthy, «What Should We Make of WikiLeaks 
as a Source?»; Gibney, Alex. Can We Trust Julian Assange and WikiLeaks?». The New York Times. 8 August 2016. 




Five million of the WikiLeaks-documents, the so-called Global Intelligence files are e-mails 
from the US private company Stratfor during 2004-11.27 This constitutes about half of the 
total number of files, and it is interesting to take a closer look at the company. Stratfor is a 
Texas-based intelligence corporation producing and selling geopolitical analysis.28  
 
Stratfor admitted that they had been hacked but would not confirm or negate the validity of 
the files published by WikiLeaks.29 It was probably difficult to break into and steal five million 
documents from a world-leading intelligence company; however it is probably even more 
complicated to change or create vast amounts of documents to make them appear as real. It 
would be very time- and resource consuming and require great insights in many complicated 
and confidential questions. That strengthens the argumentation that the documents are 
real, but does not prove it. The authenticity of two of the documents I can personally 
confirm. One is an e-mail I sent and received an answer to regarding a book I was to receive 
as a Stratfor subscriber in 2011.1 Another contains my contact information and subscription 
details. Both of these were included in the leaked documents I checked. 
 
CIA documents: The authenticity seems to be quite clear. Manipulating US Presidential briefs 
and other official documents would probably create a domestic and international scandal 
and seems highly unlikely. However, not all the information in a document has been 
revealed. In most reports, single sentences, paragraphs or even whole pages are visibly 
blanked out. Other papers have not been published at all. The reason for concealing 
information has partly been to protect US personnel, and the names of the sources involved, 
from publicity and any potential danger. In addition, some US internal discussions and 
actions would surely set the US in a bad light even today.  
 
General for WikiLeaks and CIA documents: The vast majority of the texts were internal 
reports, overviews etc. based on intelligence and meant to make a basis for analysis and 
decisions. They were not meant for publication framing actors or situations in certain ways 
for the public. This gives them more credibility than interviews and public statements meant 
                                                          
27 WikiLeaks, «Search the GIFiles».  
28 News and analysis are sold openly to subscribers including huge corporations, arms manufacturers and US authorities including security 
organizations. 
29 Stratfor, «Stratfor on the Wikileaks Release».  
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to have political influence. Still, the US personnel involved had not necessarily been in the 
room where information was first shared or decisions made. On the other hand, the US had 
an extensive network, probably the largest in the world, of diplomats, intelligence agencies 
and other connections with officials meeting many of the actors relevant for this thesis. The 
US analysts seemed to have very good access to information on the Syria-Lebanese theatre. 
The Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam in one instance told the US ambassador 
to Damascus that «your information is extremely precise».30  
 
From the sources accessed, it becomes clear that all the main parties of the Lebanese Civil 
War to a certain extent spoke with the Americans. The US allies and Arab friends and 
sympathisers of course talked with the US, but even the opponents, the Russians, the 
Syrians, and the PLO did so. All parties would naturally further their own goals and interests. 
Still, the meetings included information, argumentation and views that in turn can be used 
to say something about their real intentions. Even the issues a party does not talk about can 
tell something about their position. For instance, a lack of reaction to a kind of event which 
the party usually responded to, may say something about a change of priority.  
 
Interpretation: To a large extent the sources describe expressions of political leaders’ and 
actions and transactions of states and organizations. The US origin of the documents creates 
several challenges. The USA has had strained, and for years conflictual relations with the 
Soviet Union, Syria, and the PLO. The American officials taking notes and writing minutes 
and reports often met the informers; nevertheless, they were not participating in the 
parties’ internal discussions and decision-making meetings. They may have got hold of the 
information indirectly, via others, or through different forms of electronic surveillance. The 
Americans had their own view of the parties and the situation they were involved in, and 
that has necessarily influenced their presentation of the events. To get a better 
understanding of their real opinions and thoughts it is necessary to interpret them.  
 
The US analysts analysed and commented many of the Soviet, Arab and Western 
statements, events, newspaper articles and broadcasts. The parties, as a part of their 
                                                          





conflicts, also led a propaganda war manipulating information to influence people. Some of 
the analysed texts clearly had political and propagandistic intentions without base in reality, 
others are more uncertain. The US analysts compared the texts with other information they 
had access to and this helped them and, in effect, the later historian to get a more reflected 
and clear picture of what really happened. Many of the analysts were experienced, were 
present on the ground at the time and produced valuable information.  
 
However, the US personnel could not have a complete overview, let alone detailed 
knowledge, about a complex situation where so many parties acted in secrecy. On top of 
that comes their ability to select, validate the reliability, interpret the real intentions and 
goals and analyse information. Obviously, this opens for many possible misjudgements, still 
by viewing the sources together as a whole, a degree of certainty appears. 
 
Taken together, we see that it is difficult and sometimes admittedly impossible to 
understand the situation from the parties’ perspectives or to get a complete picture of what 
really happened and why. Therefore, the picture a reader gets is necessarily incomplete. 
Still, what actually is available contains new and valuable information. 
 
Ethical considerations: The criticism of WikiLeaks has primarily been that individual names 
have been published in the documents, which may put the people mentioned in danger. The 
material included in this thesis was made by public servants and some of the names of the 
sources for the information are also mentioned. However, since the information is openly 
accessible on the internet, the relevant authorities, that is Syrian, Russian, Palestinian and 
Lebanese government agencies, have probably seen them already. This thesis is based on 
documents that are publicly accessible, and not by breaking in to steal any information. In 
sum, I do not see any ethical problem in using WikiLeaks. 
 
Interviews: Regarding the people interviewed, they offer descriptions of events that shed 
light on details and provide a closeness other sources cannot provide. However, the people 
who were present took part in a very complicated conflict with many events taking place at 
the same time and at different places. They lived with the manipulated media coverage 
referred to above. They may have forgotten details, misinterpreted or purposely selected 
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parts of the events when they gave their accounts. Therefore, it is important to see the 
interviews together with the other sources. 
 
Secondary sources - Research literature 
The Soviet reactions to the Syrian intervention was not an isolated policy but took place in 
an overall framework of Soviet relations with 1) the Middle East, 2) Syria, 3) the PLO. Syrian 
relations with the PLO and the involvement in the Lebanese Civil War is also important to 
take into consideration. To place the research question into the field of these relations I 
present an overview of the most relevant research literature.  
 
Soviet-Middle East relations 
Several books on Soviet-Middle East relations have been published.31 The relationship with 
Syria, the PLO and the Syrian 1976-invasion of Lebanon were just some of several topics 
covered. Consequently, the coverage of the events in 1976 is in general brief. Two of the 
most renowned researchers who have also written specifically about Syria and the 
intervention of Lebanon are Galia Golan and Robert O. Freedman, both American. These 
writers will be referred to throughout this thesis.  
 
Golan has written several books, book chapters and articles on Soviet policy towards the 
region.32 She is Darwin Professor emerita of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where she 
was chair of the Political science Department. In 1990, she wrote Soviet Policies in the 
Middle East – From World War Two to Gorbachev including book chapters about Syria and 
the PLO.33 Freedman, an American political scientist holding appointments at the Baltimore 
Hebrew University and Johns Hopkins University wrote several books, book chapters and 
articles on Soviet-Middle East relations.34 His first book Soviet Policy toward the Middle East 
                                                          
31 Laqueur, Walter. The Struggle for the Middle East – The Soviet Union and the Middle East 1958-68. 1972. Landis, Lincoln. Politics and oil: 
Moscow in the Middle East. New York: Dunellen Publishing Company. 1973. Dawisha, Adeed and Karen Dawisha. The Soviet Union in the 
Middle East – Policies and Perspectives. 1982; Sella, Amnon. Soviet Political and Military Conduct in the Middle East. 1981. Breslauer, 
George W. Soviet Strategy in the Middle East. 1990;  
32 See the bibliography for Golan’s publications.  
33 Golan, Golan. Soviet Policies in the Middle East – From World War Two to Gorbachev. 1990. 
34 Freedman has a Ph.D. degree in International Relations from Columbia University. He has also been assistant Professor of Russian History 
at the United States Military Academy and Associate Professor of Political Science and Russian at Marquette University. Baltimore 
Council of Foreign Affairs, "Crisis in United States Israel Relations". 2015. See the bibliography for Freedman’s publications. 
12 
 
since 1970 came out in three editions during 1975-82. He published another book Moscow 
and the Middle East in 1991.35  
 
Immediately after the end of the Cold War, a few books were published. After this however, 
the area faded from interest for most researchers.36 While articles continued to be written, 
few books were published until well into the 2000s.37 To present a Russian perspective, 
Yevgeny Primakov is included. Primakov worked as a Middle East journalist in the 1960s, was 
an academic in the 1970s and later became head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, 
Minister of Foreign affairs and Prime Minister, a rather unique combination. He published a 
part memoir, part history book in 2009.38 
 
Soviet-Syria relations 
Regarding the USSR’s general relations with Syria, only three English language books have 
been published and they were all written during the final years of the Cold War. Efraim 
Karsh, an Israeli-British historian, wrote a booklet The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years 
in 1988.39 He analysed the relations from when Assad came to power in 1970 to 1988, with 
one chapter on the Lebanese crisis. Karsh came out with a revised and expanded book three 
years later.40 Karsh wrote that the Lebanese Civil War «constituted the backdrop against 
which Soviet-Syrian relations played out some of their most trying moments».41 
 
Pedro Ramet is an American political scientist and professor at the Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology (NTNU). Based on two and a half years of data compilation, he 
wrote The Soviet-Syrian relationship since 1955 – A Troubled Alliance, the most voluminous 
research on the topic, in 1990.42 Ramet’s speciality, though, was not the Middle East, but 
                                                          
35 Although it focuses on the Soviet policy since the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, it gives a long introduction to the decades from World 
War II to 1979.  
36 Vassiliev, Alexei: Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism, 1993; Hollis, Rosemary (eds.). The Soviets, their 
successors and the Middle East – Turning point, 1993; Goldberg, David H. and Paul Marantz. The Decline of the Soviet Union and the 
Transformation of the Middle East, 1994. 
37 Nizameddin, Talal. Russia and the Middle East 1999; Kreutz, Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?, 2007; Ginor, Isabella and Gideon 
Remez. Foxbats over Dimona. The Soviets’ Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War, 2007; Khalidi, Rashid. Sowing Crisis – The Cold War and 
the American Dominance in the Middle East. 2009. Nizameddin, Talal. Putin’s New Order in the Middle East, 2013; Sekulow, Unholy 
Alliance: The Agenda Iran, Russia, and Jihadists Share for Conquering the World, 2016.  
38 Primakov, Russia and the Arabs, Behind the scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the present, 2009. 
39 The book has 103 pages plus notes and appendices. Karsh, Efraim, The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years.  
40 The book has 182 pages plus notes, appendices and bibliography. The expanded space is given to military economic and other 
dimensions. However, the analysis of the events in Lebanon were hardly updated, and the space dedicated to Lebanon was actually less 
than in his first book. Karsh, Efraim, Soviet policy towards Syria since 1970.  
41 Karsh, Soviet Policy towards Syria since 1970, 22. 
42 Ramet, Pedro, The Soviet-Syrian relationship since 1955 – A troubled alliance. 262 pages including notes. 
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Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe. The book covers the relations from the 1950s to 1990 and 
discusses the Lebanese crisis in parts of a chapter. He also refers to the Syrian intervention 
as a low point in Soviet-Syrian relations.43 
 
In addition, a PhD thesis about the 1970-1980 period has been written.44 Jonathan Chanis in 
his 1987 dissertation at the City University of New York says the USSR misjudged Assad’s 
intentions and capabilities in Lebanon.45   
 
Several books dedicate a chapter or considerable coverage to Soviet-Syria relations. Galia 
Golan and Itamar Rabinovitch co-wrote a book chapter in 1979.46 In a 1991 case-study 
comparing Soviet-Syria with US-Israeli relations, David Roberts, Moshe Efrat and Robert O. 
Freedman, wrote a chapter each.47 Some articles regarding the relations between Russia, 
Syria and Lebanon have also been published.48 Since the fall of the Soviet Union no books on 
Russia-Syria relations were published until 2016.49 
 
The USSR and the Lebanese Civil War 
The only research specifically treating the Soviet Union and the Syrian invasion in 1976 are 
two articles and a book chapter from the late 1970s. The first article, again written by Robert 
Freedman, appeared in 1978.50 The next year Ilana Kass, a political scientist wrote an article 
«Moscow and the Lebanese Triangle».51 Kass had written a Soviet-Middle East special study 
and later wrote a book about the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Freedman’s and Kass’ 
articles give a chronological presentation of the events, and are primarily based on Soviet, 
US and Arab newspapers from 1976. The experienced Christian Science Monitor 
                                                          
43 Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian relationship since 1955 – A troubled alliance, 114. 
44 Chanis, «Soviet policy toward Syria». Another Ph.D. thesis by Azzedine Souyad, «The Soviet Union in Syria's foreign policy 1970-1980 
Ideology versus regime interest». University of Exeter, 2000, has not been available. 
45 Chanis, Jonathan A. Soviet policy toward Syria and the lessons of Egypt, 248.  
46 Golan, Galia and Itamar Rabinovich. «The Soviet Union and Syria: the Limits of Co-operation» in The Limits to Power: Soviet Policy in the 
Middle East edited by Ro'I, Yaacov, 213-31. 1979. 
47 Efrat and Bercovitch, Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East. Freedman,  
48 Articles about the relations between Russia, Syria and Lebanon: Freedman. «The Soviet Union, Syria, and the crisis in Lebanon»; Spechler, 
«The Politics of intervention The Soviet Union and the crisis in Lebanon». Several research articles about the Soviet-Syria relation have 
been published: Golan, «The Soviet Union and Syria since the Yom Kippur war»; Hannah, «At Arms Length: Soviet-Syrian Relations in the 
Gorbachev Era»; Karsh, «Soviet-Syrian relations: The troubled Partnership» and Kreutz, «Syria: Russia's Best Asset in the Middle East».  
49 The first, Russia and the Syrian Conflict - Moscow's domestic, regional and strategic interests was written by Nikolay Kozhanov in 2016. It 
primarily treats the relations since the war started in 2011. Later other books treating the Russian role in the war came out. 
50 Freedman, Robert O. «The Soviet Union and Civil War in Lebanon 1975-76».Jerusalem Journal of International relations. Vol. 3 No. 4 
(1978): 60-93. 
51 Kass, Ilana. «Moscow and the Lebanese triangle». Middle East Journal, Vol. 33 No 2 (Spring 1979): 164-187. Ilana Kass is professor of 
Military Strategy and Operations at the National War College, US National Defense University. She has been a member of the US Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and has written extensively about the Middle East. Godson and Wirtz. Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First 
Century Challenge, 242. 
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correspondent James F. Collins wrote a book chapter about the Soviet policy during the 
Lebanese Civil War.52 Collins also worked at the Soviet Office at the Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research at the US Department of State. 
 
Soviet-PLO relations 
Two books and some book chapters and research articles have been written on Soviet-PLO 
relations.53 Golan issued the first book in 1980, The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization.54 It covers in detail the Soviet policy towards the PLO from its creation in 1964 
when Moscow ignored the organization, to supporting the establishment of a Palestinian 
state in the late 1970s. The Lebanese crisis is treated in a separate chapter. Golan wrote 
another book, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in 1988 including the 
policy toward the PLO.55 Roland Dannreuther’s The Soviet Union and the PLO from 1998 is 
the most recent book on Soviet-PLO connections. It deals with the relations from the 
formation of the latter party in 1964, to the collapse of the former in 1991, and includes a 
chapter on the Civil War in Lebanon. Dannreuther stresses the ideological part of Soviet 
policy, however Golan comments in a book-review that this ideology is overemphasized.56 
 
A majority of the literature has been written to analyze Russian policy towards the Middle-
Eastern actors, not the other way around. One notable exception is a Rashid Khalidi’s article, 
«Arab Views of the Soviet Role in the Middle East».57 Most of the books about Soviet-Syria 
and Soviet-PLO relations have been written by American or Israeli researchers. Because of 
Israel’s security situation they had a strong interest in understanding the cooperation 
between its enemies. The overwhelming majority of literature was published during the Cold 
War or in the two or three years after it ended.  
 
  
                                                          
52 Collins, James F. «The Soviet Union». In Lebanon in Crisis eds. P. Edward Hale and Lewis W. Snider, 209-23. New York: Syracuse University 
Press,. 1979. Collins, based in Beirut, was a Middle East correspondent from 1965 to 1978. 
53 Articles: Golan, «The Soviet Union and the Israeli Action in Lebanon». Golan, «The Soviet Union and the PLO since the War in Lebanon».  
Book chapter: Gurevitz, Baruch. «The Soviet Union and the Palestinian Organizations» in The Limits to Power: Soviet Policy in the Middle 
East edited by Ro'I, Yaacov. Pp. 254-81. 1979.  
54 Golan, Galia. The Soviet Union and the PLO: An uneasy alliance. 1980. 
55 Dannreuther, Roland. The Soviet Union and the PLO. 1998. 
56 Golan, Galia. «Book-review: Reviewed Work: The Soviet Union and the PLO by Roland Dannreuther». Slavic Review Vol. 58, No. 2, (1999): 
491-492.  
57 Khalidi, Rashid. «Arab Views».  
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The Lebanese Civil war 
There is an extensive literature on the civil war in Lebanon and the Syrian involvement. 
Some relevant works are: Adeed Dawisha’s 1980 book and Naomi Weinberger 1986 book 
about the Syrian intervention in Lebanon;58 Patrick Seale’s 1988 Assad biography;59 and 
Hanna Batatu’s 1999 sociological study about Syria.60 
 
Writers and media 
Most of the writers were employed by Western institutions, and the majority of the 
newspaper articles are from Western media. Several of the main researchers were Israeli or 
employed at Israeli academic institutions. As the Cold War lasted until 1991, and the conflict 
between Syria and Israel has continued until today, the presentation will be affected by this 
both through the sources accessible to the writers and views belonging to one part of the 
conflict. Also later Western researchers may be naturally affected in their view of the former 
enemy, the Soviet Union. Syria continues to be seen as an opponent of the West.  The 
effects are not necessarily conscious, but a writer’s identification with a particular political 
view affects how events and actors are seen. It is necessary to take into account how this 
may have influenced the texts.  
 
The Cold War bias described above also applies to the Russian sources, just in the opposite 
way. In addition, in Russia, the media has been less than free, and open debate about 
foreign policy issues has been limited. Therefore, when reading Russian literature, it is 
necessary to take into consideration the censorship they endured.  
 
Theory: What kind of patron-client relations did Moscow and Syria have? 
 
In political science, relations between states with unequal strength can be characterized in 
several ways: Patron-client; «the tail wags the dog» or empire-satellite. Most writers have 
characterized the USSR and Syria as having a patron-client relationship without defining or 
                                                          
58 Dawisha was born in Iraq and is Professor in political science at Miami University.  Dawisha, Adeed. Syria and the Lebanese Crisis.  
Weinberger, Naomi Joy. Syrian Intervention in Lebanon. 
59 Patrick Seale was a British correspondent who knew Hafez al-Assad personally. His biography includes a chapter on the Lebanese Civil 
War of 1975-76. Seale, Patrick. Asad - The struggle for the Middle East. 
60 Hanna Batatu was a well-known Palestinian Marxist and specialist in Iraqi history. Her book has a chapter about Assad’s relations with 
the PLO. Batatu, Hanna. Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics. 
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analysing it further.61 One exception was Karsh who stated that it «falls neither into the 
category of ‘patron-client relations’, nor into ‘the tail wags the dog’ paradigm. He saw the 
relation as «a mutually, beneficial strategic interdependence between two allies».62 This 
thesis will look into what kind of patron-client relations Moscow and Damascus had during 
1976-77. 
 
The Cold War was characterized by a bipolar balance of power directly between the 
between the USSR and the US. 63 As each superpower feared for its own security, the 
relation became a zero-sum game where one superpowers’ gain was seen as a loss for the 
other. Even small shifts were not tolerated as they could cause a «domino» effect. The 
growing stockpiles of nuclear arms made the potential consequences devastating. When one 
power acted in a way that the other perceived as a threat to its vital interests, a crisis arose 
and the latter tried to maintain the status quo. Thus, crisis management became important 
in a complicated situation where the US and the USSR were rivalling for power, and at the 
same time cooperating to avoid a nuclear war. In crisis management, the focus was on 
tactics like taking initiative, demonstrating resolve and prudence, maintaining freedom of 
choice, communicating effectively and different forms of coercive bargaining.  
 
A bipolycentric crisis occurred when conflicts between regional states threatened to draw 
the superpowers themselves into direct conflict. So, even when small states decided to go to 
war with their neighbours, for example the 1973 Israel-Arab Yom Kippur War, it could lead to 
a superpower confrontation. Managing a bipolycentric crisis was more difficult than a 
bipolar emergency, as they involved regional states with regional interests. These interests 
were of vital importance to the regional states, but could be marginal to the superpowers. 
As the regional states had their own relations to regional states and the other superpower, 
the number of relationships increased. This made the crisis more complex and dangerous. 
The decisive factor was the influence the patron had over the client. In spite of being a much 
                                                          
61 By «patron» Ramet meant: «any power which undertakes to provide long-term and reliable support and protection to a lesser power in 
the hope of realizing some advantages or benefits. The most important thing that a patron-state can offer a client-state is protection 
from regional or other threats. By the term «client», I mean any power which contracts a patron to provide certain services it cannot 
provide for itself (better protection, more sophisticated arms, subsidies for economic development, professional training of certain kids), 
offering trade, intelligence, and limited foreign policy cooperation in return. A client is, by definition, an independent actor – as opposed 
to a satellite. Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian relationship, 1-3. 
62 Karsh claimed that the patron-client view Ramet presented was close to the the empire-satellite view which the well-known Middle-East 
and Syria researcher Daniel Pipes had. Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria, 96. Karsh, Soviet policy towards Syria, 7 and 33.  
63 Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client State Relationships Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age, 1-9.  
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weaker state, the client could try to manipulate the patron, complicate the crisis 
management, and create a superpower confrontation. 
 
In the Cold War, smaller states could have a value for each superpower because of their 
resources or strategic geographic location and the ability to confer an advantage in the 
competition with the other superpower.64 The client state on the other hand gained greater 
influence by cooperating with the patron. The patron-client relationship is distinguished by: 
a sizable difference in military capability; the client plays an important role in the patron’s 
competition; there is an apparent association between patron and client. Both parties try to 
enhance their own security and the military dimension with arms supplies security 
guarantees are the most important factor in the relationship. Arms transfers are potentially 
powerful tools of influence as training is needed to operate the weapons, and maintenance 
and spare parts are required to make them work over time. The relationship is not static, but 
fluctuates and becomes sharply defined during a crisis making it more complex to analyse.  
 
The patron’s goals and the client’s threat level 
How much control the patron has depends on the goals sought and the client’s ability to 
fulfil them. The states’ goals are the starting point in the analysis. The patron wants to have 
some kind of control over the client, who is supposed to relinquish some of its autonomy. On 
the other hand, the Third World client is sensitive to «neo-colonial» control and tries to 
uphold its independence. The way it guards its autonomy may at times seem irrational. The 
conflicting goals makes the relationship unstable, however both states maintain the 
relationship as other objectives transcend the antagonism between them.  
 
The types of goals may be: 1. Ideological to show the superiority of the patron’s system; 2. 
international solidarity like voting at the UN, signing agreements, making visits between 
states of head and supporting international initiatives, the purpose is to give the impression 
that the client is part of its bloc and not the opposite, the patron will achieve more obvious 
and tangible benefits than in a relationship based on ideological goals; finally 3. Strategic 
advantage by controlling a piece of the client’s terrain, bases or another vital resource to 
gain a military edge over the opponent. When the patron possess goals of strategic 
                                                          
64 Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client State Relationships, 12-24.  
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advantage it will go far to preserve the relationship. It may even imply intervention though it 
is costly and difficult to project and maintain a force. As coercing is difficult, cajoling tactics 
may be the only available option for the patron. To achieve these goals, the patron may be 
willing to pay a steep price, and these relationships were a great danger to the stability of 
the international system.  
 
The client usually has very different goals, primarily because its military power is much 
smaller. As Third World states often exist in a very hostile environment, the patron can be a 
source for national survival. The threat level will shape the relationship. If the level is low, 
economic development, regional leadership and international prestige may be important in 
the relationship and the client may shop around with different patrons. If the threat level is 
high, the client is more willing to submit to the patron’s demands.  
 
Figure 1: A Patron-client typology65 
  
 
 High   I   II   III 
 
Client’s threat  
environment 
    IV   V   VI 
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    Ideology  International   Strategic  




The relation can be understood as a bargaining relationship where each state tries to 
achieve as many concessions as possible from the other. The key prizes are influence and 
control over resources. The more control the client has over the patron’s military and 
political resources, the greater risk for conflict on a global scale. When the patron sees 
strategic value in the relationship, he will give up most of the control. The client has most 
                                                          
65 Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client State Relationships, 23-24. 
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control when its environment of threat is modest or low. In consequence, the patron-client 
relations need to be examined by the underlying goals and threats. By combining the 
criteria, a typology with six different types of relationship can be established.  
In the first three types, the client is in a high-threat environment. As the client is insecure, it 
is highly dependent on the patron and is desperate for the patron to provide security, often 
of a military nature. The client is willing to concede extensive commitments to achieve 
security. In contrast, in the last three types, the client is less willing to accommodate. 
 
Patron-client typology66 
Type I: Patron centric. In this kind of relationship, the client conforms with the patron’s 
ideology. The patron controls the relationship and get huge ideological concessions.  
Type II: Patron prevalence. The patron demands that the client closely follows the patron’s 
international position. Type II is more valuable to the patron than type I, as it gives the 
patron advantages over its opponents.  
Type III: Influence parity. The patron’s goals are directly related to the competition with 
other patrons and it will go to great lengths, and incur great expense to maintain the 
relation. As both states press for advantages, rapid change marks the relationship. It gives 
the patron little room to disengage, and is the most dangerous type for global stability. 
Type IV: Patron and client indifference. It is not much valued by either state, and none of 
them will be very receptive to the other’s demands.  
Type V: Client prevalence. These relations are more important to the patron who is willing to 
invest more than in type IV. The client, who is not so interested, makes steeper demands, 
and increases its influence in comparison to the previous relationships.  
Type VI: Client centric. The patron gains a significant and measurable strategic advantage 
over its opposing patron through its ties with the client, who it values highly. The client does 
not face a major threat, and can negotiate from a position of strength. The client’s position 
improves further when it appears to be available to other patrons who are interested in 
bidding. Of all the types, this gives the client maximum influence over the patron and 
greatest access to its military and political resources. A conflict of this type is the most 
                                                          
66 Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client State Relationships, 26-44. 
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dangerous type for the international community as it is at great risk of escalating into a 
larger conflict, potentially involving the superpowers directly.  
 
Shoemaker and Spanier argued that the field of patron-client relations was underdeveloped 
and needed more study. This thesis aims to place where the Soviet-Syrian relation was in this 
typology.  
 
Outline of this thesis 
 
Chapter 2 will present a historical background with the parties’ long-term foreign policy 
strategies, key events and developments of their own history and relationships.  
 
There were basically three ways the USSR could influence Syria. A. Directly argue with and 
pressure Damascus to change policy, B. Directly support the PLO-LNM; or C. Pressure, invite 
or accept third parties to do the same. The means that Moscow had at its disposal were of 
diplomatic/political, military or economic nature. Consequently, this thesis is divided into 
these three forms of action. Chapter 3 focuses on the Soviet diplomatic and political policy 
towards Syria during the intervention in Lebanon. It has a chronological presentation 
including development of the fighting on the ground in Lebanon.  
 
Chapter 4 centres on military relations and is organized thematically in three themes: The 
Soviet military relations with Syria; the Soviet navy’s central role in the crisis; and finally the 
Soviet, Egyptian, Libyan and Iraqi involvement supporting the PLO-LNM. Soviet-Syrian 
economic and cultural relations comes next in chapter 5. In Chapters 3-5, I first present an 
overview of the research literature. Then, I analyze the events, and using the source material 
found, compare it with the literature and conclude on each topic.  
 
Finally, Chapter 6 sums up this thesis’s findings, compares them with the patron-client 
theory and concludes.  
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Chapter 2 Historical background 
 
Bilad al-Shaam, or Greater Syria as it is known in the West, is centrally placed in the Levant.67 
The region has few natural borders, is vulnerable to invasion from all directions and difficult 
to control from its centre.68 The Ottoman Empire conquered Greater Syria in 1516 and 
divided it into Vilayets or provinces, each ruled by a governor reporting to the Sultan in 
Istanbul. During periods, todays’ Lebanon and Palestine were under Damascus’ authority, 
while the northern areas were under the Aleppo province.69 The population was 
predominantly Arabic and Sunni Muslim, and the Ottomans based their rule on notables, 
wealthy Sunni Muslim families over the next four centuries.70 However, many minority 
groups, Christians, Druze and Shia Muslims lived in the region, including in the area of 
today’s Lebanon.71  
 
Russian, British and French Imperial interests 
 
Russian interests 
Russia‘s relations with the Middle East date back to the tenth century when the Byzantines 
baptized Vladimir, Grand Duke of Kiev.72 After the Turks conquered Constantinople in 1453, 
the Russian Church became the principal seat of Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Moscow 
declared itself the third Rome, assuming the functions of Constantinople.73 However, Russia 
was at the time too weak to fulfil its pretensions as heir of the Byzantines. From the 1550s 
onwards, the Grand Duchy of Moscow expanded in all directions. The Russians fought the 
Turks in thirteen wars during 1766 to 1914, and gained a number of concessions from 
Istanbul.74 
 
                                                          
67 The region includes today’s Syria, Turkey’s Hatay province, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Palestine. 
68 Bilad al-Shaam means the land to the left, because an Arab standing in Arabia facing north has Shaam to the left. In the West it has been 
called Greater Syria. McHugo, Syria, 35. 
69 The borders of the Vilayets and the subdivision Sanjak, were reorganized over time. 
70 Damascus was the capital of the vast Umayyad caliphate (661-750) and the Sultan ruled over areas from today’s Morocco to India. The 
Byzantine Empire was also known as Eastern Roman empire Based in the cities, but having vast landholdings in the countryside, the 
notables were intermediaries between the Ottomans and the people McHugo, Syria, 44. Notables were state administrators, landowners 
and religious leaders, but seldom military officers. 
71 The Christians were both Catholic and Orthodox. The Catholics came to be known as Maronites.  
72 Dannreuther, The Soviet Union and the PLO, 8.  
73 The Byzantine Empire is also known as the Eastern Roman Empire and Constantinople was considered to be the second Rome.  
74 Vego, «Soviet and Russian Strategy in the Mediterranean since 1945», 164-65. 
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The Russian interests were both strategic and religio-ideological. The basic strategic 
objective was to secure the southern borders against any hostile foreign power. It was ever 
since in Russian interest to keep stable and friendly relations with the nations on the 
borders, and that sometimes meant to extend the influence and expand.75 The Turkish 
Straits are the entrance and exit route for commercial and naval ships in the Black Sea. As 
Russia has no warm-water ports, the access to the Mediterranean has been especially 
important and Moscow wanted to secure access through, and possibly gain control over the 
Straits.  
 
Additionally, Moscow wanted to protect the large numbers of Orthodox Christians and 
Russian pilgrims travelling to the Holy Land.76 The Ottoman Empire recognised Russia as 
protector of the Greek Orthodox Church.77 Moscow supported the Arab Orthodox’ quest for 
independence from the Greek-dominated religious hierarchy. This underpinned the first 
Arab nationalist initiatives and freedom from Ottoman control. In 1915 during World War I, 
Russia gained the right to the left bank of the straits in a secret accord, the Constantinople 
agreement signed with Britain and France.78  
 
The French and British take control over the region 
Imperial France and the UK also had interests in the region and became more influential 
during the 19th century. France had cultural and economic relations with the coastal Syria 
and Lebanon and wanted to control the area.79 London’s top priority was to maintain a safe 
route to India through the Suez Canal, and keep any competing power including Russia out 
of the way. During a Civil War in Mount Lebanon in 1860, Druze forces massacred Christians. 
After strong French and British protests, the Ottoman Sultan created an autonomous 
administrative unit, a Mutasarrifate, called Mount Lebanon under a Christian leader. 
 
The UK and France fought the Ottoman Empire during World War I. To stimulate an Arab 
rebellion against the Ottomans, London promised the ruler of the Hejaz region in the 
                                                          
75 Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, 8-9.  
76 France became protector of the Catholic Churches. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon, 36.  
77 Russia set up a consulate to Syria and Palestine in Beirut in 1839 and the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society did charitable work and ran 
over 77 schools with 9.000 pupils by 1905. Vego, «Soviet and Russian Strategy in the Mediterranean since 1945», 164-65. 
78 The parties also made a vague compromise over the Palestinian Holy Places. Dannreuther, The Soviet Union and the PLO, 10-11. See 
original British archives. 
79 McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks, 367. 
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Arabian Peninsula, Sharif Hussein bin Ali Arab to rule over an Arab kingdom if he would rise 
up against the Turks.  The borders of 
this new kingdom were not clearly 
defined and have later been heavily 
disputed. The Sharif started a rebellion 
in 1916 and his eldest son, Feisal led an 
Arab military force against the 
Ottomans.  
 
At the same time, the UK and France 
secretly signed the Sykes-Picot 
agreement in 1916 dividing the 
Ottoman provinces into spheres of 
influence between themselves. And 
thirdly, the British government 
promised to work for a Jewish 
homeland in the Balfour-declaration in 
November 1917. The British army 
conquered most of the Ottoman Arab 
provinces, nevertheless an Arab army 
led by Feisal reached Damascus first.80  
Map: Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate.81 
 
The Syrian National Congress proclaimed Faisal King of Greater Syria in March 1920.82 
However, the League of Nations interfered and gave today’s Lebanon and Syria as a 
Mandate to France, and Palestine as a mandate to Britain.83 The Mandatory powers were 
obliged to prepare the mandates for independence, and had no rights to change the 
borders. Damascus under King Faisal opposed rule from Paris, but a token force was easily 
defeated by a French invading army in 1920. France split the mandate into semi-
                                                          
80 The Ottoman Arab provinces at the start of World War I consisted of today’s Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Hejaz (the Red sea coast of Saudi Arabia) and Northern Yemen. 
81 Wikipedia, «Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate». 
82 The Greater Syria encompassed today’s Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Palestine. McHugo, Syria, 65.  
83 The borders between the French and British mandates were renegotiated to accommodate British demands for oil in the Mosul province.  
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autonomous dependent «states» under their own control.84 Lebanon was constructed by 
adding Muslim areas to the Christian-dominated Mount Lebanon province. The French 
encouraged religious minorities to join the Troupes Speciales, which became the core of the 
Syrian army. With the army as a power base the Alawite minority, to which the Al-Assad 
family belongs, later took over the country.  
 
Further south, in Palestine the 
majority population was Muslim, 
while a small Jewish had existed 
there for centuries. Zionism 
started as nationalist ideology and 
movement in Europe in the 1880s 
with the aim of creating a country 
for the Jews. Waves of Jewish 
immigrants came to Palestine over 
the next decades. The Muslim 
population of Palestine opposed 
the increasing immigration and 
settlement, but to little avail. After 
the Nazi’s Holocaust, tens of 
thousands of Jewish survivors 
streamed to Palestine on a wave 
of sympathy from the Allies.   
Map: Territory of the Mutassarifate over a map of the current  
demographics of Lebanon.85 
 
The Soviet Union in the Middle East 
 
Soviet support of communist parties 
The 1917 October Revolution in Russia was welcomed by many people in the Middle East 
who saw it as a possibility to fulfil their national aspirations to rid themselves of Western 
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domination. After the revolution, the Bolsheviks government focused on winning the civil 
war and secure the Soviet state. The Bolshevik government condemned the Western 
dishonest diplomacy and denounced the Sykes-Picot agreement and other Imperial Russian 
agreements.86 The Bolshevik’s ideology was atheistic and they refrained from any interest in 
the Holy Land and the former Ottoman Empire.87  
 
Still, the leader of the October Revolution, Vladimir Lenin, appealed to the Arabs in 
December 1917 saying, «The Arabs, as well as all Muslims, had the right to be masters of 
their countries, and to decide their own destinies as they wished».88 The USSR refused to 
acknowledge the mandate system and concluded Friendship and brotherhood treaties with 
the Northern Tier countries, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. When the Communist 
International, Comintern, called on the Muslim peoples to attend a congress in Baku in 1921 
it stated: 89   
«…Peasants of Syria and Arabia! The English and French have promised you independence but now 
their troops have occupied your country, imposing upon you their own laws; and you, after liberating 
yourselves from the Turkish Sultan and Government, have become the slaves of Paris and London 
governments, the only difference from the Sultan being that they will keep a stronger hold on you and 
will plunder you more effectively».  
 
Communist parties were established in Palestine in 1923, and Syria-Lebanon in 1924 and 
were recognized by the Comintern.90 Still, in 1928, industrialization in the Arab world was 
low and the proletariat constituted a small group. Labour movements were nascent, met 
strong opposition from the mandate powers and the ideological message of the communists 
was too narrow to attract the peasant masses, still they endured the 1930s and 1940s.91  
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The start of the Cold War 
After World War II Stalin became more active in the Middle East. In 1946, the USSR claimed 
that France and the UK did not have any justification to keep their troops in Syria and 
Lebanon.92 The mandate powers pulled out and Syria and Lebanon became independent 
republics in 1946. The year after Moscow voted for the UN Partition Plan of Palestine. Stalin 
was still caught in a traditional anti-British strategy, and probably voted for the creation of 
Israel to weaken the UK and hoped to win a new client for the USSR. The 1948 Arab-Israeli 
War resulted in the creation of Israel and the exodus of approximately 750,000 Palestinians 
to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The Soviet policy quickly reversed, and became pro-Arab and 
anti-Israeli, which it stayed for 40 years.  
 
As the grip of the old colonial powers, the UK and France, rapidly decreased in the Middle 
East, the two superpowers tried to win their own allies, and the region became a central 
arena in the Cold War, which became a framework for international politics from the late 
1940s. After Stalin’s death in 1953, the new First Secretary of the USSR Communist Party 
Nikita Khrushchev changed the policy of Socialism in one country, chose to support Arab-
nationalist regimes, and managed to establish good relations with the authorities in 
Damascus and Cairo.  
 
The newly founded Syrian republic was badly prepared for governing and democracy and 
quickly became embroiled in regional and Cold War struggles. Small but ideologically radical 
Ba'ath, pan-Arab and communist parties competed for power in Syria in the 1950s.93 Egypt, 
Iraq and other Arab countries rivalled to become the regional hegemon and interfered in 
Syria to promote their own interests. Democratic channels for expression of political debate 
did not develop; on the contrary, military officers took power in frequent coups.    
 
The Soviet-Egyptian relation blossoms 
In 1952, a revolution in Egypt brought the anti-British Free Officers to power.94 However, it 
was not until after Stalin’s death in 1953 that the USSR became interested in the bourgeoisie 
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nationalist Arab regimes who sought non-alignment in the Cold War. The new Soviet leader 
Khrushchev started a new policy of «peaceful coexistence» with the West. While the US was 
not interested in the Arabs demand in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was crucial to the Arabs. 
The Russians tried to win over the Arabs by taking a clear pro-Arab position in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged as the strong leader of Egypt and in 1955, he 
signed a US$250 million Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal which was seen as a dramatic 
entry of the USSR in the region. The Soviet Union had no history of colonialism and its anti-
imperialist policy suited the anti-colonial position of the nationalist Arab regimes. After the 
US refused to finance the construction of the huge Aswan dam, Moscow offered loans and 
this sealed the friendship.  
 
Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956 and Israel invaded Egypt in collusion with the UK 
and France. Initially the USSR did not want to take a military risk and only offered political 
support by referring the crisis to the UN Security Council.95 After the US reacted strongly 
against the UK-France scheming, a Soviet ultimatum was presented. This demonstrated that 
the objective of avoiding a confrontation with the US was more important than improving 
the Soviet position with the Arabs.  
 
The Soviet-Syrian cooperation starts 
It was actually Damascus, not Cairo that broke the Western monopoly of arms sales to the 
Middle East when the Syrian army purchased tanks from Czechoslovakia in 1954.96 As a part 
of the US strategy of contain the USSR and encircle it by a chain of allies, the Baghdad Pact 
was created in 1955. Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan became members, and both Syria and 
Lebanon were invited to take part. Egypt under the pan-Arab President Nasser refused to 
become a member. In February 1955, a crisis over the Baghdad Pact arose as Turkey and Iraq 
massed troops on the Syrian border.97 The USSR publicly took Syria under its protection and 
declared that Western interests were in conflict with those of the Middle Eastern states.98 
The Syrian government thanked the USSR and the two parties moved closer.  
 
                                                          
95 Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, 49. 
96 The tanks were former German Mark IV-tanks. Seale, The Struggle for Syria, 234. 
97 Seale, The Struggle for Syria, 234. 
98 Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian relationship since 1955, 15-16. 
28 
 
In 1958, the Syrian Ba’ath Party were increasingly rivalling with the Communist Party, and 
the former were afraid the latter would take power.99 The Ba’ath leaders contacted Nasser 
who was pan-Arabist and ruthlessly anti-communist. Nasser agreed to become the leader of 
a union between the two countries, the United Arab Republic (UAR). The Russians were 
disappointed about the UAR, but publicly applauded it. All Syrian political parties, including 
the Communist Party were prohibited. To Moscow’s relief a revolution in Bagdad in 1958 
ousted the Western-friendly government in Iraq and a regime friendly to the USSR took over. 
 
In Syria there were misgivings with Nasser’s rule and after a military coup in 1961 the new 
regime ended the UAR.100 The Russians maintained relations but were not involved in the 
domestic upheavals. Two years later, in 1963 the Ba’ath Party took power in Damascus. 
Ideologically it was nationalist, socialist and basically anti-communist. Nevertheless, the 
Ba’athists were clearly anti-Western and they sought improved relations with the USSR. The 
left wing of the Ba’ath party made a coup in 1966 and received Soviet economic, political 
and military support.  
 
The importance of the Mediterranean to the USSR 
Soviet influence in the Middle East increased and the region’s importance grew for Moscow 
during the 1960s.101 In 1964, Khrushchev was removed, and Brezhnev came to power, 
nevertheless Moscow’s position in the region was clearly stronger than it had been ten years 
earlier. The Bagdad Pact was all but destroyed after Iraq withdrew from it, the USSR 
maintained diplomatic relations with almost all Arab states and Western influence had 
diminished. The USSR gave economic and military aid to several countries, in spite of this, in 
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Algeria, communist parties remained illegal and many communists 
were jailed.  
 
Meanwhile in the Mediterranean the US 6th fleet deployed submarines armed with Polaris 
missiles that could hit targets in the USSR. The USSR responded by establishing a 
Mediterranean squadron, the Fifth Eskadra to cope with this threat in 1964. The expanded 
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fleet needed access to naval bases, and increased Soviet arms supplies to Egypt was 
rewarded when Nasser granted the USSR access to Egyptian ports and airfields in 1966.102   
 
The 1967 Six Day War  
In June 1967 Israel made a pre-emptive attack on Egypt and Syria.103 The USSR severed its 
diplomatic relations with Israel and threatened to take military actions, but showed no 
willingness to risk a confrontation with the US, and the Soviet armed Arab states were 
defeated. Israel occupied the Syrian Golan Heights, the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip.  In addition to a Soviet lack of support to its clients during the war, 
the quality of the Soviet arms and training was questioned. At the same time, the US’s 
position declined in the radical Arab states and Moscow mounted an immediate and massive 
resupply of Syria and Egypt and redoubled its efforts to oust Western influence.104  
 
The USSR sought a political solution to the Arab states’ conflict with Israel and urged them to 
recognize Israel in exchange for return of the territories lost in 1967.105 However, the 1967 
Arab summit in Khartoum responded with no peace, no recognition and no negotiations 
with Israel. Moscow ignored this and tried to coordinate and unite the Arab states in a 
political solution. The USSR worked out the UN Security Council Resolution 242 (UNSCR 242) 
in November 1967. UNSCR 242 included an Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 
the recent conflict and recognition of Israel as a state. UNSCR 242 was accepted by Egypt, 
Jordan and Israel, but not by Syria or the PLO.  
 
The Arabs sought to reclaim the lost territory and Egypt launched a War of Attrition in 
1969.106 In 1970, Nasser and the Kremlin agreed that the USSR would assume responsibility 
for Egypt’s air defense, and 15,000-20,000 Soviet military advisers were sent to Egypt. Sadat 
asked the USSR for offensive weapons, however, the Kremlin which was in a process of 
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reaching a détente, an easing in relations, with the US, refused. He gave the Kremlin an 
ultimatum, either they supported him, or he would seek American mediation in the conflict 
with Israel. The Russians responded by signing a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with 
Egypt in May 1971. Sadat said the USSR continued to refuse to deliver missiles and aircraft, 
and in 1972, he expelled around 20,000 Soviet military advisers.  
 
The creation of the PLO and the Soviet relation to it 
The Palestinian question was a dominant feature of Middle Eastern politics for decades and 
most Arab governments played the Palestinian card to promote their own interests. 
However, after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the USSR looked upon the Palestinian issue as a 
refugee problem.107 Syria on the other hand had fought in 1948 on the Arab/Palestinian side. 
From 1964, Damascus worked closely with the largest Palestinian guerrilla organization 
Fatah, and its leader Yasser Arafat.108 Among the Fatah founders, there were many Muslim 
Brotherhood sympathisers.109 
 
In 1964 the Arab League and Egyptian president Gamal Nasser took the initiative to create 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). As its armed wing, the Palestinian Liberation 
Army (PLA) was established with units formed in some Arab countries.110 The Syrians formed 
the Hittin Brigade as part of the PLA, recruiting Palestinians living in Syria. In addition, the 
regime in Damascus created as-Sai’qa as the Palestinian wing of the Syrian Ba’ath Party in 
1966. 111 By the end of 1968 as-Sai’qa was a well-equipped force with over 5,000 men. 112 
The Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was created by the Arab League summit in 1964 as the 
military unit of the PLO.113 
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The Soviet Union didn’t react to the founding of the PLO and condemned most of its armed 
actions.114 In 1968, Moscow changed policy when Fatah leader Arafat was secretly invited to 
Moscow as part of Nasser’s delegation. Fatah joined the PLO in 1969 and Arafat became PLO 
Chairman with Egyptian support. The PLO was an umbrella organization, consisting of 
several groups with different ideologies, from centre-right to Marxist. The PLO had bases in 
Lebanon form where it attacked Israel. The Lebanese government wanted to limit the 
Palestinian activities and in 1969 signed an agreement with the PLO, the Cairo Agreement, 
which regulated Palestinian activities in Lebanon.   
 
The PLO had a very strong position in Jordan, but this was to change. The PLO attacked Israel 
from Jordanian bases but King Hussein also felt his own position threatened. In September 
1970, a Civil War erupted between the Jordanian army and the PLO.115 The Syrian army 
intervened in support of the PLO, but the minister of Defence Hafez al-Asad, refused to send 
in the air force. Israel and possibly the US threatened to intervene, and the USSR pressured 
Syria to withdraw. Nasser mediated in the conflict, but in the middle of the negotiations, he 
died and Anwar Sadat became Egyptian President. The PLO was defeated and several 
thousand soldiers moved to Lebanon. Relations between the King Hussein and Arafat were 
strained over the next years.  
 
In Syria another Ba’ath party crisis erupted after the Jordanian Civil War.116 The Defense 
Minister Hafez al-Assad ousted the pro-Soviet leader Salah Jadid in November 1970 in an 
intra-party coup. Before taking power, Assad was regarded as a jealous guardian of Syrian 
independence and an anti-Communist.117 In spite of this, Assad stayed close to Moscow 
though he refused to enter a Friendship and Cooperation agreement with the USSR. 
However, Syrian relations with Jordanian improved and by the mid-1970s, Hussein 
cooperated closely with Assad. 
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Soviet high point and expulsion from Egypt 
The high-point of Soviet influence in the Middle East was regarded as the time before 
Nasser’s death in 1970.118 Nonetheless, Moscow paid a price in increased economic and 
military aid. There was also a higher risk of war with the US at a time when the Sino-Soviet 
struggle intensified.119 Egypt had been regarded as the strongest military Arab power and 
was a Soviet client in the 1960s. In July 1972, Sadat expelled the Soviet advisors in Egypt. 120 
The shocked Russians increased their support of Syria, Iraq and the PLO to reduce the 
political losses and main its influence in the region.  
 
The 1973 Yom Kippur War  
In 1973 Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in the Yom Kippur War, and after initial successes 
their armies recovered some respect after the colossal defeat in the June 1967 War. In 
December 1973, the USSR and the US co-chaired a one-day peace conference in Geneva. The 
Russians considered this as very important as they were given equal status as the US in the 
negotiations. It became a primary Soviet goal to reconvene the Geneva conference and bring 
the Syrians and the PLO there to strengthen Moscow’s position. However, to Soviet 
disappointment US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took centre stage in 1974-75 with a 
very active shuttle diplomacy between Cairo, Tel Aviv and Damascus. President Sadat 
considered the US to be the only power to have influence over the Israelis. He ended the 
close relations with the USSR, and made a disengagement agreements, Sinai I, on Israeli 
withdrawals from parts of the Sinai.121 
 
The Soviet Middle East strategy 
The Kremlin developed one overall policy to overcome all the problems, to encourage Arab 
unity on an «anti-imperialist» basis.122 The USSR would cement together the Arab states 
communist parties and organizations like the PLO in a united front against Israel and its 
Western supporters. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, it seemed to succeed as nearly all 
Arab states backed Egypt and Syria against Israel and the USSR resupplied them with 
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weapons and supported them politically. The Arab states imposed an oil embargo against 
the US and which caused a sharp price increase on oil and economic problems.  
 
The US Foreign Secretary Henry Kissinger rebuilt the US position in the region by a very 
active diplomacy. Kissinger succeeded in negotiating disengagement agreements between 
Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria in 1974. The Russians were excluded from this process 
and opposed further disengagement, however in August 1975 Egypt and Israel agreed to a 
second accord, the Sinai II agreement. Egypt, that had once been the closest Soviet ally, 
moved over to the US side and formed a conservative axis with Saudi Arabia. They 
attempted to attract neutral and pro-Soviet Arab states. The Kremlin tried to stop other 
states from defecting to the Saudi-Egyptian camp and reconstruct the Arab unity front, 
which had fallen apart. Syria, which was building closer economic ties with the West, 
became the primary Soviet concern. However, the Soviet client state Iraq, which the 
Russians tried to include in the anti-imperialist front, was an enemy of Syria. Libya was 
moving closer to Moscow, but had strained relations with Syria, and was almost breaking 
relations with Egypt.  
 
The Lebanese Civil War  
 
In Lebanon tensions between different political and ethnoreligious groups built up during 
the early 1970s and these exploded in a Civil War in 1975. The PLO sided with the Lebanese 
National Movement (LNM) against Lebanon’s leading political force, the Christian Maronites, 
a Catholic group supported by France and the West. 123 The LNM was a leftist coalition 
including the Lebanese Communist Party. The movement, led by Kamal Jumblatt, a Druze, 
called for political reforms. Two of the PLO groups, the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), were 
Marxist. They had for years showed a pro-Maoist tendency, inclined towards the Chinese 
Communist Party, a rival of the Soviet Communist Party.124 The DFLP and PFLP had come 
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closer to the USSR by the time of the Lebanese Civil War, but were not strong enough to 
challenge Fatah. 
 
The Egyptian-Israeli agreement of September 1975 and increased fighting in Lebanon led to 
increased Syrian insecurity.125 Assad sent in two battalions, one of the PLA and one of as-
Sai’qa in late September to stop hostilities in Tripoli. The Lebanese government asked for the 
withdrawal of the forces and 
Assad complied. Later Christian 
forces launched an offensive and 
Syria feared a division of 
Lebanon was possible. On 19 
January 1976 Syria sent the 
Yarmouq Brigade  of the PLA into 
Lebanon. The USSR showed little 
interest in Lebanon until the Civil 
War.126 Even then, Soviet media 
coverage was meagre. The 
Soviet Union agreed to the 
Syrian intervention because 
Moscow wanted to prevent the 
Christians from defeating the 
LNM-PLO. 
 
 Map: Some of the events in the 1960s and 70s involving Syria and Lebanon127. 
 
The first Syrian intervention in Lebanon 
In January 1976 made its first intervention in Lebanon.128 Until then Syria had given both 
political and military support to PLO-LNM. The LNM wanted a much greater portion of 
power in Lebanon while the PLO sought to use the country as a base for attacking Israel. The 
PLO and LNM joined to confront the Lebanese Christians who wanted to maintain the status 
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quo and expel the PLO. After the Lebanese Civil War intensified in the summer of 1975, the 
USSR showed its preference for the PLO-LNM hoping it could shift Lebanon from the pro-
Western to the pro-Soviet camp. This consisted of Syria, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, Algeria 
and the PLO. The PLO was one of the Soviet main allies and Jumblatt had won the Lenin 
prize. Jumblatt was interior minister and legalized the Lebanese Communist Party in 1970.  
 
Syria on the other hand was the USSR’s main ally and appeared to be the Palestinians 
leading champion. 129 One of the strong groups within the PLO was al-Sai’qa, which Syria 
dominated, nevertheless, as-Sai’qa was not allowed to attack Israel. Several brigades of the 
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), under control of a Syrian officer Masbah al-Budeiry, were 
also stationed in Syria. On 20 January 1976 Syria sent several PLA battalions into Lebanon to 
stop fighting. This led to the signing of an agreement with a more equal power sharing 
between Christians and Muslims.130 Moscow hailed the Syrian moves who claimed that Israel 
and the imperialists wanted the Civil War in Lebanon to strike at the PLO and set up a 
separate Christian state which together with Israel would fight the Arab peoples. During the 
25th Communist Party Congress on 24 February, Brezhnev said in a keynote address that the 
USSR acted in concert with Syria on many international problems, above all those of the 
Middle East.  
 
Three weeks later Sadat abrogated the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship treaty signed in 1971.131 
Meanwhile in Lebanon, the LNM was not satisfied with the agreement and the PLO 
concerned with Syrian control over the Palestinians. Muslim members of the Lebanese Army 
defected and a rebel Muslim «Lebanese Arab Army» was created. The regular army started 
to disintegrate and the commander of the Beirut garrison made a coup demanding the 
resignation of the President Suleiman Frangieh and Prime Minister Rashid Karami. Two-
thirds of the Lebanese Parliament made a petition calling for Frangieh’s resignation.  
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Syria, using as-Sai’qa troops stopped an intent by the rebel army to capture the president. 
Jumblatt stated there would be no ceasefire until Frangieh resigned and major political 
changes took place. The Muslim forces continued its offensive in the mountains and took 
over the Beirut-Damascus highway.132 It seemed like partition of Lebanon was a real 
possibility with a Christian mini-state in the north and a leftist state in the south. Possibly the 
PLO-LNM could take over the whole country. Such a state would likely have close 
connections with Iraq and Libya and would permit PLO attacks against Israel. Tel Aviv might 
invade Lebanon to stop this and Syrian was not ready for a war against Israel. Assad cut the 
military supplies to the Palestinians and blocked Lebanese ports at the end of March and 
pressured the PLO to stop aiding the LNM. 133 Assad sent troops across the border a week 
later and supported a truce that had been agreed upon recently.  
 
For the Russians the Lebanese events threatened to split its two main Arab allies, Syria and 
the PLO, and between the Kremlin’s friend Jumblatt and Syria. Making the situation worse 
the US became more involved in Lebanon. Washington sent a special envoy, Dean Brown to 
Lebanon to mediate the conflict, and the US Sixth Fleet was stationed off the coast in case of 
an evacuation of US citizens.134 As the US and Syria had coinciding interests in restricting the 
PLO-LNM, the Kremlin must have been fearing they were coordinating activities. Kissinger 
called the Syrian intervention «constructive» on 14 April, and the US helped to prevent Israel 
from reacting militarily against Syria.  
 
Still, the fighting continued in the middle of presidential elections. Then Moscow presented 
a peace plan for the Middle East on 29 April, using the Civil War in Lebanon as a reason, in 
spite of this fighting increased.135 Elias Sarkis won the 8 May elections, which Arafat 
supported and Jumblatt boycotted, splitting the PLO-LNM.136 Jumblatt’s relations with Assad 
worsened, while Arafat continued to meet the Syrian president. To counter the Syrian 
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pressure Arafat approached Sadat, and then he praised Moscow to balance his move 
towards Cairo. 
 
For the USSR more trouble was coming as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait tried to mediate the 
Syria-Egyptian conflict by inviting Assad and Sadat to meet in Riyad in May. After the 
increase in oil prices, Riyad possessed a huge new oil wealth, was clearly an allied of the US 
and was Moscow’s regional nemesis. Afraid the Saudis might pull Syria over to their side, 
Moscow criticized the Saudi mediation, and to the Kremlin’s relief the meeting was 
cancelled. 
 
Meanwhile in Lebanon the relations between the PLO and Syria were deteriorating.137 
Another intent of mediation was made by the Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Jalloud who 
followed Arafat to meet Assad in Damascus. Soon a statement said that Libya, Iraq and 
Algeria had formed an alliance with the PLO-LNM.138 Fighting in Lebanon increased and 
France offered to send troops. It was at this point that the Kremlin decided to send Kosygin 
to Bagdad and Damascus, probably to reconcile Iraq and Syria and reunite Syria with the 
PLO-LNM. On 26 May, Dean Brown said that the US «made a mistake» by discouraging Syria 
from sending forces to Lebanon in April. Two days later Assad agreed to renew, without any 
conditions, the UN observers on the Golan Heights.139 On 29 May, a Syrian controlled 
newspaper wrote that Syria would join the rejectionist front with Libya, Iraq, Algeria and 
other states against Israel.140  
                                                          
137 Syria controlled PLA-forces fought Iraqi leftist forces in the northern town of Tripoli on 14 May. Arafat ordered the PLA to withdraw, 
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Chapter 3 The USSR from confused to critical to resigned 
 
On 1 June, Syria invaded Lebanon and the Kremlin was challenged as two clients fought each 
other. This chapter reviews some of the Soviet and Syrian main statements, negotiations, 
assessments of and messages to each other. The fighting on the ground in Lebanon is laid 
out chronologically as a background for the discussion. 
 
The period viewed in the research literature 
 
The Soviet view of Cold War competition in the Middle East 
One of the questions discussed in the research literature has been what the overall Soviet 
policy goals and results in the Middle East were. According to Robert Freedman, there were 
three Western schools of thought about this.141 The first view sees Moscow as being 
«offensive-successful» as the USSR aimed at and succeeded in ousting the West from the 
region. The second school he calls «defensive-unsuccessful», as it viewed the Kremlin on the 
defensive and not able to cope with the problems. The final group, to which Freedman 
belongs, viewed the USSR as «offensive-unsuccessful», as it used every opportunity to oust 
the West, but failed in doing so.  
James Collins argues that the Soviet influence in the Middle East and especially in Syria and 
Egypt had declined since the early 1970s. Still, the USSR had impressive advantages and 
attempted to win back what had been lost.142 To Moscow, the Lebanese Civil War was a 
problem as it damaged the Soviet position in the whole Fertile Crescent and weakened the 
hope to maintain the Arab regimes favorable to the USSR united. Ilana Kass sees Moscow’s 
and Damascus’ goals converging on establishing a Syria-sponsored northern Arab front; 
isolate Egypt and tame the PLO to make it more amenable to the USSR’s line. 143  
 
Did the USSR have prior knowledge about the Syrian invasion? 
Another question has been whether the USSR knew about and approved the Syrian invasion 
in Lebanon in advance. The majority of writers see the invasion as a Syrian decision and that 
Kosygin was met with a fait accompli. Freedman says that Assad, unfortunately for the 
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142 Collins, «The Soviet Union», 209. 
143 Kass, «Moscow and the Lebanese triangle», 172. 
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Russians, ordered the invasion when Kosygin was in flight to Damascus.144 Ramet and Collins 
see the invasion as highly embarrassing for Moscow.145 In addition, Collins thinks Assad 
timed the invasion with Kosygin’s visit. Golan concludes that the Syrians timed the invasion 
to prevent any Soviet interference.146  
 
In contrast, Efraim Karsh, as one of only two authors of books on Soviet-Syria relations, in his 
1988 book, claims it was unthinkable that the USSR did not know about the invasion.147 
Karsh argues that Assad held several consultations with external actors in May 1976, 
including at least one meeting with the Soviet ambassador to Damascus. According to Karsh, 
the USSR supported the Syrian intervention by doubling the presence of surface combatant 
ships in the Mediterranean between 28 May and 4 June.148 He argues it was meant to warn 
the US about interference in Lebanon. In 2015, Karsh writes that the invasion of Lebanon 
was against Soviet wishes, but Assad «had no reason to anticipate a Soviet-Syrian rift».149  
 
Of all the researchers, Ilana Kass gives the most extensive discussion to the question of 
Soviet involvement of the invasion. Kass titles her chapter about the invasion «From 
neutrality to collusion» and calls the relation a Soviet-Syrian collusion and Soviet support of 
Syria’s anti-Palestinian policy.150 She asserts that although it was «virtually impossible to 
determine whether and to what extent Moscow was a party to Assad’s decision to invade 
Lebanon, one might safely assume that the decision itself did not take the Kremlin by 
surprise».151 Kass argues that the Soviet ambassadors to Damascus and Beirut had been 
actively involved in the crisis and that USSR had an extensive presence in Syria and to a 
lesser degree in Lebanon. She finds no explanation for the doubling of Soviet naval combat 
ships in the Mediterranean, and speculates that it was at least meant to back the Syrian 
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146 Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, 151.  
147 Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria, 32. 
148 Karsh refers to an International Herald Tribune article dated 5 May 1976. The right dating is probably 5 June as the article refers to 
events taking place at the beginning of June. Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria, 33. Earlier Karsh had argued that Assad presented 
Kosygin with a fait accompli. «President Asad, however, did not appear overly bothered by Soviet reservations regarding his Lebanese 
policy, and when Premier Kosygin arrived in Damascus on June 1, Asad presented him with a fait accompli». Karsh, «Influence Through 
Arms Supplies: The Soviet Experience in the Middle East », 51. 1986.  
149 Karsh, The tail wags the dog, 4 and 90.  
150 Kass, «Moscow and the Lebanese triangle», 166, 181-82.  
151 As the only writer, Kass gives 31 May as the day of invasion instead of 1 June. According to Kass, a Syrian armored regiment with 2,000 
troops and 60 tanks entered Lebanon on 31 May. She further reflects Karsh’s argument about Syrian vacillation during the intervention 
and cites a US Defense Department spokesman’s statement about the number of Soviet ships. As Karsh, she refers to a 5 May article in 
The International Herald Tribune. She also refers to Belgrade Domestic Service. Kass, «Moscow and the Lebanese triangle», 171-73. 
40 
 
forces entering Lebanon psychologically. Kass goes further and interprets the formidable 
task force as a signal to the West to stay away and ensure Syria’s freedom of action.152  
 
The first Soviet reactions 
There are also differing views about the Soviet reactions after the invasion occurred. 
Freedman and Karsh interpret the joint communique issued at the end of Kosygin’s 
Damascus visit as a tacit Soviet support of the Syrians.153 Ramet investigated articles in nine 
Soviet newspapers in the week following the invasion, and finds divergent opinions.154 Kass 
thinks the USSR supported the invasion.155  
 
On 9 June, the Soviet news agency TASS made a statement calling for an end to the 
bloodshed in Lebanon.156 The research literature has described this as the turning point in 
Soviet reactions, but the explanations for the change vary. Ramet concludes that by the 9 
June the Kremlin had reached a consensus to oppose the invasion.157 Freedman sees it both 
as a reaction to the Syrians directly fighting the PLO-LNM after 7 June, and as a warning to 
the Western powers to not intervene.158 Karsh and Kass on the other hand think the 
Russians changed opinion as a result of disappointment with the Syrian intervention which 
seemed to be indecisive and worsened the situation in Lebanon.159 
 
On 11 June, the Soviet Union announced the opening of a PLO office in Moscow. The 
decision to establish a PLO office had been declared in 1974. Golan sees the opening as a 
clear compensatory gesture to King Hussein who visited Moscow in June.160 In contrast, 
Collins considers the opening a symbolic gesture to the Palestinians.161  
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The July talks fails, and the USSR increases the pressure on Syria 
The Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam went to Moscow on 5-8 July and held talks with Soviet 
leaders about Lebanon. The literature agrees that the meeting was a failure, but few details 
were given.162 There is disagreement about the goals of, and who took the initiative to the 
meeting. Freedman writes that Khaddam was invited to Moscow to show the PLO that the 
Kremlin made some activity.163 Collins agrees that Khaddam was invited, but to set forth the 
Soviet views and clarify Syria’s intentions. 164 Karsh claims Khaddam was summoned.165  
 
The day after Khaddam left, on 9 July, the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) 
made a declaration on Lebanon.166 The AAPSO was a communist front organization aiming to 
increase Soviet influence in the Third World.167 The declaration was published in Pravda, the 
official newspaper of the Soviet Communist Party. Freedman considers the criticism as 
relatively mild, and not strong enough to satisfy the PLO.168 Kass thought the Kremlin was 
caught between Assad and Arafat and had yet not taken a final stance.169 Karsh and Collins 
do not mention AAPSO’s statement. The latter regards the Soviet policy as monotonous for 
the rest of the summer, almost completely reactive and resigned to the sidelines.170 
 
On 20 July the French newspaper Le Monde published an alleged letter from Soviet General 
Secretary Brezhnev to Assad, dated 11 July. In the letter, the USSR asked Syria to pull out of 
Lebanon. Freedman is uncertain about the authenticity of the letter, but notes that 
increased, though limited, Soviet criticism of Syria followed.171 Kass calls the letter an 
attempt to pressure both Syria and the PLO as a desperate effort to get out of a very difficult 
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situation.172 According to Karsh, Assad was offended by what he perceived as unjust 
criticism, but ignored it and intensified the Lebanese military campaign.173  
 
The Syria-Palestinian agreement 
On the ground in Lebanon, fighting continued through June and July. Syria and the PLO 
negotiated, and signed a ceasefire agreement on 29 July. Freedman comments the Soviet 
positive response to both the reconciliation process and the agreement.174 Collins sees 
Moscow routinely welcoming the agreement, and notes it was the only sign of hope that 
summer.175 He is the only writer who refers to reports that the USSR had been involved in 
the talks. Kass thinks the agreement confirmed Syria’s predominant role in Lebanon.176 She 
further saw a vested Soviet interest in a Syria-Palestinian rapprochement to avoid choosing 
between the two.   
 
In Beirut, the Christians renewed attacks on Tel al-Zaatar, a large Palestinian refugee camp, 
and after a six months siege, the camp fell on 12 August.177 Hundreds of Palestinians and 
Lebanese were massacred. Kass notes that two days after the fall of Tel al-Zaatar a Pravda 
commentary called for a «healthy compromise».178 Freedman says PLO leader Salah Khalaf 
complained about the Soviet request for the PLO to make an agreement with Syria.179 From 
Moscow, the Soviet Afro-Asian solidarity Committee came out with another statement, 
appealing for a Syrian withdrawal and restoring Arab anti-imperialist unity.  
 
The Kremlin becomes more critical of the PLO-LNM 
On 8 September, Pravda printed an Observer article.180 Kass sees this as the Communist 
Party censuring «certain leftist elements within the Palestinian movement and the National 
Patriotic Forces for their intransigence and outright rejection of all peace proposals».181 Kass 
thought that Moscow slowly concluded that imposing a Pax Syriana, although the PLO would 
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have to give huge concessions, was the only way to save the PLO from being destroyed. 
Reconciling the PLO and Syria would secure Soviet regional interests of separating Damascus 
and Washington and room to refocus on the Geneva peace conference. Freedman primarily 
regards the article as a continued attack on Syria.182 He also notes the warning to the «ultra 
leftist» elements within the PLO-LNM.  
 
Kass writes that the Kremlin took a mediation initiative in mid-September.183 Gromyko met 
the PLO leader Farouk al-Kaddoumi in Moscow.184 Kass regards this and a series of meetings 
between Arafat and the Soviet Chargé d’affaires in Beirut, as an attempt to convince the PLO 
to compromise with Syria. Freedman thinks Kaddoumi went to Moscow to clarify the Soviet 
policy. As the joint statement had no call for a Syrian withdrawal, he speculates that the 
Kremlin might have given up the hope. Collins regards that the Soviet propaganda became 
more pro-Palestinian and critical of Syria.185 Nevertheless, it did not take positions on the 
conditions for a Syria-Palestinian reconciliation or publicize the PLO’s demands for Soviet 
suspension of military and economic aid.  
 
In Lebanon, Sarkis finally replaced Frangieh as president on 23 September. Kass notes that 
the USSR seemed to succeed as Arafat on 24 September announced a unilateral stop in the 
fighting and pledged support for Sarkis.186 The next day Assad held a speech justifying Syria’s 
presence in Lebanon and accusing «certain Palestinian leaders» for falling into a trap set by 
the imperialist, published in Soviet media. Collins regards the period around Sarkis’ 
inauguration as the USSR’s last effort to influence the Lebanese Civil War.187 Moscow 
markedly changed its public stance by stipulating acceptance of Syrian forces to stay in 
Lebanon and for the first time condemned Palestinian extremists and rejectionists.  
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Syrian offensives and a Soviet peace proposal collapses 
The Russian were once more overtaken by events when Palestinians took over the 
Semiramis Hotel in Damascus on 26 September says Freedman.188 Syria reacted by launching 
an offensive against the PLO-LNM, demanding unconditional surrender and withdrawal of its 
forces. The Russians responded with another Afro-Asian solidarity committee statement, the 
strongest so far. The other authors do not mention the Semiramis attack. Kass sees the 
Syrian offensive as encouraged by PLO and Soviet acquiescence.189 Moscow, however, 
became bewildered by the Syrian onslaught.  
 
Within a few days, the Kremlin launched another Middle East peace initiative on 2 October. 
Freedman sees it as a reaction to threats to the Soviet policy. The Syrians halted the attack 
and started to negotiate with the PLO. Soon, new Palestinian attacks against the Syrian 
embassies in Italy and Pakistan led to a renewed Syrian offensive. The Soviet leaders reacted 
angrily with an 18 October Pravda article requesting a truce. Kass regards that the Syrian 
offensive destroyed the possibility to gather in Geneva in the October-November time-frame 
the Kremlin had set.190 The collapse of the Geneva-talks distorted the image of the USSR as a 
credible coordinator and a partner of the peace process. 
 
The Arab League agrees to a cease-fire at summits 
Meanwhile, as the Soviet mediation completely failed, the Arab league intensified its efforts 
and paved the way for a Saudi brokered agreement.191 The heads of state of Egypt, Syria, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait met Arafat and Sarkis in Riyad on 16 October and worked out an 
agreement.192 After fifty-six unsuccessful attempts, this cease-fire was relatively effective. A 
30,000 man strong Arab Deterrence Force (ADF) would keep order and security in Lebanon. 
The Syrian troops constituted the main part of the ADF, which included symbolic units from 
Saudi Arabia, the two Yemeni states, and the United Arab Emirates were included.193 Ten 
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days later the Cairo summit ratified the Riyad summit’s agreement and secured Syria a free 
hand in Lebanon. In mid-November the Arab Deterrence Force (ADF) entered West-Beirut. 
 
Total period in the research period 
Freedman concludes that the successful Saudi Arabian mediation and Syria-Egyptian 
reconciliation demonstrated Riyad’s increasing influence in the region and this concerned 
the Kremlin. 194 He says Moscow was unable to control Syria’s military operations in spite of 
its dependence on the USSR. On the other hand Assad did not follow Sadat into the US 
camp. The Syrian periodic offensives and halts, suggest that Assad did not want to liquidate 
the PLO but change its course and this must have been reassuring for Moscow. Nevertheless, 
the Kremlin had time and again been caught off-guard, and Brezhnev’s claim of the two 
countries working in concert was mocked. He sees the Soviet policy as reactive, unable to 
shape events according to its own goals.  
 
Syria on the other hand was able to manipulate the USSR to grant it military support by 
making use of the Soviet-US rivalry. Afraid of losing Syria to the other camp, the Kremlin 
tolerated the Syrians pressure of the PLO. Moscow neither succeeded in reconciling Iraq and 
Syria. The USSR’s close ties to Libya may have been a problem, as Tripoli tried to mediate 
between Syria and the PLO at the same time as it supported the PLO-LNM.195 In sum, the 
Lebanese Civil War highlighted the limits of Soviet influence in the Middle East as Moscow 
could not influence Syria to follow Soviet preferred policies. 
 
Kass says the clear Russians collusion with Syria undermined the Soviet position towards the 
PLO.196 The Riyad and Cairo summits gave Assad legitimacy, the war ended and the Kremlin 
stopped supporting the PLO-LNM from trying to take control in Lebanon. The USSR went 
back to its original policy that it abandoned in July 1975, trying to unite its allies and work for 
rapprochement between Syria and the PLO. At the same time, Moscow worked to prevent 
the PLO from further weakening.  
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Nevertheless, the USSR did not achieve the goal of becoming the dominant or at least equal 
power to the US in the region. To do this it needed Damascus and Cairo, and tried to mend 
fences with both after the end of the Lebanese Civil War. The war and Syria’s behavior 
demonstrated the limits of Soviet influence.197 In a patron-client perspective, the major 
power’s possibility to decide the client’s policy is minimal when the latter is under severe 
threat. On a regional level, the Lebanese Civil War showed the Soviet lack of available 
options to handle the crisis. Saudi Arabia with its new oil wealth was in ascendancy and 
became the main promoter of Arab unity. The Palestinian cause lost some of its 
effectiveness as a tool for Soviet policy.  
 
Collins thinks the Syrian invasion was a setback for Moscow as it failed to end the fighting 
between its clients, and did not manage to exclude Western and Arab adversaries from 
playing a role in resolving the conflict.198 The Riyad summit enhanced Assad’s position in 
Lebanon, ended Syria’s isolation in the Arab world and gave Assad more independence in 
relation to the USSR. The PLO’s military weakening was another reversal and the USSR 
became more dependent on Syria in Lebanon. The temporary Soviet-Egyptian congruence of 
interest during 1976 did not result in improved relations. As Libya and Iraq did not accept 
the Riyad agreement, the chances for uniting the Arabs in a «progressive» front became 
smaller.  
 
The Soviet view of competition, globally and in the Middle East 
 
Using Freedman’s theory of evaluating the Soviet Middle East strategy in terms of offensive-
defensive and successful-unsuccessful, there are clear signs that it was offensive. However, it 
is not so clear how successful the strategy was. The CIA saw the USSR as having extensive 
global aims in the mid-1970s.199 The Kremlin contemplated the world in terms of a struggle 
between two great systems, in which theirs would be victorious. The USSR sought increasing 
influence without going to war, and military power was the crucial tool to achieve this. The 
US analysts differed on how the Russians themselves viewed the power of balance. One 
group thought Moscow judged the West to be in decline and that the USSR had a realistic 
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ability to win a war. In contrast, another group thought the Kremlin considered the West to 
be on the rise and had no expectations to win a war with them.  
 
Whatever the case, the détente, «peaceful coexistence» agreed upon with the US, was 
considered to be a framework in which the USSR could nurture favorable changes in the 
Third World, including the Middle East.200 During a crisis, détente facilitated mechanisms to 
consult with the US and avoid nuclear war. Nonetheless, détente did not implicate a 
renunciation to «progressive forces» including those involved in armed struggle. In the 
Middle East, this thinking implied that Moscow would try to improve its position with clients 
including with the PLO, while avoiding risks that could lead to a war with the US. This would 
necessarily mean to balance policies carefully, and we will look at how difficult that was.  
 
Soviet decision-making 
So what do we know about the Kremlin’s decision-making? The Soviet leadership saw 
themselves as disciplined policy-makers, socially coherent and steadfast in dealing with 
international affairs, according to the CIA. In addition, although the Soviet diplomacy 
suffered setbacks in the Middle East and elsewhere, it was seen as extremely patient. In 
relation to the West, the Russians would bargain for a prolonged time, test positions and 
discover the response to maintain momentum. Only then would they make concessions. 
Despite disappointments, the Third World was seen as moving from the capitalist to the 
socialist camp. Nevertheless, after two decades of both successes and failures, the Russians 
understood that the task was complex. They had a pragmatic world view, and were attentive 
to exploit situations when the West was vulnerable. This analysis of Soviet policymaking 
seems to be applicable to the Syrian case. As we will see, the Kremlin seemed to have been 
patient and stuck to established policies in its dealings with Damascus. As the Syrian regime 
altered its policy by invading Lebanon, it took the Kremlin quite some time to understand 
the changing realities on the ground and respond to them with new, customized initiatives. 
 
Little research has been made about the Soviet political elite’s international decision-making 
processes including towards the Middle East.201 Alexei Vassiliev, Professor and Director of 
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the Institute for African studies in Moscow, writes about it in a book on Russian Middle East 
Policy. Real power he says was concentrated at the Politburo, and the number one person 
was the Communist Party leader.202 Soviet diplomatic reports to the Kremlin usually 
reflected what the Politburo wanted to hear.203 There was a desire to see «an imaginary 
world», and not the imperfect one that existed in reality. The academic institutes had little 
access to first hand information and tried to theorize from Western sources and Media.204 
The only analysis that reached the top was those that caught «the mood» of the officials, 
others were at best ignored.  
 
Syrian dependence and struggle for independence from the USSR 
The USSR and Syria had different views on their relationship. As Soviet-Egyptian relations 
deteriorated, Moscow considered Syria to be its principal foothold among the Arab 
confrontation states opposing Israel, according to a 1 June Memorandum.205 Syria was 
dependent on Soviet supplies of military hardware including during a crisis. Still, the Soviet 
Union had not managed to turn this into a hold over Syria as it once had toward Egypt. 
 
The Russians were afraid that Syria, in its desire to achieve a settlement with Israel, would 
deal with the US in the way Sadat had. The Kremlin was also concerned that Saudi Arabian 
money could lead Syria closer to Egypt and the US.206 Assad’s rejection of the Soviet 
proposal to sign a friendship treaty or to be bound to any country in even symbolic ways was 
seen as a consequence of the regime’s fervent pan-Arab nationalism.207 The Kremlin had 
earlier in 1976 criticized the Syrian handling of Lebanon and Assad’s close dealings with the 
US about Lebanon. This led Damascus to take a more independent policy and the relations 
had cooled over the last few months before Prime Minister Kosygin arrived. Seen in the 
topology of the patron-client theory introduced in chapter 1, the client’s, Syria’s threat 
environment was decreasing while its strategic advantage was increasing.  
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The Soviet Union had long championed reconvening the Geneva conference as they had a 
coequal role with the US in that forum. Syria on the other hand, was not supportive of the 
Geneva conference. Moscow was also critical of how Syria handled Lebanon by consulting 
closely with US officials and antagonizing Soviet friends like PLO-LNM and radical Arab 
states. The Russians had reasons to be worried, as in fact the US main goals towards Syria 
were to involve Assad in the peace process with Israel, restore peace and security in 
Lebanon and wean the country away from the USSR.208  
 
The Russians actually had a long list of concerns regarding the Syrian: Crackdown on the 
Syrian Communist Party; military’s frictions with Soviet advisers; opposition to expanded 
Russian use of its ports; increasing turn to Western technology and goods and finally 
escalating disagreement with the Soviet client Iraq.209 In spite of this, Moscow put less 
pressure on Syria than it had on Egypt, continued to supply arms and economic aid in 
considerable quantities and avoided open criticism of Assad. Premier Kosygin’s trip to Iraq 
and Syria probably aimed at alleviating some of the strains in relations. It was the first visit of 
a principal Soviet leader since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. 
 
Assad’s moves were more indirect than overtly confrontational. As Syria was dependent on 
Soviet support, it seems like he was balancing his policy to create as large room to maneuver 
as possible. The Syrian president kept his cards close to his chest, and the Russians must 
have been uncertain about his true motives and plans. Most was probably at stake for the 
Russians, however Kosygin’s visit was important for both Moscow and Damascus. 
 
Did the USSR have prior knowledge about the invasion? 
 
In 1976, there was no friendship agreement regulating the relations between the USSR and 
Syria, so Assad had no formal obligation to inform or get the Kremlin’s green light for the 
intervention.210 In a patron-client relationship, a client state would usually inform its patron 
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about major decisions like going to war, because of the implications it would have for the 
latter. The patron might feel pressured to support the client politically, militarily or 
economically; and come under international criticism for its alignment with the client’s 
belligerency. The two countries had been co-operating closely on security, military and 
economic issues for years and they probably had certain mutual expectations regarding 
information sharing and behavior on topics with huge implications for the other party.  
 
Assad had recently demonstrated his independence towards the USSR. In 1973 Syria and 
Egypt planned to invade Israel to win back the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. The 
USSR on the other hand preferred a political solution to the conflict. Syria and Egypt were 
dependent on Soviet military resupply and political backing, and Sadat and Assad wanted to 
keep the Russians from restraining them from attacking. Sadat informed the Soviet 
Ambassador to Egypt about the decision to start the Yom Kippur War just three days before 
the invasion took place.211 Even then, the exact date was not revealed to the Kremlin.  
 
The June 1976 intervention in Lebanon was taking place in a different context. The invasion 
was much smaller than the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and just one, though important step, in an 
escalation that had been going on for months. Moreover and maybe more importantly, this 
time Assad seemed to have an acceptance or even backing from the US. With what seems to 
be a silent US acceptance, he would have less need for political Soviet assistance and 
therefore less reason to inform the Kremlin about his plans. As it turned out, no protests 
came from Washington after the Syrian tanks rolled over the border, and Assad’s calculation 
proved correct. 
 
What about Soviet public declarations and speeches, do they contain any signals that reveal 
Soviet thinking? One hint may be found in the statement Kosygin made in Baghdad on 31 
May.212 He claimed there was an imperialist conspiracy, meaning the US and the other 
Western powers, against Lebanon to «destroy the Palestinian resistance movement and at 
dealing a blow to the nationalist and progressive forces of Lebanon». This rhetoric had been 
expressed before; however, during April-May it was a combination of Syria-backed and 
Christian Lebanese forces that were combatting the PLO-LNM. There were publicly 
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expressed suspicions about US support of the Syrian actions, and the Russians were worried. 
Kosygin further said, «Lebanon should be protected against any imperialist intervention in its 
internal affairs, because such affairs are the exclusive right of the Lebanese people 
themselves and such a legitimate right should be respected by everybody». This last part 
openly excluded acceptance of a Syrian invasion or anybody else’s intervention in Lebanon. 
 
Before Kosygin left Baghdad, the USSR and Iraq issued a Joint communique on 1 June. The 
two sides expressed their: 
«…deep concern regarding the serious situation in Lebanon and the continuing attempts of 
imperialism and reaction to interfere in Lebanon’s internal affairs for the sake of destroying the unity 
of the progressive forces and attacking the Palestine resistance movement. Iraq and the Soviet Union 
shall continue to help stop the bloodshed in Lebanon as soon as possible in order to protect its unity, 
independence and sovereignty and that forces opposing aggression may come out of the crisis more 
unified and powerful than before. The two sides assert that a positive settlement of the Lebanese 
crisis must be accomplished by the Lebanese people themselves».213  
 
In fact, Syria was not mentioned with a word, neither in Kosygin’s speech nor in the joint 
communique. This was hardly a message the USSR would send if they knew about the 
imminent invasion. If the Russians were aware of and approved of the intervention, they 
could have chosen other words to argue for the Syrian moves. If they disagreed, they 
probably would have used stronger words to try to stop the Syrians or distance themselves 
from the upcoming actions.  
 
Brezhnev later asserted in a letter to Assad that the Syrians seized the opportunity of 
Kosygin’s visit and sent their forces into Lebanon.214 According to Brezhnev, the Syrians told 
Kosygin that they only sent a token force to help maintaining security. Yevgeny Primakov, a 
Soviet Middle East expert and later Russian Prime Minister who served in the region at the 
time, claimed that Assad did not give the Russians any warning of the invasion.215 According 
to Primakov, it was Oleg Grinevsky, Deputy Head of the Middle East Department of the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs who informed Kosygin about the intervention and the 
latter reportedly responded:  
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«This whole story of sending in the troop puts both the Soviet Union and me personally in a ridiculous 
position. Whatever I do, things will either be bad, or really bad. If we publically state the whole truth – 
that our Syrian allies did not consult us – then firstly no one will believe us, and secondly they’ll ask: 
Who’s supposed to be the lead partner in this alliance – the Soviet Union or Syria? It would be a case 
of the tail wagging the dog. That’s really bad. It’ll be even worse if I come out and condemn their 
action. That would pour oil on the flames of the Lebanese Civil War and might even provoke the 
Israelis and Americans to send their own troops in. But no way can we come out in favor of the Syrian 
incursion. That would only encourage the hotheads to widen the conflict and drag Israel into it. Then 
what would we do – intervene in their war? The only option is the least bad one – to keep our mouths 
shut. But then they will say that their action was carried out with our tacit approval, and it was no 
coincidence that I’d been in Syria these past few days».216 
 
The «tail wagging the dog» refers to a situation where a person, organization or country is 
being controlled by one that is much less important or powerful.217 Primakov could have 
been trying to excuse Kosygin’s reactions. However, his reflections on the Kremlin choosing 
among different responses show vulnerability in a difficult situation. There is little face-
saving in his remarks which seem open and credible.  
 
Primakov further claimed the Soviet Ambassador to Damascus, Nuradin Mukhitdinov was 
very angry.218 Mukhitdinov said, «The Syrians realized that Moscow would not support this 
move – and that could have spoiled the mood of crucial talks between comrades Assad and 
Kosygin – talks that were of great value to the Syrian government.» Primakov added that 
Kosygin was sickened by seeing the USSR projected as the «driving force» backing its Middle 
East allies. In contrast, Primakov claimed that the US was behind the invasion. Assad had 
discussed the prospects of sending troops with the US Ambassador on 16 October 1975. The 
ambassador affirmed US support, only objecting to use regular Syrian troops.219 Further 
strengthening the view that the USSR did not know about the Syrian intervention 
beforehand is The New York Times on 2 June 1976, which referred to Soviet diplomats in the 
region expressing their preference for Syria to restrict its actions to political moves.220  
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Then we come to the weightiest argument that has been used in the research literature, the 
increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean. US intelligence confirms that large 
Soviet surface vessels held exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean in early June 1976 during 
the Syrian intervention.221 On 15 June, the Mediterranean Fifth Eskadra consisted of 70 
ships, 15 more than the level of a normal situation.222 But it changed its deployment 
responding to the US Sixth Fleet’s moves.223 By 24 June, the majority of the Soviet vessels 
were leaving as they kept monitoring the US navy. 224 The Russian moves were reactive, not 
proactive. 
 
Furthermore, in a report the US President Ford got from the CIA, the heavy Soviet presence 
is explained by a series of exercises in the area and an extensive turnover of ships. Vessels 
that had been patrolling the area were leaving for the USSR and replaced by incoming 
ships.225 By 16 July, the number of Soviet vessels were back to a normal level of 50 units. 
There is no reason to doubt the US intelligence, as the Sixth Fleet was present and the first 
to observe any Soviet extraordinary moves. This is a strong indication that the Russian 
presence was a normal navy procedure and not support of the invasion as Karsh and Kass 
claimed.  
 
In sum, there is no evidence of Soviet prior knowledge about the Syrian intervention. On the 
contrary, all sources claim the USSR disapproved of the undertaking and the naval 
operations in the Mediterranean were normal. Aware of the Russians’ critical attitude, Assad 
likely invaded without telling them to avoid any discussion and pressure.  
 
A nationalist democratic Lebanon, a friend of the USSR and a threat to Syria 
According to Zafer Khatib, former head of PFLP’s media department, the USSR wanted a 
democratic state to succeed in Lebanon in 1976.226 The reason was that the Lebanese 
Communist Party was the strongest party within the LNM, in addition to the Communist 
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Action Organization, not Jumblatt’s party.227 If the LNM had come to power, it would have 
supported the PLO and the USSR. It would also have served as an example for others in the 
Middle East to follow. Before the Syrian invasion, the LNM and the PLO controlled over 80% 
of Lebanon. The only region left under Christian control were Jounieh, East-Beirut and the 
area east of the capital. Assad did not want the LNM to win, because a social democratic 
state would have been a threat to his regime. Khatib also says that Fatah had supported the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Syria, which was in opposition to Assad’s regime, with weapons 
up to 1976.228 In his youth, Arafat had been a member of the MB, but in the early 1970s, he 
was linked to Saudi Arabia and Iraq. These countries were supporting the MB, maybe as a 
move against Syria. Whatever the case, Assad wanted to maintain the balance of power 
between the sects in Lebanon, and reduce the influence of the PLO-LNM.  
 
The Lebanese Christians escalate the war to have a Syrian intervention 
So what triggered the Syrians to launch the invasion just when they did? During the last 
weekend of May 1976, Muslim forces attacked two Christian villages in Northern Lebanon.229 
The Christians reacted with heavy attacks in other parts of the country, including Palestinian 
refugee camps in Beirut. The US analysts regarded the severe Christian attacks were meant 
to force the president–elect Sarkis to ask for a Syrian intervention. In spite of the escalating 
violence, on 30 May Sarkis actually rejected a proposal to have an Arab League conference 
dealing with the conflict in Lebanon.230 Sarkis and Syria were unwilling to let other countries 
play a part in resolving the problems. Later Frangieh said he had «made an important 
contribution in encouraging Syria to play a role in Lebanon».231 The details in these 
revelations are also new and show that the Lebanese Christians cooperated with Assad 
about the invasion. 
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From awkwardness to skepticism - Early Soviet reactions to the invasion 
 
The Russians seemed to be puzzled by the Syrian 1 June invasion, and needed over a week to 
reach a position of skepticism. The invasion took place during the morning when Kosygin 
travelled from in Baghdad to Damascus.232 In Damascus, Kosygin gave a speech on 1 June, 
blaming the imperialist forces as responsible for the situation in Lebanon. Kosygin repeated 
the Soviet demand for Palestinian participation at the Geneva peace conference to create a 
lasting peace in the Middle East. Primakov later argued that the Soviet Union gave its 
support to the Syrian intervention after it took place, because the Kremlin hoped it would 
stabilize the situation.233 
 
Pictures: Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin arrives in Damascus on 1 June 1976, and is met by the Syrian Premier Mahmoud al-Ayyubi.234 
 
The CIA analysts also concluded that the Soviet Premier was in an «awkward position» in 
Damascus.235 They assumed he was under heavy pressure from the Palestinians and leftists 
to control Assad. They considered Kosygin’s speech as light criticism of Syria. At this point, 
the Syrians were supporting the Christians who seemed to work for partition of Lebanon, 
and the Syrian escalation could hardly be seen as peaceful. In sum, Kosygin’s speech can be 
seen as a mild expression against Syrian meddling. These findings confirm the view which 
saw the USSR as being in a difficult position, and contradict Karsh’s and Kass’ opinion that 
the USSR supported the invasion. 
 
The Joint Soviet-Syrian communique of 3 June 
At the end of Kosygin’s visit, a joint USSR-Syria communique was issued on 3 June.236 It 
described the meetings were held «in an atmosphere of mutual cordiality and 
understanding, a wide exchange of opinions concerning Syrian-Soviet relations and major 
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current international affairs took place». These were code words for differences of opinion 
on certain subjects.237 Lebanon was mentioned in two sentences blaming the Imperialist and 
Zionist schemes and declaring the intention of working to restore peace and security and 
keep Lebanon as an independent and integrate state. According to The New York Times, 
Western diplomats interpreted this and the continuation of Soviet aid as if Moscow favored 
the intervention.238  
 
The Joint communique expressed support of the Geneva conference and the PLO’s 
participation there. Some analysts saw this as a success for Moscow as Damascus had been 
downgrading the importance of Geneva in the last few months. However, the communiqué 
did not refer to any Soviet support of the Syrian moves. The statement is probably the 
minimum position the parties agreed on, and the phrasing and what missing parts tells 
about disagreement between the parties regarding Lebanon. The Syrian leaders seemed to 
have miscalculated the Palestinian willingness to oppose the intervention. Still, Syrian troops 
advanced to Khalde, just south of Beirut and Alayh, east of Beirut.239 
 
As we have seen, the Kremlin disapproved of the Syrian activities against the PLO-LNM. 
There is no reason to believe Moscow would agree to an escalation of a campaign they 
resisted. Kosygin’s first public reaction not mentioning the Syrian intervention, resonates 
with Primakov’s arguments and the US analysis, the Russians were caught off-guard and 
gave the least bad reaction, a muted response. This contrasts Karsh’s argument that the 
Kremlin so far had agreed to the escalating intervention and Assad would not expect Soviet 
resistance to the 1 June intervention. 
 
A few days after the invasion, a member of the Politburo of the Lebanese Communist Party 
(LCP) Karim Mroue visited the Soviet Embassy in Beirut.240 He met a Soviet official, the 
number two at the embassy, a friend of his, who asked him why the LCP was fighting the 
Syrians. Mroue in return, asked what the Soviet Union did when Hitler’s forces invaded. The 
Russian did not accept the comparison, but Mroue insisted that the Lebanese had the right 
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to defend their own country against an invader. The LCP believed that the USSR did not 
know about the intervention before it took place, but could not understand why the Kremlin 
supported it. Mroue believes that the USSR was confused at the time. The only Communist 
parties that opposed the Syrian invasion were the French and Italian. When Mroue was in 
Paris later in the autumn, the exact date is not known, he asked for a meeting with the 
Vietnamese Ambassador to discuss the possibility of sending a LCP delegation to Vietnam. 
Still disturbed about the meeting more than 40 years later, Mroue says he was met by the 
3rd secretary who stated: «You are fighting against the Syrians, you have nothing to do in 
Vietnam. The talk is finished». Which meant, «leave now». Although the dates of these 
meetings is not clear, they show that the Russians for some time gave the impression to 
their Lebanese allies that they supported the Syrians.  
 
Increased fighting and emerging Soviet criticism 
During the first few days there was no noteworthy resistance from the PLO and the 
leftists.241 Nevertheless, many soldiers of the Syria-controlled Palestinian Liberation Army 
(PLA) defected to PLO’s side.242 By 5 June, Syrian troops clashed with the PLA.243 Damascus 
withdrew some PLA-units to forestall more desertions, but the PLA soon fell apart.244 The 
Syrians then sent the entire Third Armored Division and several battalions into Lebanon.  
 
Soon messages of Soviet concern arose. On 8 June the Soviet military attaché in Damascus 
told his US counterpart that the embassy was «quite confused and unhappy» over the 
intervention because the intention seemed to be to destroy the Palestinian-leftist coalition. 
The attaché claimed the Syrians had not informed the USSR, and that Soviet advisors were 
not with the invading troops. He interpreted the timing of the invasion as meant to 
embarrass Kosygin and called it dangerous. It seems like the Russians were clearly 
bewildered and distanced themselves from the whole affair. The day after, on 9 June the 
Soviet news agency TASS issued the statement referred to above.245 After expressing the 
need to stop foreign interference, it criticized Syria for increasing the bloodshed. It called for 
a ceasefire, and the plight and the rights of the Palestinians is stressed. However, as the US 
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analysts noted, the statement lacked any Soviet indication to pressure Syria.246 It was much 
weaker than the military attaché’s expressions, and apparently tried to find a solution 
without unsettling the relations with neither Syria nor the PLO.  
 
The opening of a PLO office in Moscow  
On 11 June, the Soviet Union declared that a permanent PLO representative had come to 
Moscow.247 Golan argued that the objective was to forestall Kissinger’s efforts to attain a 
Jordanian-Israeli disengagement agreement on the West Bank. However, the PLO-Jordan 
relations at the time were still strained after the expulsion of the PLO following the 1970 
Black September in addition to disagreeing to the Jordanian claims over the West Bank.248 
Furthermore, King Hussein of Jordan supported the Syrian intervention in Lebanon without 
any reservations.249 Therefore, it seems unlikely that Moscow would do this to please 
Jordan. 
 
The establishment of this kind of office was not common. The only other national liberation 
movement which had a Moscow office before 1987, was the Vietnamese National Liberation 
Front (FNL). This shows that the USSR clearly reserved these representations to important 
clients. In August 1976, Czechoslovakia let the PLO open an office in Prague.250 The timing of 
opening of these offices, just after Syria started to fight the PLO, is interesting and hardly a 
coincidence. Therefore, the opening can be seen as a distinct signal of recognition of the 
PLO, giving it an increased level of diplomatic legitimacy and support against Syria. Still, it did 
not really cost the USSR anything, as it did not threaten the relations with Damascus. 
 
Continued fighting in Lebanon and Arab League involvement 
Back in Lebanon, Fatah representatives rejected a Syrian ceasefire proposition and 
demanded an instant Syrian withdrawal on 9 June.251 Meanwhile, the Syrian 7th Infantry 
Division entered Lebanon and moved towards Sidon. The division had been stationed in 
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southwestern Syria facing the Israeli army based on the Golan Heights. This demonstrated 
the importance Damascus put on the Lebanese actions and at the same time its confidence 
that the Israelis would not strike Syria from the Golan.  
 
 
Syrian troops in Lebanon on 15 June 1976.252  
 
The Arab League became an arena for the regional powers’ struggle over Lebanon. Arafat 
called for an Arab League meeting, and the League’s foreign ministers met in Cairo on 8 June 
adopting a resolution for an immediate cease-fire and replacement of the Syrian troops for 
an Arab security force in Lebanon.253 However, Assad preempted the Arab League by saying 
yes to Libyan and Algerian units to deploy in Lebanon.254 Christian leaders hoped Syria would 
play a dominant role in the peacekeeping operation.255 After some negotiations, an 
agreement was made to deploy an Arab peacekeeping force consisting of 3,600 men in 
Lebanon.256 In comparison, the Syrian troops already there numbered 13,000. Kass claims 
that the replacement of Syrian troops with the Arab Security Force did not revoke the Soviet 
support of Syria. 257 Nevertheless, given the Soviet criticism of the Syrian intervention, it is 
more likely that Moscow really meant that it welcomed a ceasefire between its two clients.  
 
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia kept on trying to reconcile the differences between Damascus and 
Cairo. A first meeting, between the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Syria, 
was finally organized in Riyad on 23 June.258  
                                                          
252 AP, «SYND 15 6 76 SYRIAN TROOP ACTIVITY IN LEBANON». 15 June 1976.   
253 CIA, «The President’s Daily Brief 9 June 1976», 1. 9 June. 
254 By 12 June neither Libyan nor Algerian units had yet entered Lebanon. 
255 The Arab League force would just observe the ceasefire, keep security and facilitate a Lebanese dialogue led by President elect Sarkis. 
256 NYT, «U.S. AMBASSADOR AND AIDE KIDNAPPED AND MURDERED IN BEIRUT COMBAT SECTOR», 1-4. 17 June 1976 
257 Kass, «Moscow and the Lebanese triangle», 174. 
258 The meeting had been postponed from May. CIA, «The President’s Daily Brief 24 June 1976», 2. 24 June. 
60 
 
The July talks fails, and the USSR increase the pressure on Syria 
 
Assad visited France, Romania and Yugoslavia during the second and third week of June and 
had some success in justifying his policy.259 In Paris, Assad criticized the Soviet Lebanon 
policy.260  In Bucharest, Assad commented that the Soviet Union was unwilling to discipline 
the Lebanese leftists.261 The Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam went to Moscow on 5 July 
accompanied by the Soviet ambassador to Damascus.262  
 
Khaddam’s visit took place at Syrian insistence, according to the political counselor at the 
Egyptian embassy in Moscow.263 Khaddam asked for accelerated Soviet arms deliveries, 
however the Kremlin conditioned these on, and put heavy pressure on Syria to withdraw 
from Lebanon. At the same time, Soviet media gave the anniversary of the Iraqi revolution 
excessive press-coverage.264 This support of Damascus’ archrival may well have been done to 
put additional pressure on Assad. Khaddam said he had met Gromyko several times on his 
trip to Moscow, but the Russians did not change their perceptions and the trip had been 
very unproductive. 265 
 
 
Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Gromyko meets Syria's Foreign Minister Khaddam in Moscow at a later visit in 1978.266 
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The Egyptian counselor also claimed that Syria, Jordan and the right-wing Lebanese had an 
unstated plan to weaken the PLO politically and militarily. The purpose was to make them 
compromise on agreements in Lebanon and the Middle East. Moreover, the counselor said 
Arab diplomats and Soviet experts in Moscow assumed Assad had gotten a green light from 
the US before the invasion.267 This is interesting as the Kremlin would be well aware of the 
allegations of Syria-US cooperation. At best, they would have been suspicious and definitely 
uncertain about Assad’s co-operation with the US. That may well have been a reason for the 
pressure they exerted on Khaddam. 
 
According to the Syrian Foreign Ministry Director of Western European Affairs, Gromyko told 
Khaddam that he appreciated the political objectives, but not the military solution.268 
Gromyko asked «Quo vadis», where are you going? And to underline his point Gromyko 
mentioned the metaphor of the problems involved in stopping a cart half way down a steep 
mountain. The USSR wanted an end to the fighting between the Syrians and PLO and 
increased pressure on the Lebanese Christians to stop fighting and enter a dialogue. Finally, 
the Kremlin wanted a Syrian withdrawal, though no details of how the Soviet Union could 
pressure Syria were given.  
 
The Russians’ request for Syrian pressure on the Christians, a ceasefire and negotiations 
clearly indicate their goal of a negotiated settlement and co-operation between Syria and 
the PLO. Khaddam’s failure to convince the Russians indicates that the Kremlin had 
established a clear position on the conflict and was not satisfied with the Syrian response. 
Whatever the case, Khaddam failed and the Kremlin immediately increased pressure for a 
Syrian withdrawal in two ways, a statement of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization 
followed by a peculiar letter from Brezhnev to Assad. 
 
The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization criticize Syria  
On 9 July, just after Khaddam left Moscow, stated: «The involvement of Syrian military units 
in this conflict has further aggravated the situation in Lebanon». The Committee called for 
                                                          
267 The long-term Syrian goal was supposedly to make a confederation with Jordan and Lebanon in which the Palestinians were a part of 
Jordan. The Syrians had a stated goal of strengthening its position vis a vis Israel, however it would have been difficult to achieve this 
kind of confederation as the Jordanian King Hussein and the Maronites in Lebanon would not have been interested in it. 
268 The Syrian director also criticized the Baath party for using inexperienced officials to explain their policy abroad in addition to being 
unsuccessful in explaining it domestically. WikiLeaks, «FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM'S VISIT TO MOSCOW». 15 July. 
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an immediate cease-fire and «the Lebanese conflict can and should be solved free from 
foreign interference, by the Lebanese themselves, with participation of all interested parties 
concerned on the basis of guaranteeing the independence, sovereignty and unity of 
Lebanon».  
 
Coming right after Khaddam’s departure, the US analysts saw it as a slap at Syria.269 The call 
for non-interference and at the same time have participation of all interested parties was 
regarded as a contradiction in Moscow’s vague political line. They found the declaration less 
strident, but harder on the Syrians than the 9 June TASS statement had been. It was seen as 
an admission that the Soviet Union did not have a real, nor a reactive policy towards events 
in Lebanon. The statement was interpreted to be more «in sorrow than in anger».   
 
In the Solidarity Organization’s statement, the conflict in Lebanon was called a new 
imperialistic conspiracy against Middle East peace, a standard criticism of the US. However, 
the next sentence in the same paragraph condemns Syria for worsening the conditions. 
Thus, the Solidarity Committee can be seen as indirectly blaming Damascus for taking part in 
US schemes. Then follows criticism against the Christians for bombarding the Palestinian 
refugee camps, before calling for an immediate cease-fire.  
 
By asking for the Arab Confrontation states to extricate themselves from the conflict and not 
weaken themselves nor scatter their forces any more, the USSR argues that Syria should pull 
out of Lebanon, unite forces with the PLO and the Lebanese leftists in the struggle for 
liberation of Palestine and achieve regional peace. In addition, the solidarity committee 
described the Syrian intervention as having complicated the situation even more. 
Nonetheless, the USSR did not present any concrete proposal to solve the situation. This was 
arguably a huge weakness in the Soviet response, it was a signal but it was not corroborated 
with a proactive and clear policy of action.  
 
Brezhnev’s message to Assad: «Pull out of Lebanon» 
Soon enough the Soviet pressure increased. On 20 July the French newspaper Le Monde 
published an alleged letter from Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to Assad dated 11 
                                                          
269 WikiLeaks, «July 9 Declaration of Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee on Lebanon», 2. 12 July. 
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July.270 The text was distributed to the PLO, Kamal Jumblatt and to other «friendly» 
governments, Iraq and Libya. From the start there were questions about the letter’s 
authenticity including in intelligence circles, however Assad himself confirmed the message 
in a later interview.271 Brezhnev first referred to how the Syrians had told Kosygin on 1 June 
that they had sent in a symbolic force. This attitude, he wrote, was deceptive and Khaddam’s 
allegations were untrue and inaccurate. Brezhnev continued:  
Permit me to pose a direct question for you at the start: Who is rubbing his hands with joy while 
observing the events in Lebanon? Naturally, the imperialists. (…) We, you and I were persuaded that 
the (Palestinian) resistance movement constitutes one of the principal pillars of the struggle against 
the Israeli aggressors and against imperialism. (…) On the moving plane we observe that efforts are 
under way to smash the resistance and the Lebanese National movement. Who are the assailants? 
They are the Lebanese forces of the right supported by the Syrian army. (…) We know that the 
resistance and the Lebanese national Movement are demanding an immediate cease-fire and that it is 
your forces which are opposed to the halting of combat. That sustains and intensifies the spilling of 
blood in the Lebanon. We do not understand either your course of action or the objectives. (…) 
 
Brezhnev further exhorted the Syrian leaders to halt combat immediately and then withdraw 
its forces from Lebanon. If Syria insisted on her stand, the Soviet Union would pull out 
military experts and stop supplying spare parts. 
 
One of the most curious things about Brezhnev’s letter to Assad, was the way it became 
publicly known by being printed in Le Monde.272 As a US Department of State official 
commented, this kind of publication was quite unusual.273 Assad himself confirmed the letter 
in an interview in October and further claimed the USSR leaked the letter.274 The 
unprecedented publishing led to speculation about whether the message was real, some of 
the researchers stated it was unverified or did not mention it.275  
 
The distribution of the text to the PLO, Jumblatt, Iraq and Libya is also interesting. The PLO 
and Jumblatt had protested against the Syrian invasion to the Kremlin, demanding Russian 
                                                          
270 Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria, 36. WikiLeaks, «Alleged Brezhnev message to Asad», 1. 22 July.  
271 Between various reports circulating in Damascus of Soviet pressure, the Brezhnev letter was considered to be the least credible 
WikiLeaks, «ALLEGATIONS OF SOVIET PRESSURE ON ASAD TO MODIFY HIS POLICY ON LEBANON», 1. 21 July. WikiLeaks, «Asad interview 
with Lebanese journalist comes down hard on Soviets», 2. 5 October. 
272 WikiLeaks, «Alleged Brezhnev message to Asad», 1. 22 July. 
273 WikiLeaks, «Asad interview with Lebanese journalist comes down hard on Soviets», 2. 5 October. 
274 Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy towards Egypt, 226. Dawisha refers to Assad’s interview in Events, London on 1 October 1976.  
275 Freedman missed a verification of the letter. Freedman, «The Soviet Union and the Civil War in Lebanon», 81.  
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reactions. The letter seems to have been a Soviet response trying to please these important 
allies. The way it ended up, and may have been intended from the start, was a letter from 
Brezhnev to Assad, with copies to close Soviet collaborators and opponents of the Syrian 
invasion, with full publishing through a western center-left-wing newspaper. A Soviet official 
suggested that the number two man in the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), Nadim A. 
Samid, was behind the leak to Le Monde.276 When asked why the Lebanese Communist Party 
would want to publish this, he responded, «It’s the Middle East». The Soviet official was 
regarded to be close to the source of the letter.277 As the LCP was under Moscow’s influence, 
it is likely that the Kremlin ordered the leak to Le Monde. Taken together with the 
distribution of copies to Arafat and Jumblatt, the purpose would have been to demonstrate 
to the PLO and Lebanese leftist that Moscow was putting pressure on Damascus. 
 
The Syrian policy towards the PLO and the LNM had started to change a couple of months 
earlier, however the Kremlin had not responded to the PLO’s cries for support. By the Syrian 
direct June intervention and use of brute force against the USSR’s clients, it seems like 
Moscow had woken up and come to grips with reality. Still the Soviet leaders only came up 
with threats of withdrawing military experts and to end the supply of spare parts, but did not 
announce any direct consequences. This was a way to be clear on intent and means, giving 
Damascus a chance to change course without punishing them. 
 
Soviet uncertainty and acceptance of Arab League mediation 
As Brezhnev sent his 11 July letter, fighting on the ground in Lebanon increased.278 The Arab 
League General Secretary tried to reach an agreement, and Assad reluctantly agreed to meet 
Arafat in Damascus on 16 July. The US analysts predicted the mediation attempts to fail.279 
Pravda on the other hand published an article indicating a Syrian pullback from Lebanon and 
a possible Syria-PLO reconciliation.280 Demchenko who wrote the article was chief of 
Pravda’s Afro-Asian Department and an influential Middle East expert.  
 
                                                          
276 The Soviet official Yevgeniy Pyrlin, Chief of the Department for Near Eastern Countries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs told this to the US 
political Counsellor in Moscow. WikiLeaks, «Alleged Brezhnev letter to Asad: 11 July». 23 July.  
277 WikiLeaks, «Alleged Brezhnev letter to Asad: 11 July». 23 July.  
278 WikiLeaks, «POSSIBLE SILVER LINING IN CONNECTION WITH CURRENT LEBANESE SITUATION», 2. 14 July. 
279  WikiLeaks, «JULY 15 SYRIAN MEDIA REPORT PLANS TO IMPLEMENT ARAB LEAGUE RESOLUTIONS» 1. 15 July. WikiLeaks, «POSSIBLE 
SILVER LINING IN CONNECTION WITH CURRENT LEBANESE SITUATION», 2. 14 July.  
280 WikiLeaks, «SOVIET PRESS SUMMARY - JULY 16». 16 July. 
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Demchenko expressed hope about the situation. Freedman sees him as stepping up criticism 
of Frangieh who would not step down and let Sarkis become president.281 The Pravda article 
came out before Brezhnev’s letter became publicly known, and seems like an attempt to 
support the Arab League’s reconciliation efforts and lure Assad to make an agreement. 
Though the article turned out to be much too optimistic, it also clearly signaled the Soviet 
view on how to resolve the conflict and accept the Arab League’s work.  
 
A Syrian official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hamoud Shoufi thought the USSR could 
have overlooked the intervention if Syria had gained a quick victory.282  The leftists’ 
resistance forced Assad to change strategy and instead of a quick military solution he now 
tried to strangle them slowly by a blockade and military pressure. This gave the leftists time 
to pressure Moscow and the Russians felt compelled to increasingly support them. Shoufi 
spoke to a military officer who on 14 July had talked with Assad, who denied having received 
any letter from Brezhnev. Shoufi believed the Russians put pressure on Assad to change the 
direction of the campaign in Lebanon and make an agreement with the leftist. Shoufi said 
the USSR analyzed the situation and had concluded that the US would not give Assad 
something tangible. The Russians hoped Assad would sooner or later understand that the 
USSR tried to help him with «friendly advice».  
 
The Soviet ambassador to Damascus met with Assad in mid-July. 283 He asked Assad several 
questions: What was his position on the Sinai accords after the Riyad meeting; did he have 
an understanding with the US; what were the Syrian intentions in Lebanon, and how did he 
justify the intervention when all the socialist regimes and communist parties, except the 
Syrian, opposed it? In addition, the ambassador informed Assad about Soviet plans to 
support the Palestinians in Lebanon more openly. This gives additional clues about Soviet 
thoughts and policies and shows deep Soviet concern on a range of issues.  
 
                                                          
281 Freedman, «The Soviet Union and the Civil War in Lebanon», 81. 
282 Shoufi told this to a US Embassy official in Damascus. WikiLeaks, «ALLEGATIONS OF SOVIET PRESSURE ON ASAD TO MODIFY HIS POLICY 
ON LEBANON», 3. 21 July. 
283 The exact date of the meeting is unknown. The source of the information, the editor of the Syrian state-owned newspaper Tishreen met 
with US officials on 21 July. Then he said «recently» and taking into account Brezhnev’s letter was dated 11 July, it is reasonable to 
believe the meeting took place in mid-July.  WikiLeaks, «ALLEGATIONS OF SOVIET PRESSURE ON ASAD TO MODIFY HIS POLICY ON 
LEBANON», 1-2. 21 July.  
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By making these questions the Russians seemed to be really insecure about Damascus’ 
policy objectives. The editor of Tishreen further claimed the PLO-LNM’s effective resistance 
gave them time to pressure Moscow and the Russians felt compelled to support them. The 
US observers found the reasoning to be consistent with the Shoufi’s analysis and to be 
credible. Khaddam confirmed that the USSR had increased pressure on Syria.284 And the 
USSR favored its relations with the PLO. 285 Moscow’s rhetoric against Israel, the US and the 
Rightists in Lebanon had become more strongly worded. 
 
As we have seen, the PLO certainly resisted and bought themselves time, and complained to 
the Kremlin for several weeks. What really took time was the Kremlin coming to grips with 
the intervention and developing a policy to counter it. The argument that the resistance of 
the PLO and LNM forced Assad to change strategy and strangle them slowly seem more 
plausible, as that is what happened in reality. However, the opinion that the Russians 
changed their mind when the Syrian forces met unexpected resistance does not seem 
credible. The Kremlin wanted Syrian cooperation with, not domination over the PLO.  
 
A desperate message from Assad to the US and its Arab allies 
 
In a series of meetings from 17-26 July Assad delivered messages to King Hussein of Jordan 
expressing deep concern about the Soviet reactions.286 Assad described the situation as 
extremely critical and wanted the messages to be passed on to the US president, King Khalid 
of Saudi Arabia and the Shah of Iran. Hussein added that when he himself was in Moscow in 
June, the Kremlin was very worried about Assad. 287 Hussein thought Moscow was under 
internal constraints and in distress as they needed to show that dealing with the Arabs had 
not wasted Soviet resources. This has not been reported in the research literature. 
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According to Assad, the PLO sent a message to the Libyan leader Gaddafi demanding him to 
urge the USSR to take a very tough stand with Syria.289 Three days later Moscow demanded 
an immediate Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. The USSR accused Syria of cooperating in an 
imperialist plot to destroy the PLO-LNM. The USSR had informed Assad that they wanted to 
maintain good relations with Syria only if Damascus was ready to cooperate with Soviet 
attitude and policy towards Lebanon. This was a cost of its relations. If they didn’t accept 
this, the Soviet position would become very hard, and cuts in arms and economic aid was 
implied, but not threatened. Assad was also concerned about an apparent alignment of 
Libya, the PLO, Iraq and the USSR against Syria in Lebanon. He was fed up with the Libyan 
Prime Minister Jalloud, and Syria had jailed 30 members of a pro-Libyan group. 
 
The Syrian president was probably referring to Brezhnev’s 11 July letter and the claim that 
the PLO had urged Gaddafi to act is specific and seems credible. However, the PLO had asked 
for support for months, even before the Syrian invasion, without getting any strong, public 
Soviet support. The Kremlin probably did this now, not so much out of genuine consideration 
for the hard-pressed allies in Lebanon, but to avoid losing them altogether being defeated or 
jumping over to the US side. The PLO’s predicaments were also visible for the world, and the 
Soviet credibility with its present and potentially future clients was also at stake. So the 
Russians’ response to finally demand an immediate Syrian withdrawal, may well have been 
influenced by the message through Libya.  
 
In addition, Assad referred to other conflicts where the USSR was involved and compared 
them to Syria. He said he feared another Cold War armed war like «Angola» in Lebanon, 
which was a proxy war between the US and the USSR.290 Assad also mentioned the 1975 
Communist-backed coup attempt against President Gaafar Nimeiry in Sudan. If Lebanon 
were to go, Kuwait would be next and then Saudi Arabia. Assad said that Soviet-Syrian 
                                                          
289 Libyan Prime Minister Jalloud had forwarded the message to the Libyan President Gaddafi.  
290 After Angola became independent from Portugal in 1975, two liberation movements the MPLA and UNITA fought for power in a civil 
war. The USSR supported the former and the US the latter in a proxy war. Cuba, allied with Moscow, sent tens of thousands of troops, 
which fought South African forces allied with the US. The devastating conflict finally ended in 2002 after the MPLA won the war. 
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relations were at a crucial point and could turn into another Egypt-Soviet crisis.291 He asked 
the Saudis, the Shah of Iran and the US to alleviate pressure, or to help if aid was cut.292  
Referring to Lebanon, Assad concluded that the situation of the Rightists was good at the 
moment, but with continued Soviet pressure it might shift. He claimed that the Russians 
dominated the Lebanese leftists, including Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party (PPS), the 
Communist Party, and Communist Workers Party.293 The PLO refused to come to Damascus 
to a scheduled meeting on 16 July. Assad’s claim that the Russians controlled the Lebanese 
leftist seems exaggerated as Jumblatt, the dominating figure, although being a socialist he 
was not a communist. It was probably an attempt to scare the US with a threat of 
communism, and there are no reports that it resonated in Washington.  
 
Even though the USSR threatened with hard reactions if Damascus did not comply, there 
was no statement about any concrete change of military or economic cooperation. 
Therefore, Moscow seemed to walk a fine line between threatening and making real policy 
changes. Assad’s reference to PLO’s hardened position refusing to come to Damascus to a 
scheduled meeting on 16 July indicate that the Palestinians had received a message from 
Moscow as well. Assad’s message came six days after Brezhnev’s letter, but before the Le 
Monde publication, and he likely refers to the Brezhnev letter. Whatever the case, from 
what we know today, it is clear that the Soviet message he referred to was real.  
 
Assad’s choice to contact the «imperialist» and conservative Middle East kingdoms and 
describing the situation as «extremely critical» shows that the Soviet threats had an impact. 
Assad wanted guarantees from the USSR’s antagonists, meaning he would stand up to the 
Soviet pressure if he got support. As King Khalid of Saudi Arabia learned of the Soviet 
pressure, he promised Syria increased economic support if it turned out to be necessary.294 
Assad’s lobbying seemed to work.  
 
  
                                                          
291 Assad pointed to unspecified developments in Egypt to prove meddling between Libya and the USSR. 
292 King Hussein expressed readiness to help Assad and was going to meet the Shah the next day and send a minister to see King Khalid. 
293 WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING - LEBANON DEVELOPMENTS», 1-4. 28 July.  
294 King Khalid told the Jordanian minister Khammash who relayed Assad’s message to him in Riyad. WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH CROWN 
PRINCE - JORDANIAN CONTACTS», 1-2. 22 July. 
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Assad’s speech  
The day after Brezhnev’s letter was published, Assad for the first time since the intervention, 
explained his policy to the Syrian public on 21 July.295 During the three hour speech, Assad 
did not make a single reference to the Soviet Union. He said Syria would withdraw on the 
request of Lebanese authorities, but the Palestinians had no right to ask for this. Pravda and 
another newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda concluded that Assad’s speech «Deflected allegation 
of presence of American-Syrian deal with regard to Lebanon».296 A Soviet representative in 
Damascus stressed the strength of Soviet-Syrian friendship in a press conference.297 The 
Soviet reactions seemed intended to smooth over the Soviet-Syrian disagreements. 
 
More Soviet pressure and a cease-fire agreement 
 
Brezhnev wrote a second letter to Assad, which the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Vasili Kuznetsov and the Soviet ambassador to Syria Nuritdin Moukhitdinov delivered 
personally on 22 July.298 The letter was characterized as «short and tough». The same day, 
Syria and the PLO initiated negotiations over Lebanon, and they continued for over a 
week.299 Kuznetsov and Moukhitdinov met Khaddam and Kaddoumi at the Soviet embassy 
on 24 July.300 The ambassador said the USSR supported the Palestinians, not Syria, and 
presented Brezhnev’s message to Kaddoumi. The letter apparently had a message of strong 
Soviet support to the Palestinians. Although it was not published, the Palestinians leaked it 
to a journalist, probably to support the Soviet pressure on Syria.  
  
                                                          
295 WikiLeaks, «Asad makes major speech», 1. 21 July.  
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The Syria-Palestinian ceasefire agreement 
Another cease-fire agreement, the 55th was signed on 29 July and took effect on 5 August.301 
The US analysts saw it as welcomed by the parties which needed a pause in the hostilities.302 
The PLO had been hit hard, and wanted to rearm and receive new recruits sent to them from 
Egypt and Libya.303 Syria on the other hand needed the ceasefire to avoid losing Soviet 
military supplies and Arab support.  
 
The Kremlin both supported reconciliation and pressured Damascus at the same time. The 
Kuwaiti daily al-Watan reported that Soviet pressure had caused the Syrians and Palestinians 
to agree.304 The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov had been in Damascus in secret 
discussions to make the agreement work.305 Pravda published a TASS article on 3 August 
about the Syrian Communist Party which supported the Syria-Palestinian agreement.306 
Moscow Arab Broadcast also expressed support of the Syria-Palestinian accord.307 This 
indicated Soviet acceptance of Syrian domination of the PLO as an alternative to continued 
fighting and possible destruction of the PLO.  
 
 
Kaddoumi (left) and Khaddam (right) sign the 29 July agreement. Stills from Associated Press news film.308 
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Nevertheless, the same day, the Soviet Ambassador Moukhitdinov told Khaddam that the 
USSR wanted a political reconciliation if Damascus withdrew from Lebanon and allowed the 
Communists and its allies to occupy the 60% of Lebanon the Syrians controlled.309 Khaddam 
made it clear that Syria would keep its positions in Lebanon until peace was achieved. Still, 
the Soviet pressure may actually have worked as the Syria-Palestinian agreement was signed 
within days after Brezhnev’s second letter and Kuzhnetsov’s visit and direct talks with both 
the Syrians and the PLO. 
 
Internal Syrian developments relieves the pressure on the PLO-LNM 
 
The Syrian regime faced internal problems and this affected its moves in Lebanon. Because 
of internal security problems and a lack of economic development during 1976, Assad 
became unhappy with Prime Minister Mahmoud Ayyubi’s war efforts.310 On 1 August Ayyubi 
was replaced with a loyal Major General and by designing a new loyal Prime Minister now, 
Assad seemed confident of his domestic position.311 There were in fact internal security 
problems as bombings and assassinations shook Damascus and other big cities.312 These 
were mounted by Palestinians and Iraqis to undermine Assad’s position.313 And although 
Moscow wanted Damascus to reconcile with both parties, the Kremlin did not protest the 
Iraqi and Palestinian undermining of Assad’s position.  
 
It took a week to announce a new cabinet, and the delay was probably related to the 
regime’s internal discussions over its Lebanon policy. Taken together, the increasing number 
of problems were considered to be the reason for the reduced pressure on the PLO-LNM in 
the Sidon area.314 This in turn facilitated reaching the 29 July agreement and the subsequent 
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reduced fighting. By the respite in fighting, the Palestinians achieved a large scale Soviet, 
Egyptian and other countries’ resupply through Sidon.315 This has not been described in the 
research literature and reveal how Iraqi, Palestinian and Soviet backing temporarily changed 
Syrian military strategy. As Damascus realized that the Palestinians were resupplied, Assad 
decided to change strategy and pacify Southern Lebanon.  
 
Continued fighting in Lebanon and Soviet reactions 
 
Assad kept repeating to King Hussein that he needed Jordan and Syria’s friends to see how 
serious the Lebanese situation was, and hinted that the USSR was pressuring him.316 In a 7 
August meeting, Assad told the US Ambassador Murphy that some Arab «elements» tried to 
make a revolution in Lebanon and the Lebanese Communists took advantage of the 
situation.317 Prince Saud had offered mediation in July, but the PLO rejected the suggestion 
and Assad wanted a more active Saudi Arabian involvement. Assad was very pleased with his 
co-operation with King Hussein and by using him as a channel. The US fear of Communists 
was well-known, and it is hard to say if Assad exaggerated their strength. It is clear though 
that both they and the PLO kept resisting the Syrians. Assad’s frank talks directly with the US, 
and indirectly through King Hussein, show how he kept that channel open to find support in 
balancing off the USSR and the PLO-LNM.  
 
Soviet public and diplomatic reactions 
The Kremlin continued to call for a Syrian withdrawal, nevertheless there seems to have 
been a turn to a slightly more pro-Syrian line.  A Soviet official Oleg Grinevsky at the Soviet 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ gave a positive but cautious reaction to the Syria-PLO agreement 
on 10 August.318 Grinevsky, was still skeptical to whether the cease-fire would hold and 
actually expected more fighting. He said the Soviet prescription for a solution was to arrange 
a cease-fire, let the Lebanese parties hold talks without outside interference, and show 
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respect for the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon. Grinevsky seems to have 
tried to smooth over the disagreements with Damascus, though he was realistic about the 
weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement. 
 
However, rivaling Arab countries were following their individual interests and their meddling 
in Lebanon caused problems. In addition, the Syria-Iraqi relations were not improving, and 
this must have been frustrating for Moscow as it hindered the creation of the anti-
imperialist front the USSR sought. Finally, Grinevsky insisted that the PLO should fully attend 
a Geneva conference to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, including its initial stages. He viewed 
Arafat as powerful despite internal difficulties and setbacks in Lebanon. On 11 August, Arafat 
met with the Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Soldatov, probably to ask for increased pressure 
on Syria to come to an agreement with the PLO.319 All this indicate a Soviet confidence in, 
and support of the Palestinian leader.  
 
It was claimed that Assad wanted to remove Arafat and replace him with a pro-Syrian man. 
This would have given Damascus more, and Moscow less influence over the PLO, so 
Grinevsky’s comments make sense. Even though the PLO Chairman did not have the 
ideology the Russians’ preferred, he was still seeking Moscow‘s support.  
 
In spite of its small size, the Syrian Communist Party (SCP) had a role in Soviet-Syrian 
relations. In early August, the party declared its support for the Syria-Palestinian accord and 
said the USSR also welcomed it.320 The SCP claimed the agreement foiled the Saudi-Egyptian 
attempt to exhaust the Syrians and Palestinians and drag them into Sadat’s capitulationist 
policy. The party was a traditional supporter of Soviet policy in the Middle East and the 
statement and indicated the Kremlin’s support of the agreement.  
 
The fall of Tel al-Zaatar 
During the fall of Tel al-Zaatar on 12 August, the sources estimate 12,000 Palestinians were 
evacuated and refer to 300-400 people being massacred by the Christian forces.321 Both the 
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US and Arafat considered that Syria blocked the implementation of the agreement with the 
PLO. 322 That shows that Assad did not really want a ceasefire, but used the negotiations and 
the agreement as a tactic. The goal was probably to give the Russians and the Arab states an 
image of being willing to make a compromise. Tel al-Zaatar had been under siege for 
months, and both the Pravda and the Kremlin had had a long time to prepare an opinion and 
make a policy. To get closer to Moscow’s thinking about the fall of Tel al-Zaatar it is 
interesting to see what Pravda, the official newspaper of the Soviet Communist Party wrote. 
 
Three days after the event 
Pravda mentioned it, and 
referred to Nicolas Shawi, the 
Secretary General of the 
Lebanese Communist Party’s 
comment that it was time for a 
«sound compromise» between 
Syria and the PLO-LNM.323 No 
more details were given, 
however, the fact that the 
Communists showed willingness 
to find a solution and Moscow’s 
referring to it showed a change in 
policy. This was probably 
instigated by the grim realities on 
the ground where the PLO-LNM 
lost terrain.  
Map: The Tel al-Zaatar refugee camp just south of the Nabaa  
neighborhood in Beirut.324  
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A full week later, on 19 August Pravda’s Middle East expert Pavel Demchencko said he was 
upset by the fall of Tel al-Zaatar, although he claimed the PLO was not.325 Still, Pravda had 
yet not decided how to respond. Given the long time this had been in the making, this is 
noticeable. The Soviet expert called the Lebanese Civil War «tragic» and was bitter of the US 
accepting Israeli supplies to the Christians. He actually confessed that the USSR had a 
difficult time finding a way to deal with the events in Lebanon and improve Russian policy. 
 
He said another statement could be issued, but this would not really help the Palestinians. 
He hoped that the incoming President Sarkis, a banker who strangely enough was accepted 
by the leftists, could unite the Lebanese and stop the war. The Middle East chief of Pravda 
did not know how to respond. He was sorry and hoping for a Christian, the conservative 
Sarkis to do something. Demchenko’s openness, admitting that the Moscow did not really 
have a Lebanon policy is striking.  
 
That day Pravda ended up publishing an interview with French Communist Party leader 
Georges Marchais who demanded a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.326 More criticism of 
Syria was coming through in the Soviet press, Krasnaya Zvezda cited the Lebanese 
Communist Party’s comment that the Syrian forces complicated the situation.327 Both 
Pravda and the official Soviet government’s newspaper, Izvestia referred to Italian and 
French organizations claiming that Syrian presence hindered a solution. Pravda and 
Krasnaya Zvezda ran TASS articles on continued fighting and ceasefire efforts with 
pessimism. They wrote, «Syria does not intend to withdraw its forces from Lebanon».328 The 
references to the French and Italian Communist parties, some of the strongest in Western 
Europe, and the Lebanese Communist Party, all criticizing Syria sent Damascus and the PLO-
LNM a signal. Nevertheless, it was just that, a warning message, and no practical policy was 
formulated. There seemed to be little reason for Assad to change course. 
 
The PLO had, according to Zafer Khatib, enough power to break the Christian blockade of Tel 
al-Zaatar, but he says US pressure stopped Arafat from relieving the camp.329 Tel al-Zaatar 
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was close to the PLO’s positions, but Henry Kissinger had set a red line for the PLO not to 
come close to the Christian areas in east Beirut and the core Christian area in Jounieh. 
Crossing the red line would have led to an Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Khatib believes the 
USSR knew about the red line. This could explain the limited Soviet response seen above. A 
heavier Soviet support of the PLO and stronger Palestinian action against the Christians 
could have triggered an Israeli invasion. With the US supporting Israel, the Russians would 
risk both Syria and the PLO being defeated, and an increased threat of a superpower 
confrontation.  
 
The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee followed up with a new declaration on 26 
August.330 The committee criticized Israel, but was actually more moderate than in the last 
declaration it made on 10 July.331 It indirectly proposed that a Syrian withdrawal from 
Lebanon and cooperation with «natural allies» would contribute to a solution. The 
statement called for an international campaign in support of the Palestinians and the LNM. 
Nonetheless, it did not go into specifics about how or who would do this, so it seemed more 
like a general expression of support than a call of action.  
 
Aleksandr Zotov, the First Secretary with responsibility for Lebanon and Syria in the Soviet 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said that the Solidarity committee’s statement was the least 
Moscow ought to do. Despite that, he denied any co-ordination between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Solidarity Committee. Zotov showed some comprehension for the 
motivation for the Syrian intervention, but said it served the Rightist-Christian groups and 
that it would not be possible to practice «normal» politics until Syria withdrew. He added 
that the Soviet view was that Syria was becoming isolated in the Arab world, but also 
expressed that the big powers had an extra responsibility of avoiding escalation. His partial 
understanding of the Syrian policy is a sign of awareness of Damascus’ goals, but he was still 
critical of them. Seeing Syria as isolated was in fact not quite correct. As we have seen Assad 
had indirect and secret contact with the Saudis. By commenting on eschewing an escalation 
in superpower relations, he signaled a cautious attitude. Moscow did not seem to want 
more tensions.  
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The PLO-leader Kaddoumi thought that Syria would not destroy the Palestinian forces in 
Lebanon, not because it was unable, but because of other reasons which he did not 
declare.332 He also claimed the Palestinians would have won if Syria had not supported the 
Rightists. This is another indication that the Syrians made a limited but clear move to quell 
the PLO-LNM from taking power. Jumblatt on his side met the Soviet Ambassador Soldatov 
asking the USSR to coerce Syria to withdraw and kept demanding a reform of the Lebanese 
political system.333 This confirms the direct contact between the USSR and the LNM-leader. 
However, while the PLO saw its military weakness compared with Syria and was willing to 
talk, Jumblatt was unwilling to compromise. These internal differences in the PLO-LNM camp 
necessarily weakened the alliance, and also made it clear that the Kremlin was unable to 
dictate their political strategy.   
 
On 29 August, Pravda, stated that a withdrawal would have «great significance» in solving 
the War in Lebanon.334 The points made were basically the same as the Solidarity committee 
had made three days earlier, and this now became the official line. On 30 August, the 
Lebanese government statement sent the Kremlin a note protesting the Soviet Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Committee’s support of the Palestinians.335 This was a rare Lebanese reaction, still, 
as the pro-western Maronites dominated Lebanon, it was not surprising. The reaction 
demonstrate the weak relations Moscow had with the Lebanese government. Consequently, 
the Kremlin had to walk a fine line in the maneuvering of supporting the PLO-LNM and not 
antagonizing the Lebanese Christians.   
 
On 2 September, Assad told President-elect Sarkis that future talks with the PLO would only 
take place if Arafat was replaced.336 According to unnamed «observers», the preferred 
Syrian candidate was as-Sai’qa leader Mohsen. This clearly confirm the claims of Assad’s 
antagonism against Arafat and that he clearly wanted him removed. In addition, Assad 
blamed the PLO for the problems in Lebanon and for the 1970 Black September fighting in 
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Jordan. A Syria-controlled PLO would not have been in Soviet interest and this partly explains 
the Russian opposition to Damascus’ intervention in Lebanon. 
 
The Soviet ambassador’s absence 
The Soviet ambassador to Lebanon, Alexander Soldatov left Beirut on 2 September. 337  He 
did not return until 14 December, but no explanation was given about his absence and this 
caused some uncertainty. According to the Russian Embassy, he was going on a two week 
vacation, however rumors said he was recalled to Moscow.338 An official publication of the 
Palestinian Rejection front claimed the Soldatov’s recall showed that the Kremlin’s wished to 
avoid an embarrassing situation.339 Three weeks later, the Soviet political officer in Cairo 
commented that the Embassy in Beirut hardly functioned. In addition, Moscow was more 
and more frustrated by a lack of clear understanding of the evolving situation in Lebanon. 340 
The Soviet Embassy in Cairo tried to support with some analysis, still their feeling was that 
the Egyptians had no role to play in Lebanon led Moscow to lean heavily on Damascus.  
 
A three months absence for an ambassador at a time when two Soviet clients fought each 
other, can hardly have been a coincidence. Soldatov kept on as ambassador until 1986, and 
there are no signs that he did not have Moscow’s confidence, so that was probably not the 
reason. The description by the Cairo diplomat is new, it is rare, very revealing and makes 
sense. It seems like the Soviet embassy in Lebanon was in chaos and this strengthens the 
image that Moscow simply did not manage to follow the evolving situation. The Lebanese 
Civil War was an important topic and the ambassador may have been recalled to advice the 
Kremlin more closely during this difficult period. The recall may also have been prolonged to 
avoid embarrassing confrontations by highly critical PLO-LNM leaders. 
 
On the ground, there were indications of increased support for the LNM. On 8 September, a 
Lebanese official claimed that street gangs in West Beirut had become more communist-
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oriented.341 He remarked that the leftist still believed in full victory and was afraid that a 
prolonged conflict would increase the Communists’ strength. This backed up the claim Assad 
made a few weeks earlier. However, street gangs are not an organized force capable of 
fighting a regular army like the Syrian. In spite of all the problems, the LNM was unwilling to 
compromise. Moscow had not been able to convince them to compromise with Syria.  
 
Now, the Kremlin seemed to take on the call for a compromise that the Lebanese 
Communist Party had made three weeks earlier. In a long Pravda article on 8 September, 
«Observer» once more criticized the Syrian invasion of Lebanon.342 «Observer» stated that 
the cooperation between Syria and the PLO was ruined, and warned against forcing the 
Palestinians and LNM too far and instead asked for a compromise. On the other hand, it 
noted that a partial pull-back was also a new idea to solve the conflict. «Observer» said a 
political solution «on basis of a reasonable compromise» was the only way to achieve peace. 
Rejections of a peace proposals, as «some ultra-left elements» in the PLO and in the LNM 
would lead to more lives being lost. This alert about hard Syrian pressure on the PLO would 
strengthen the Palestinian «ultra-left», resonated with statements made by other Soviet 
Middle East experts.343 As the research literature pointed out, the Kremlin continued to 
publicly express its disagreement with the Syrian policy. The Pravda article gave no 
indication of what the USSR might do to work out a solution to the conflict.  
 
The Russians made a different attempt to support the PLO. On 9 September the Soviet 
Ambassador to Cairo, Vladimir Polyakov suggested to the PLO Political Director Said Kamal 
that the time was opportune to form a Palestinian government in exile.344 Kamal though 
reported several problems with establishing a government and the PLO had seemingly 
rejected a similar proposal at an Arab League meeting arguing that the conflict in Lebanon 
ought to be solved first. 
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Then, as the research literature wrote on Kaddoumi met with Gromyko in Moscow to talk 
about the conflict in Lebanon 17 September.345 Pravda reported a «warm and friendly» 
atmosphere in meetings with the Central Committee, however Kaddoumi’s talk with 
Gromyko was only «exchange of opinions» in a «friendly» atmosphere. This implied a 
difference in Soviet and Palestinian positions. Moreover, after weeks of Soviet references to 
a Syrian withdrawal, Pravda did not report about any need for that. Combined with the 
timing of the meeting, just a few days before Sarkis was to access the presidency, it 
indicated that the Kremlin applied pressure on the PLO to move closer to Syrian positions.  
 
In the Arab-world, accusations and demands continued to take place. On 17 September, 
Khaddam said the Gulf states were supporting Jumblatt, while they had cut the aid to 
Syria.346 He said Damascus had informed Saudi Arabia and other Gulf leaders about the full 
extent of Soviet pressure and claimed that if Jumblatt succeeded, the Gulf states would be 
the first to pay the price. According to Khaddam, Syria might be unable to sustain the current 
burdens, and change policy. This would be felt in the Gulf States, and Khaddam requested 
the US to ask the Gulf states to stop their aid to Jumblatt and the extremist elements of the 
PLO. This was a complete reversal of previous Syrian policy when Damascus claimed inter-
Arab relations were only a matter for Arabs to discuss, and shows how far Assad would go to 
withstand the Soviet pressure. 
 
Renewed Soviet initiatives 
 
The Soviet Middle East Peace Conference initiative  
The Kremlin tried another tactic to raise the question about a region overall peace 
settlement and link it to a solution in Lebanon. The Soviet co-president of the Middle East 
Peace Conference (MEPC) in Geneva, Vladimir Vinogradov visited Damascus 17-20 
September.347 He proposed a two-stage process where the PLO would participate in both 
phases. Khaddam responded that Syria continued to demand a complete Israeli withdrawal 
from the Golan Heights, recognition of Palestinian rights and PLO participation as a full 
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member of the conference.348 Vinogradov said that Geneva could establish a base on which 
the Lebanese conflict could be resolved afterwards.  
 
Meanwhile, Pravda backed up the message by calling for the superpowers to meet in 
Geneva, and the need for a separate conference on Lebanon. Soviet Premier Gromyko again 
raised the Geneva conference at the UN Security Council meeting on 28 September.349 By 
explaining that the situation in Lebanon was caused by the absence of an overall settlement 
and urging for reconvening the Geneva conference, he tried to link the two issues.  
 
The Political officer at Soviet Embassy in Cairo gave more details about the new policy. He 
told US Embassy Official on 21 September that Moscow was making concerted efforts to 
induce Assad to adopt a more even-handed stance between PLO and Christians in 
Lebanon.350 The Political officer conceded that the Soviet policy had been inconsistent over 
the past six months, but now Moscow saw Syria as the only viable arbiter and were using 
friendly persuasion to end fighting. It took the Soviet Union a long time to realize why the 
Syrians had intervened in Lebanon and to get over the shock of Syrian move coinciding with 
Kosygin’s visit. Now the Soviet Union understood that the Syrian government feared a 
dominant Leftist-PLO bloc might trigger an Israeli intervention. Hence, Damascus supported 
the Christians. The Russians further believed Syria had reached its national goals and 
thought Damascus’ influence would continue if fighting ended.  
 
However, Moscow was afraid that by continued support of the Christians, its «progressive» 
reputation in the Arab world was at risk as well as concerned about the internal dissolution. 
The Soviet Political officer further said Moscow was not very optimistic regarding a quick end 
to the fighting in Lebanon. After failed talks in Cairo the last ten days, the Soviet embassy 
more and more saw the Syrians as the «only game in town as far as Lebanon concerned». 
 
Vinogradov had another goal by his trip, to make the Syrians reach an agreement with the 
PLO leadership.351 The US analysts thought this could have been the theme for Kaddoumi’s 
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recent talks in Moscow. As we have seen this was an important topic for all three parties. 
The Kremlin made clear it upheld its support of Arafat in another Afro-Asian Solidarity 
Committee statement on 1 October.352 The committee saw Arafat as a positive force, and 
the Syrian attacks were portrayed as dangerous for the PLO-LNM.  
 
Soviet use of the Syrian Communist Party 
In addition, Moscow played another card, the Syrian Communist Party (SCP). TASS referred 
to an alleged SCP attack against Assad’s Lebanon policy, and this was regarded as a reminder 
that the USSR could use the SCP to increase Syria’s domestic problems.353 However, the 
Soviet position seemed to change towards accepting a Syrian role in Lebanon. The Pravda’s 
«Observer» article notably modified Moscow’s earlier hardline demand for a withdrawal. 
Soviet officials confirmed that the USSR continued to honor bilateral agreements with Syria, 
providing economic and military aid. 
 
Seen together, the recent busy Russian activity indicated that Moscow wanted to be a party 
to all activities, and also regarded the actions in Lebanese as especially important. The PLO 
had been losing positions, and Moscow accused the imperialists and Israel of trying to 
destroy the PLO. This suggested that that the Kremlin considered the Syrians gains as 
irreversible, and more fighting could only lead to a complete Palestinian defeat. From the 
Kremlin this was a good moment to make a settlement. 
 
Palestinians attack Damascus hotel and Syrian goes on the offensive 
The Kremlin’s hopes for a resolution were quickly dashed. Three days after the Lebanese 
president Sarkis was inaugurated on 23 September, Palestinian guerillas attacked the 
Semiramis hotel in Damascus taking 50 hostages and demanding 25 Palestinians released 
from Syrian prisons.354 Syrian troops stormed the hotel, the guerillas supposedly admitted 
they were members of Fatah and that the attack had been planned in Baghdad.355 This gave 
Damascus an excuse to act, and on 28 September, just five days after the inauguration of 
Sarkis, the Syrian army attacked the Palestinian-LNM forces in the Metn area northeast of 
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Beirut.356 After a two-day battle where Syria obtained most of its military goals, on 29 
September a ceasefire was agreed upon.357 Now the Palestinians only held one location 
north of the Beirut-Damascus road and were obviously weakened.  
 
Once more Moscow was overtaken by events. The Soviet Political Officer in Cairo was 
stunned by the 28 September Syrian-Christian offensive, and wondered why Assad did this 
so soon after the inauguration of Sarkis.358 The USSR had in fact had so many surprises in 
Lebanon, that they were starting to take broader views of the events and were not «rattled 
by every inexplicable lurch». At the same time, Moscow confirmed the earlier mentioned 
patience by saying it would continue to work for a meaningful compromise. He admitted 
that Egypt would play a role in Lebanon, but did not think that the upcoming Riyad meeting 
was the right forum to solve the crisis.  
 
In Egypt as well the USSR suffered setbacks. The Soviet Political Officer in Cairo said on 30 
September that although the Egyptian government claimed that Moscow backed up its 
Lebanon policy, they had a tendency to exclude the Russians. In fact, the Soviet embassy in 
Cairo had no contacts with the Egyptian government over Lebanon at the moment.  
 
The question of partition 
 
The question of partitioning Lebanon was raised by several parties. One report said everyone 
was accusing the other parties of working for partition of Lebanon.359 The Egyptian 
newspaper Gazette claimed in early August that the Soviet Union accepted a partition plan 
where Syria would get the Beqaa valley.360 However, none of the main Lebanese Christian 
leaders favored a partition of the country.361 Their goal was a unified Lebanon without 
Palestinian armed forces playing a role in Lebanese politics. Nevertheless, Lebanese 
president Frangieh said the «de facto» partition was making the Palestinians more radical 
and former president Chamoun thought one part of Lebanon could be saved from «going 
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communist». Chamoun denied partition was an issue for the Christians if the Palestinians 
were disarmed. 362 For the Maronites the urgent goal was to end Palestinian political 
involvement in Lebanon and accept the Cairo accords.363 They thought this could take a long 
time as the Soviet Union and Arab states supported the PLO. Another Christian leader 
claimed the Syria intervened to achieve the political goals of reinstating a stable and 
conservative Lebanon.364  
 
There was disagreement among the Maronite political elite. Frangieh said Syrian policy was 
crucial and as long as Assad stayed in power he expected his support of the Christians. 365 In 
contrast, Presidential candidate Raymond Edde criticized the Syrian intervention and 
claimed Damascus wanted to annex portions of Lebanon and feared the country would be 
partitioned.366 He claimed Syria had never accepted that France separated the Bekaa valley, 
Akkar and Tripoli and adjoined it to form Lebanon in 1920. Israel was going to annex the 
areas south of the Litani river. Syria also wanted to destroy PLO’s capacity to be independent 
because the organization threatened Syrian freedom of action. The Arab League force was 
only 3,000 strong and needed 12,000 to succeed. The problem was in Edde’s opinion that 
moderate Arab countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were tired of the PLO and 
wanted them crushed. 
 
As we have seen Grinevsky at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign affairs stated the USSR showed 
respect for the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon. Ambassador Soldatov 
confirmed  to Lebanese Prime Minister Karame that the Soviet Union backed Lebanon’s 
sovereignty, integrity and independence.367 In sum, the Soviet policy was upholding all the 
time to keep Lebanon together as a state.  The Egyptian claim seems more like part of a 
propaganda campaign trying to discredit the USSR. 
 
  
                                                          
362 Frangieh wondered why the US was so silent about the American support of Syria. The US official responded that the results of 
diplomacy was more important than the image held by the Lebanese public. Frangieh replied that the Russians were not hiding their 
intentions and support of their friends. WikiLeaks, «MEETING WITH FRANJIEH AND CHAMOUN», 3. 25 August. 
363 WikiLeaks, «EVOLUTION OF OVERALL SITUATION», 1. 26 August.  
364 WikiLeaks, «MEETING WITH PAKRADOUNI», 1-2. 26 August. 
365 WikiLeaks, « MEETING WITH FRANGIEH AND CHAMOUN». 6 September. 
366 WikiLeaks, «CALL ON RAYMOND EDDE», 1-4. 30 August.  
367 WikiLeaks, «LEBANESE SITUATION AUG 28», 1-3. 28 August. 
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Another Soviet call for Geneva and pressure on Cairo 
 
Then on 4 October Kremlin again proposed to reconvene the Geneva conference.368 
According to a TASS statement the USSR sent the proposal to Syria, the PLO, Egypt, Jordan, 
Israel and the USA. It included four points: Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in 
1967; recognition of the Palestinian people, including the right to have a state; right to 
independence for all concerned parties and finally an end of the state of war. The PLO 
should participate from the start of the conference and as an equal party. Khatib explained 
that the Soviet strategy was based on the thought that a Palestinian state would be a friend 
of the USSR.369 The Kremlin wanted to have one state for the Palestinians and one for the 
Israelis said. The Russians supported both the Palestinian armed resistance and the 
convocation of a conference in Geneva.  
 
The Soviet charge d’affaires in Cairo pressed Egyptian Foreign Minister for a reaction to the 
proposal about the Geneva conference, and especially if it could be organized before the US 
elections in November. 370 The Egyptians had sent signals of reconciliation to Moscow in the 
summer, but got no response from the USSR.371 Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait led 
Arab moderate states efforts to reconcile Egypt and Syria and saw this as the key to solve 
the conflict in Lebanon. The détente made in Riyad on 23 June was destroyed by Assad’s 
speech on 20 July. The Egyptian government saw Assad’s policy as efforts to dominate the 
region and tried to counter him. Since then a propaganda war played out between Damascus 
and Cairo and Sadat thought the internal dissent in Syria would end Assad’s rule.  
 
Moscow tried to avoid any foreign involvement in Lebanon and let the Lebanese negotiate 
themselves. This was demonstrated by the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Cairo 
criticism of rumors about a French roundtable discussion on Lebanon.372 The USSR thought 
any meeting should be held in Lebanon and preferably only with Lebanese parties present. 
Only if and when the Lebanese agreed to, the PLO and Syria could be included in the talks. 
                                                          
368 WikiLeaks, «NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL ON GENEVA CONFERENCE», 1.-2. 4 October.  
369 Interview with Zafer Khatib in Sidon, Lebanon 13 November 2017. Arafat wanted to have good relations with the USSR, however, he did 
not believe in making a strategic alliance with only one part, so he maintained relations with Europe and USA. 
370 WikiLeaks, «NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL ON GENEVA CONFERENCE», 1.-2. 4 October.  
371 WikiLeaks, «QUARTERLY POLITICAL ASSESSMENT: 1 JULY TO SEPT 30, 76», 4. 4 October. The assessments were made in a quarterly US 
report on the situation in Egypt. 
372 WikiLeaks, «COMMENTS BY SOVIET DIPLOMAT ON LEBANESE SITUATION», 1-2. 5 October. Damascus reacted with silence and Beirut 
with condemnation, so the French imitative soon fell. 
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This proposal made sense from a Soviet point of view. Because in spite of all the setbacks the 
PLO-LNM held considerable ground and this would give them some influence in 
negotiations. With a Syrian seat in the negotiations, PLO-LNM would be weakened. 
 
Assad on his side reacted to the Soviet activities. In an interview with a Lebanese editor, he 
criticized the Soviet policy in Lebanon in stronger terms than before.373 Assad confirmed the 
veracity of the Le Monde version of Brezhnev’s message to him and described it as:  
… in this message Leonid Brezhnev asked me to pull the Syrian Army out of Lebanon, I considered this 
request simply as an expression of a point of view, which is not subject to compromise because it is 
based on our firm national principles and interests.  
Assad admitted he had received another message from Brezhnev, not revealing the content 
of it, just saying «we disagree in our assessment of the situation in Lebanon». 374 Assad 
probably referred to the message Soviet Deputy Minister Kuznetsov brought on 22 July.  
 
Asked about a Soviet backed Iraqi proposal to create a Libyan-Algerian-Iraqi-Syrian front, 
Assad said the Soviet position on UN Security Council resolution 242 was unclear. He was 
also unhappy with an increased number of communists and «Marxists» operating in 
Lebanon, mentioning the PLO groups PFLP and DFLP. Assad denied that Kosygin had raised 
the issue of «Syrian hostility to establishment of progressive regime» in Lebanon during the 
visit in June. Assad had denied several issues, in spite of other sources verifying them. This 
denial indicates that the USSR regarded the PLO-LNM establishing a progressive regime, one 
that would be a friend of the Soviet Union.  
 
On 8 October The Syrians halted their offensive and this gave Arafat an opportunity to 
reconsider the situation.375 The US assessed Syria had the military capacity to make a new 
offensive. According to a US analysis, the Syrian influence over the Palestinian resistance had 
decreased during the last few months.376 The USSR, Iraq and Egypt wanted to keep the PLO 
as an independent force outside Syrian domination. The US assessed that Syria did not want 
to reconcile, but to completely submit the PLO and put it into a similar position as in Syria 
                                                          
373 Assad gave the interview to Salim al-Lozi, publisher of the Lebanese journal al-Hawadith. Events is the English-language weekly version 
of al-Hawadith. El-Lozi, «If we were not in Lebanon, Israel would have intervened», 19-23. Events, 1 October 1976. Al-Lozi was killed in 
March 1980, and the assassins were suspected to be Syrian.  
374 WikiLeaks, «ASAD INTERVIEW WITH LEBANESE JOURNALIST COMES DOWN HARD ON SOVIETS», 1-2. 5 October.  
375 WikiLeaks, «n/a», 1-2. 8 October.  
376 WikiLeaks, «SYRIA AND THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON», 1-2. 11 October.  
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proper, where it was supervised by the Syrian army and government. It seemed like the 
Palestinian leaders were slowly coming to realize the Syrian goals and were looking for 
alternatives to a complete surrender. 
 
The latest Soviet proposal for a Middle East settlement repeated the main elements of the 
Kremlin’s 28 April statement.377 It had some new points: A direct call for action, in contrast 
to earlier sharing of Soviet views; specifically propose dates for reconvening the Geneva 
conference in October or November; PLO participation on equal footing with the rest of the 
participants; «Stoppage in the state of war between the concerned Arab states and Israel». 
The last point was likely a response to the February 1976 Israeli proposal to end the state of 
belligerency as a next step in the peace process. The US saw the Soviet proposal as a way to 
get them a role in the Arab-Israeli talks and influence discussion at the upcoming UN General 
Assembly along Soviet lines. The Russians main goal seemed to be to reintroduce themselves 
in the overall settlement process, but it was seen as a perfunctory statement as Moscow did 
not expect progression in the Middle East based on its initiatives. Arafat asked Brezhnev to 
take a clear stand on the Syrian attack.378 
 
Mini-summit and agreement in Riyad 
 
A mini-summit was organized in Riyad on 18 October with Assad, Sadat, Arafat and Sarkis. 
The Lebanese President Sarkis and Arafat worked out the «Riyad declaration» detailing how 
the PLO’s relationship with the Lebanese government would be.379 These were similar to the 
terms made at the Arab League’s Rabat and Algiers conferences. The declaration would be 
brought to an Arab League Summit in Cairo for approval by the member states. Assad 
avoided criticizing Egypt’s second Sinai agreement and Sadat accepted Syrian supremacy in 
Lebanon.380 
 
Assad’s political advisor Adib Daoudi said that Sadat and Arafat came to Riyad ready to make 
an agreement.381 Arafat had said he was prepared to force the Palestinians and the leftists to 
                                                          
377 WikiLeaks, «SOVIET PROPOSAL ON THE MIDDLE EAST», 1-3. 12 October.  
378 WikiLeaks, «LEBANESE SITUATION OCTOBER 14», 4.  14 October 1976.  
379 WikiLeaks, «RIYADH MINI SUMMIT», 1-2. 18 October.  
380 WikiLeaks, «EC,: INTSUM 178 - OCTOBER 26, 1976». 26 October. 
381 The PLO had sent moderate delegates and Assad had personally persuaded Arafat to go by supplying a Syrian military helicopter 
transferring him to a Saudi plane in Damascus. WikiLeaks, «SYRIAN VIEW OF RIYADH SUMMIT», Section 1 and 2. 21 October.  
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stop fighting, and Sadat admitted the Egyptian policy against Syria had failed. Daoudi 
thought the Russians would see that Syria could resist the Soviet pressure and would 
become more lenient from now on. Arafat had himself proposed to go directly to Baghdad 
to convince the Iraqi leaders that he was content with the Riyad resolutions.  
 
Daoudi said that before the mini-summit, the Saudis had thought Syria one-sidedly 
supported the Christians, and had cut the economic aid to Damascus and backed up the 
Muslims. Assad’s presentation in Riyad made Saudi Arabia change its mind about Syrian 
intentions in Lebanon, and expected them to reduce the support to the PLO and the 
Lebanese Left. Daoudi also thought the Russians would be pleased with the new situation, as 
they disliked an increased role for the Saudis in the region because they regarded them as 
acting completely on US prompts. Daoudi stated that the Kremlin had been cautious by 
avoiding pressuring Damascus into a conflict.  
 
The Russians had obviously been dissatisfied by being forced to choose between the PLO 
and Syria. Assad had understood this and used this insight when he replied to the criticism in 
Soviet media. For instance, Assad held his reaction in the interview with the Lebanese 
journalist. Finally, the outcome of the Riyad meetings supported Damascus in standing up to 
Moscow. As the Russians were clever he assumed they would understand this and soon 
relieve their pressure. The Arab Security Force (ASF) was outlined to have 30.000 men. 
 
The Soviet embassy officials in Cairo expressed suspicions of the decisions in Riyad.382  As the 
mini-summit was a Saudi Arabian initiative, they thought the US had been making up the 
scheme. A Soviet official A. Zotov at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was positive about the 
Riyad agreement.383 He saw the Palestinians’ loss of influence as natural because of the 
defeats they suffered in Lebanon. He said Syria wanted to strengthen its domination over 
the PLO however, he did not think Damascus wanted to wipe out the PLO. As Assad wanted 
a change in PLO’s leadership Arafat might have to go, but Kaddoumi, who was very much like 
Arafat, he could not see other replacements acceptable to the Palestinians.  
 
                                                          
382 All members except Libya and Iraq endorsed the proposal. WikiLeaks, «ARAB FONMINS APPROVE RIYADH RESOLUTIONS», 1-3. 21 
October.  
383 WikiLeaks, «SOVIET MFA OFFICIAL ON RIYADH AGREEMENT», 1-3. 21 October.  
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For the USSR though, the relation with the PLO could not be compared to the relationship 
with a state. Zotov explained the lack of a call for a Syrian withdrawal in the recent Soviet 
statements.384 He said it would have been embarrassing to once more express the Soviet 
position of an immediate and complete pull-out when the Riyad conference was likely to 
agree upon a gradual withdrawal. The Soviet policy would remain the same, but if the Arab 
League found a way to achieve Syrian withdrawal it would be a step forward.  Nevertheless, 
Zotov was satisfied with the ceasefire agreed upon, nevertheless he was skeptical if the 
different groups involved would agree to be disarmed. And if the Palestinians went back to 
the camps that would be a defeat to them. The expanded Arab Force which was going to 
observe the Syrian troop withdrawal, would have to be formed by Syrian troops, and he 
doubted the agreement would hold. The most important issue according to Zotov was what 
would happen to the Palestinians.  
 
The Kremlin showed some understanding for Assad’s goals intervening in Lebanon, however 
these were inconsistent with staying on in Lebanon. The Kremlin had informed Damascus 
about its view and there had been tension. Moscow had refused some Syrian «suggestions» 
in economic and military areas. He said the USSR and Syria had been conscious about 
keeping their disagreements within controlled limits.  
 
On 25 October, Brezhnev criticized the US, other NATO states and Israel for attacking the 
PLO and trying to sow discord among the Arabs. The Soviet General Secretary expressed a 
very cautious optimism over the Riyad agreement.385 He was only lightly critical of the 
Syrians noting more in sorrow than in anger that they had «unfortunately» been drawn into 
the fray. Brezhnev stressed the great importance of the reconciliation between Syria and the 
PLO-LNM. Nevertheless, gone were the optimistic remarks he had expressed half a year 
earlier about the Soviet-Syrian relations.  
 
  
                                                          
384 Zotov referred to the Pravda commentary of 18 October and the Afro-Asian solidarity committee’s 19 October statement. 
385 WikiLeaks, «FIRST DAY OF THE OCTOBER 1976 CC PLENUM: BREZHNEV ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY». 26 October. 
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Increased Soviet political and diplomatic pressure deflected by Syria 
 
In sum, immediately after the Syrian intervention, the USSR was confused about it and even 
supported it. After more than a week, the Kremlin distanced itself from it and in July put 
diplomatic and political pressure on the parties through media and closed meetings. 
Moscow’s main negotiation attempt seems to have taken place in July and this led to the 29 
July ceasefire agreement. That gave the Russians a respite from the pressure they were 
under from the PLO-LNM. After the Syrian offensive in late September, the Soviet and 
Eastern Bloc diplomats in Damascus said the Syrian intervention was necessary to sort out 
the Lebanese crisis. However, before the last Syrian offensive the policy shifted back to 
criticize the Syrian moves. Damascus responded by reducing the Soviet attempt to 
reconvene Geneva, which Vinogradov promoted on his visit.  
 
The Russians may have believed that Damascus did not have an US option and was forced to 
maintain good relations with the USSR as a superpower and its protector, but they were not 
sure of this. Assad on the other hand clearly made his moves based on a belief that the 
Kremlin could not bear the expense of losing another Middle East client, either Syria, the 
PLO or the LNM. Neither party wanted to damage their relationship, so when Syrian 
interests of national security were at stake, Assad easily diverted the Russian diplomatic 
initiatives that he considered unfriendly. Moscow was not able to force Damascus to adhere 




Chapter 4 The USSR’s and its clients' military pressure on 
Syria and support of the PLO  
 
Moscow regarded military means as the most efficient way to expand influence in the Cold 
War, according to a CIA report. 386 One of the questions that has been raised, is how much 
military pressure the USSR put on Syria after the intervention in Lebanon in 1976, and how 
Assad reacted. Another issue has been how much support the USSR and its regional clients 
gave to the PLO-LNM.  
 
The military aspects in the research literature 
 
Soviet military pressure of Syria 
Most of the researchers agree that the USSR heavily reduced or suspended arms supplies to 
Syria after the intervention in Lebanon.387 Nevertheless, they differ in view regarding the 
scale and timing of the measures.388 The USSR suspended deliveries of military equipment 
and spare parts and delayed the signing of new arms contracts from July, according to Pedro 
Ramet.389 Assad retaliated by sending thousands of Soviet military advisers home according 
to Ramet.390 Efraim Karsh on the other hand says it was the Russians who held up technical 
assistance, in addition to significantly reducing arms supplies after Brezhnev’s letter in mid-
July.391 Later he calls it an embargo that lasted until early 1977, when shipments were fully 
restored before Assad secured military aid during his Moscow visit in April 1977. 
Contradicting them, Ilana Kass deems a report about a Soviet arms embargo as propaganda, 
meant to pressure Syria.392 This falls in line with her view that the USSR endorsed the Syria 
intervention. 
 
                                                          
386 CIA, «NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE - SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES», 15-16. 12 January 1977. 
387 Dawisha claims that Soviet arms supplies «dwindled to a trickle» in the autumn and recommenced in April 1977. Dawisha cites a The 
International Herald Tribune article dated 3 October 1977, which is based on CIA reports. Dawisha, Syria and the Lebanese Crisis, 107 and 
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by ordering several thousand Soviet advisors to leave Syria» and temporarily ending the program of sending Syrians to the USSR for 
training. Chanis, Soviet policy toward Syria and the lessons of Egypt, 250 and 252. Freedman does not deal with the military issues. 
388 There are several issues involved; to what degree existing arms contracts were completed, whether new agreements were made and 
what happened to the military technical assistance. 
389 Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian relationship since 1955, 112.  
390 Syria reduced the number of Soviet advisers from 3,000-5,000 to 1,800 and stopped sending military personnel to the USSR. Ramet, The 
Soviet-Syrian relationship since 1955, 113. 
391 Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria, 36, 39, 43. Ramet cites a paper by Roger Pajak to the US Congress regarding the arms suspension, and 
a New York Times article 4 March 1977 about the advisor reduction.  
392 Kass referred to an Iraqi News agency’s report of suspended Soviet deliveries. Kass, «Moscow and the Lebanese triangle», 172, 176. 
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The Soviet navy’s activities and need for bases in the Mediterranean  
The literature is relatively brief about the Soviet navy’s need of bases and its actions in the 
Mediterranean after the Syrian invasion. Dawisha and Chanis say the Syrians believed the 
USSR’s support of the PLO‐LNM derived from the need for naval bases in the 
Mediterranean.393 The Syrians refused to increase the base access, and the Russians hoped 
to get them in Lebanon says Dawisha. Karsh disagrees with this view and says Syria gave the 
USSR access to facilities off Tartus in May 1976, and that a Soviet need for naval bases was 
not behind its PLO‐LNM support.394 Further, Karsh says Assad threatened, Ramet says he 
asked, Moscow to remove Soviet vessels from Tartus in January 1977.395 According to Karsh, 
this led to the Soviet renewal of supplying arms mentioned above. The Israeli navy blockaded 
Lebanon writes Karsh.396 In addition to the Israeli, Freedman mentions the Syrian blockade of 
Lebanese ports, and refers to the PLO complaining about a lack of Soviet support.397 He 
argues that the Russians were not willing to challenge either Syria or Israel. Kass does not 
mention anything about the Soviet naval issues.  
 
Soviet military and its clients’ support of the PLO-LNM  
The literature is even sparser on the USSR and its clients’ military support of the PLO and 
leftist forces.398 Collins refers to repeated Christian Lebanese reports of Soviet aid to the 
PLO-LNM, but says these were unconfirmed.399 He briefly states that arms of Soviet origin 
came to the PLO-leftist groups through Libya, Iraq and Egypt and the Russians never 
objected to this. Freedman refers to the Iraqi deployment of several divisions to the Syrian 
border as a way to counter the Syrian invasion of Lebanon.400 Galia Golan writes «there was 
no Iraqi assistance during the trials and tribulations of Lebanon».401 Later she added that 
                                                          
393 Dawisha, Syria and the Lebanese Crisis, 149. Jonathan Chanis in his Ph.D. thesis argues that the Soviet desire for a port in Lebanon was a 
major factor for the Kremlin’s support of the PLO-LNM against Syria. Chanis, Soviet policy toward Syria and the lessons of Egypt, 246.  
394 Karsh discusses a claim by the Syrian Minister of Information that the USSR wanted naval bases in the Mediterranean after losing access 
in Egypt. Karsh argues that because the USSR achieved naval access off Tartus, it had no interest in Lebanese naval bases. Karsh, The 
Soviet Union and Syria, 33-34.  
395 Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian relationship since 1955, 113. Karsh, The Soviet Union and Syria, 39.   
396 Karsh notes the blockade in relation to a Radio Moscow report which set Israel and Syria on the same side in the conflict against the 
PLO-LNM. 
397 Freedman cites Salah Khalaf, second in command in the PLO after Arafat, saying «We want a ship carrying flour and hoisting the Russian 
flag to come to Sidon and defy Israel». Freedman, «The Soviet Union and Civil War in Lebanon 1975-76», 84. 
398 Kass does not mention anything about military support of the PLO. 
399 Collins also mentions Christian claims of Soviet aircraft deliveries, but says these could be rejected as there were no planes to be seen in 
the sky. The Soviet ambassador in Beirut denied any arms shipments. Collins, «The Soviet Union», 221, 307.  
400 After the Iranian agreement was signed, Saddam crushed the Kurds in northern Iraq with Soviet weapons. Freedman, «The Soviet Union 
and Civil War I Lebanon 1975-76», 77.  
401 Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, 161.  
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Iraq sent a symbolic force of 100 soldiers to assist the PLO-LNM against Syria, and increased 
troop levels on the Syria-Iraqi border to force a Syrian troop withdrawal from Lebanon.402  
 
Soviet arms supplies remained normal until October 
 
In contrast to the literature described earlier and media claims, we will see that the USSR 
upheld its military support to Syria for a period after the invasion. In mid-July, a leftwing 
Lebanese newspaper claimed that the USSR had suspended arms deliveries to Syria, and this 
was followed by other claims.403 PLO-leader Kaddoumi told a Syrian journalist that the 
Russians suspended arms supplies a week after Khaddam visited the Kremlin.404 In early 
August, The Financial Times referred to Syrian sources who claimed that the USSR had 
implemented a total arms embargo on Syria and wanted Assad to be overthrown.405 
 
On the other hand, political and intelligence sources contradict this. Moscow had recently 
asked Damascus for increased access to naval facilities and the chances of achieving this 
would be reduced if the Kremlin cut off arms supplies, in the view of US analysts.406 Syrian 
Deputy Prime Minister Haydar admitted there were tensions in the relations with Moscow, 
but he did not believe the rumors of a Soviet threat to cut military support.407 Assad himself 
said he feared a cut-off in arms and military spare parts.408 However, he confirmed at the 
end of July that arms supplies had yet not been cut.409 The government in Cairo also stated 
that the USSR continued to ship weapons to Latakia.410 US intelligence stated that a Soviet 
ship brought trucks and other military equipment to Latakia on 2 August, which might be 
followed by several similar shipments.411 A senior Soviet military delegation with officers 
                                                          
402 Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, 170. 
403 CIA, «THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 JULY 1976», 2-3. 16 JULY. 
404 WikiLeaks, «SECOND BREJNEV LETTER TO ASAD: QADDUMI CONFIRMS SOVIET SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS», 1-2.  27 July. 
405 Financial Times correspondent Michael Tingay interviewed King Hussein who attacked Egypt’s Lebanon policy.  WikiLeaks, «FINANCIAL 
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406 In addition, existing Soviet access would be jeopardized. Still, the US analysts thought Soviet shipments might be delayed to show 
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407 WikiLeaks, «DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HAYDAR COMMENTS ON LEBANON; DOWNPLAYS REPORTS OF SOVIET PRESSURES ON SYRIA», 1-
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especially if the Russian military support was cut. WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING - LEBANON DEVELOPMENTS», 1-4. 28 July.  
410 The reaction, given by an official Egyptian spokesman, was published in the Egyptian daily al-Akhbar and focused on criticizing the 29 
July Syria-PLO agreement. It rejected the Syrian claim of Soviet pressure, however, as we have seen there was pressure, so this was part 
of the Egyptian propaganda against Syria. WikiLeaks, «EGYPT ATTACKS SYRIA OVER SYRIAN-PLO ACCORD AND COMMUNIQUE», 1-4. 31 
July. 
411 This was the first delivery since 12 July. CIA, «THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 AUGUST 1976», 3. 7 August 1976.  
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from the Chief of Staff visited Damascus on 20 September discussing armaments, and 
demonstrating that the parties sustained the relations.412 
 
Contradictory reports about arms shipments appeared. In mid-October, the Russians 
protested strongly against the fact that the Syrians used Soviet weapons against the PLO in 
Lebanon. About the same time, the Hungarian embassy received Soviet orders not to parley 
new arms agreements with Syria, and was advised not to fulfill existing ones. There were 
speculations that other East Bloc countries got the same message. Nevertheless, the USSR 
continued to fulfill existing arms agreements in late October according to US intelligence.413 
At the same time a Syrian official was absolutely sure that arms and spare parts supplies had 
not been cut.414 On the other hand, since Kosygin’s June visit, the Russians had started to 
demand Pound sterling cash payments for military spare parts that had usually been 
provided by the USSR.415 A CIA-report confirmed the demand for cash payment.416 In sum, 
there seems to have been a shift in the Soviet policy in October.  
 
Deliveries of Soviet tanks and missiles scheduled for October were delayed until 
December.417 When they finally arrived, it was just 30% of the agreed upon quantity. 
Another US report of January 1977, noted that aircraft deliveries had «slackened» in the 
second half of 1976.418 It further said the USSR might have withheld certain parts of the 
military aid and weapons, still no significant cuts were noticed. The USSR reduced arms sales 
to show displeasure with the invasion in Lebanon, Syria’s closer ties with Egypt and 
acquiescence to the US role in peace negotiations. Assad reacted at the reductions by 
threatening to cut the Soviet access to Tartus.  
 
In addition, in 1976, for the first time since 1969, the USSR and Syria did not sign a new 
military agreement.419 The cooling relationship was seen as the most important change in 
                                                          
412 WikiLeaks, «SYRO-SOVIET RELATIONS», 1-3. 26 October. 
413 The US observers thought the Russians had not done anything that could have put relations with Assad at risk. At the same time they 
said, the Kremlin maintained a relatively steadfast support of the PLO and denounced the Syrian intervention. CIA, «SOVIET MILITARY 
POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD», 24. 21 October. 
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419 CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 1. September 1977. 
96 
 
Soviet relations with Third World countries.420 However, neither part wanted a further 
deterioration. For Assad, arms purchases were important and he still depended on the USSR 
to get them. The Russians on the other hand saw Syria as their best entry point to the 
region, and their stature and influence over peace negotiations would suffer further in case 
of a rupture with Damascus.  
 
Nevertheless, the arms deliveries in 1976 totaled US$290 million.421 These were mostly 
sophisticated weapons that had been ordered under the October 1975 arms agreement. In 
the first half of 1976, arms shipments were so extensive that even with curtailment in the 
second half, the total was larger than in 1975.422 Aircraft constituted 75% of the value.423  
 
Table 1: Soviet arms deliveries to the Third World.424 (US$ millions) 
 1971-75 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Total 6,437 843 797 2,070 1,445 1,282 n.a. 
Syria 1,691 106 152 708 535 190 290425 
Egypt 1,375 340 240 565 80 150 n.a. 
Iraq 1,052 30 80 352 336 254 n.a. 
Libya 390 39 27 24 84 216 n.a. 
 
Syria turns to the West and the USSR recommence arms deliveries in 1977 
In January 1977, the Syrians again accused the USSR for cutting back on military 
shipments.426 A reason could be the increase Saudi influence over Syria and the fear that 
Assad might follow Sadat who regarded the US to hold the keys to reach a comprehensive 
Middle East settlement. As we will see below, Assad reacted to the renewed arms cuts by 
threatening to deny the Soviet navy access to Tartus. Czechoslovakia resumed shipments of 
T-55 tanks in January 1977 after a six months pause.427  
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Still, Syria attempted to diversify arms purchases to Western countries. During the first 
months of 1976, Syria bought French helicopters and antitank missiles, the first important 
arms purchase from the West in 20 years.428 In early 1977, new inquiries were made to 
France, West Germany, the UK and the US.429 There were several reasons for this change. 
Some Syrian officers believed that Western equipment and training were behind the Israeli 
superiority in the 1973 War.430 The Soviet deliveries were also considered to be insecure, 
and maybe more importantly, Assad resented the Soviet pressure and wanted to lessen the 
dependence on the USSR.431 The shift was also encouraged by Saudi Arabia and Egypt.  
 
The Syrian diversification in arms purchases may have influenced the Kremlin’s to change 
policy. Seen from Moscow, Syria must have become more important as relations with Egypt 
kept worsening after and the PLO’s misfortunes in Lebanon. Just before Assad travelled to 
Moscow for a summit in April 1977, the USSR delivered several MIG-21 fighters, which were 
agreed upon under existing accords.432 However, there are contradicting US reports on what 
had been delivered in the preceding months. One report say this was the first shipment in 10 
months.433 Another says some MIG-21s and MIG-23s were delivered in 1976.434  
 
Whatever the case, during Assad’s five-day visit to Moscow in April 1977, Syria and the USSR 
came closer on the military issues.435 In the Joint Communique issued on 22 April the parties 
had considered «steps for further raising the level» of Syrian defense. It also called for 
«further deepening» bilateral economic and technical co-operation. This was interpreted as 
the Kremlin agreeing to further weapons and economic aid. Moscow also reopened the sale 
                                                          
428 CIA «Memorandum: Relations between Syria and the USSR», 4. 1 June 1976. The New York Times published the story in March 1977, 
citing US intelligence sources. The New York Times, «Syria Is Said to Reduce Military Role of Soviet», 1. 4 March 1977. 
429 Damascus sought military equipment and training of officers from France, arms from West Germany and the UK, and other equipment 
from the US. Syrian officers, trained by the French, promoted a shift to Western training and equipment. WikiLeaks, «SPECIAL SUMMARY 
NUMBER FIVE: TELEGRAPHIC AND INTELLIGENCE», 10-11. 18 February 1977. 
430 WikiLeaks, «SPECIAL SUMMARY NUMBER FIVE: TELEGRAPHIC AND INTELLIGENCE», 10-11. 18 February 1977. 
431 The Economic Counselor at the French Embassy in Damascus assessed in October 1976 that Soviet pressure, if it actually took place, 
would be foolish as the Syrians would turn to Western countries. WikiLeaks, «FRENCH VIEWS ON SYRIAN ECONOMY: GENERAL VIEWS, 
DEVELOPMENT, RELATIONS WITH EEC, EFFECTS OF LEBANESE CRISIS, AND AID TO SYRIA», 1-2. 22 October.  
432 CIA, «WEEKLY SUMMARY», 4. 29 April 1977. CIA, «MEDITERRANEAN REPORT - DECEMBER 1976», 2. 5 May 1977. Another report 
detailed deliveries of 5 aircraft containers probably MIG-21, five T-62 tanks and 200 GAZ-66 trucks from the USSR. In addition, 20 T-55 
tanks came from Czechoslovakia as part of a contract of 500 T-55 tanks. WikiLeaks, «MEDITERRANEAN REPORT-DECEMBER 1976 - APRIL 
1977», Section 6 page 3. 16 April 1977. 
433 CIA, «WEEKLY SUMMARY», 4. 29 April 1977. 
434 CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 31. 1. August 1977. 
435 Assad would reportedly bring military advisers with him on the trip to Moscow, indicating that arms deliveries were on the agenda. CIA, 
«WEEKLY SUMMARY», 4. 29 April 1977.  
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of military spare parts.436 In early June, Soviet military material was delivered to Syria, but 
only according to former contracts and with systems that the Syrians already posessed.437  
 
In sum, Syria was dependent on Soviet arms at the time of the invasion in Lebanon. Assad 
strived for military parity with Israel, and this was a key question for Syria. A view was raised 
that the Kremlin reasoned that Damascus would not get tangible results by dealing with the 
US. So being dependent of the Russians, the Syrians would eventually come back to them. It 
is not quite clear whether the Syrian official who came up with this analysis got it from the 
Russians or if it was his own opinion. Whatever the case, given the military pressure we have 
seen the Kremlin put on Syria, it seems reasonable that the USSR made such an analysis. 
However, the pressure was not strong enough to risk relations with Damascus, so the 
Russians may not have been quite sure of this analysis. They seemed to be afraid that Assad 
might do as Sadat and go over to the Americans. Then the USSR would lose its most 
important remaining client. It seems like the Kremlin had problems making up their mind 
and took some time to make a new strategy. In the end, they threatened to cut arms 
supplies. Eventually, they postponed and reduced shipments.  
 
Reduced and delayed Soviet arms supplies, but no embargo 
The USSR continued to ship arms to Syria until October 1976 probably because Moscow first 
tried to use threats to coerce the Syrians. Then arms deliveries were delayed and reduced to 
a level of 30% in December. Further Syrian complaints about lacking weapons shipments in 
early January 1977 signal a continued Soviet pressure. The shift may seem surprising as the 
political and diplomatic pressure was reduced after the Riyad agreement. The reason was 
likely that the Kremlin wanted to force Syria to co-operate with the PLO-LNM and to show 
displeasure of Syria’s improved relations with Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Assad threatened to 
close the Soviet access to Tartus in January 1977, and this combined with renewed Syria-
                                                          
436 During the summit, the Kremlin reportedly agreed to sell MIG-25 fighters. Nonetheless, there were doubts about whether the MIG-25 
deal was real as MIG-25s had not even been supplied to the Eastern European countries. Supply of these fighters would constitute a 
«major shift in Soviet policy». As the information was leaked both from Moscow and Damascus, it was interpreted as a signal to the US 
that Assad had been strengthened militarily. This implied that Syria needed to be «taken more seriously» in peace negotiations. In May, 
Soviet ships were observed offloading sixty T-62 tanks in Tartus and other «large lorries» were assumed to carry aircraft bodies. 
However, in early June, no MIG-25 contract had been signed. Neither were there any contracts for the modern T-72 tank that supposedly 
also would be included in new arms agreements. WikiLeaks, «REPORTS OF SYRO-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON MILITARY ITEMS IN MOSCOW», 
1-3. 4 May 1977. 
437 That included 90 T-62 tanks, equipment for two air defense brigades, 122 mm MB-21 rocket launchers for two battalions, trucks and 
spare parts. The equipment had been shipped to Syria recently. The reason for the Russians did not enter new agreements because 
Damascus was not able to pay their debts. Reports circulated of a Soviet agreement of a three-year moratorium on debts. WikiLeaks, 
«INTSUM 330 - JUNE 3, 1977», 3-4. 3 June 1977. 
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Palestinian cooperation in Lebanon and Syrian purchases of Western weapons, may have 
affected the Kremlin’s decision to start resupplying Syria. Soviet arms deliveries were 
restored on the eve of Assad’s Moscow visit, but only in accordance with signed contracts. 
Deliveries of more sophisticated weapons were not agreed upon, partly because they were 
too advanced and partly because Syria was unable to pay for the weapons. All in all, the 
Kremlin did not cut arms transfers completely but balanced them to not lose Syria. 
 
Eastern Bloc and Syrian military technicians 
 
Eastern Bloc technicians in Syria 
Deployment of Eastern Bloc military technicians was necessary for the Syrians to learn how 
to use Soviet arms and equipment. The number of Soviet and East European military 
technicians to Syria increased from 750 in 1970 to 3,200 in 1975 (see table below).438 This 
constituted 32% of the total number of East Bloc military technicians in the Third World, 
making Syria by far the most important country in 1975.439  
 
As we saw in the literature, Karsh claimed that the Kremlin held up technical assistance 
while Ramet claimed that Assad sent several thousand Soviet military home. By late October, 
no Soviet withdrawals had taken place according to a Syrian official. 440 Rumors circulated in 
the Syrian army in October that Assad would reduce the number of Soviet advisors.441 At 
some point in the autumn, in response to Soviet pressure, the Syrians increased their efforts 
to become more independent of and reduce the number of Soviet military advisors.442 At the 
same time, Damascus sought training of officers from France.443 Consequently, Syria reduced 
the number of Soviet advisors to 2,000 by the end of 1976.444 Including technicians from 
Eastern Europe the number decreased from 3,200 in 1975 to 2,500 in 1976. The decrease 
continued further down to 1,750 in April 1977.445 
                                                          
438 The 1976 report uses the figure of 3,050 for 1975. CIA, «SOVIET MILITARY POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD», 12. 21 October 1976. The 
1977 report using the figure of 3,200 for 1975, is expected to be more correct. CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 55. 1 September 1977. 
439 Further demonstrating Syria’s importance, the number of technicians in Egypt decreased from 6,500 to 215 during the same period. 
440 The official Shoufi from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is mentioned as an informant earlier, was sure that no Soviet military 
advisors had been withdrawn. WikiLeaks, «SYRO-SOVIET RELATIONS», 1-3. 26 October.  
441 The official Shoufi from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs WikiLeaks was the source. «SYRO-SOVIET RELATIONS», 1-3. 26 October. 
442 WikiLeaks, «SPECIAL SUMMARY NUMBER FIVE: TELEGRAPHIC AND INTELLIGENCE», 10-11. 18 February 1977. CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO 
THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 44. 1 September 1977. 
443 WikiLeaks, «SPECIAL SUMMARY NUMBER FIVE: TELEGRAPHIC AND INTELLIGENCE», 10-11. 18 February 1977. 
444 CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 55. 1 September 1977 
445 This report uses a figure of 2,250 in mid-1976. However, the later report using 2,500, is expected to be more correct. WikiLeaks, 




Table 2: Soviet and East European military technicians in Third World countries.446 
 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976447 1977448 
Total a 13,125 12,450 12,600 9,020 9,780 10,090 9,080 n.a. 
Syria 750 800 1,140 1,780 2,150 3,200b 2,500 1,750 
Egypt 6,500 5,500 5,500 520 200 215 190  n.a. 
Iraq 320 400 500 785 1,035 1,035 1200  n.a. 
Libya - 20 20 10 145 345 845  n.a. 
a Excluding Southeast Asia, which in 1975 were estimated at 700-1,00 military technicians.  
b The 1976 report had a total number of 3,050 technicians. The September 1977 report gave a figure of 3,200. 
 
It was not certain that the 45% reduction of advisers was only due to the events in 
Lebanon.449 Nevertheless, as a part of the April 1977 agreements, the number of Soviet 
military personnel stationed in Syria would increase.450 This growth is telling, as no new 
weapons systems were agreed upon. The Kremlin wanted the surge to gain influence in 
Syria, while Damascus either wanted it for military reasons, or compromised to gain 
renewed Soviet co-operation. Whatever the case, it shows that the Syrian reduction of 
Soviet military advisors in 1976-77 was based on political considerations. Nevertheless, the 
decrease was less than the literature suggests and it was initiated by Syria, not the USSR. 
That is important as it shows that Assad was willing to and able to demonstrate his relative 
independence in relation to the USSR. He had some room to maneuver and negotiate. 
 
Syrian military personnel in the USSR 
The only writer mentioning this topic is Ramet who says that Assad halted sending Syrian 
personnel to the USSR in 1976.451 The sources show that Syrian military personnel sent to 
train in the USSR increased sharply from 1971 to a climax in 1973, before falling to 300 in 
1975.452 It turned out that in 1976, 200 Syrian military personnel departed for the USSR.453 
No more information about the reason for the decrease was given. The cut from 300 to 200 
                                                          
sharper reduction took place, from 3,500 after the Yom Kippur War to 1,500 military advisers in March 1977. The New York Times 
referred to US intelligence sources. NYT, «Syria Is Said to Reduce Military Role of Soviet», 1. 4 March 1977. 
446 CIA, «SOVIET MILITARY POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD», 12. 21 October 1976. 
447 CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 54-55. 1 September 1977 
448 WikiLeaks, «MEDITERRANEAN REPORT-DECEMBER 1976 - APRIL 1977», Section 3, page 4. 16 April 1977. 
449 Some contracts might have come to an end, and as the Syrian air force had been flying MIG-23 for three years it should be able to 
operate them by themselves. WikiLeaks, «MEDITERRANEAN REPORT-DECEMBER 1976 - APRIL 1977», Section 6, page 2. 16 April 1977. 
450 WikiLeaks, «REPORTS OF SYRO-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON MILITARY ITEMS IN MOSCOW», 1-3. 4 May 1977. 
451 Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian relationship since 1955, 113. 
452 CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», Table 4, 56. September 1977 
453 In addition, another 120 military personnel went to Eastern European countries. 
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was part of a downward trend which had been going on since 1973, and it was modest. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that it was another signal from Assad to the Russians that he would 
not tolerate interference in his Lebanon policy.  
 
Table 3: Military personnel from the Third World in the USSR.454 
 1955-75 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 455 
Total 37,495 660 2,320 2,155 3,400 3,965 2,490 
Syria 3,325 50 530 700 530 300 200 
Egypt 5,665 300 220 100 - - - 
Iraq 2,950 40 145 350 700 250 300  
Libya 900 - - - 300 600 200 
 
Syria was the largest recipient of Soviet military technicians in the Third World. Nevertheless, 
Syria tried to become less dependent on these and after the Soviet pressure started Assad 
countered by accelerating the reduction of Soviet advisers and Syrians in the USSR. This was 
probably to send Moscow a warning that Syria could chose to reduce the relations further. 
 
In conclusion, Assad reduced the number of Soviet military technicians in Syria in 1976-77 to 
show displeasure with Moscow’s pressure. Syria also sent fewer of its own personnel to the 
USSR. This demonstrates not just Assad’s ability to press for political influence, but the 
military threat to Syria was low enough for him to be able to do that. 
 
The Soviet Navy needs bases in the Mediterranean 
 
The USSR had a strong desire to get access to new naval repair and supply facilities after 
Egypt expelled all Soviet military personnel and ended all use of ports and anchorages in 
April 1976.456 The Soviet navy was able to support 42 combatant ships through a 45‐day 
period and capable of doing that in another war.457 However, in wartime operations the 
support system was expected to decrease sharply as combat progressed. Major repairs at sea 
were impossible. Still, in 1976, the Fifth Eskadra kept up the same level of surface activity as 
                                                          
454 CIA, «SOVIET MILITARY POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD», Table IV, 16. 21 October. 
455 CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 56. 1 September 1977. 
456 CIA, «Prospects for Soviet Naval Access to Mediterranean Shore Facilities», 1. 2 August. 
457 CIA, «Special National Intelligence Estimate», 7. 30 January 1975. 
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it had in previous years.458  Nevertheless, the number of Soviet diesel submarines decreased 





Soviet requests for increased access to Syrian ports 
Prior to 1976, the Fifth Eskadra, about 50 vessels strong, included some of the USSR’s most 
modern and effective surface combat ships.461 Syria was close to the Fifth Eskadra's primary 
deployment area, and the extensive military investment the Russians had made presumably 
guaranteed a continued search for improved port access. The facilities in Tartus and Latakia 
were improved. However, both ports were crowded and lacked a dry dock, trained shipyard 
workers, and other required facilities. The ports were inadequate, especially for submarine 
maintenance, also before the loss of Egyptian facilities. Still, since the 1973 war, support 
ships were almost continuously present in the one of the ports servicing visiting Soviet diesel 
submarines and minesweepers. 
 
                                                          
458 The surface ships could access the Russian bases in the Black Sea. CIA, «Prospects for Soviet Naval Access to Mediterranean Shore 
Facilities», 1, 6. 2 August. 
459 The diesel submarine force deployed from the Northern Fleet needed shore access or supply ships to a higher degree than surface ships. 
The Montreux Convention (Article 12) stated that Black Fleet submarines could only exit the Turkish straits for overhaul outside, after 
notice to the Turkish government and on the surface. Submarines from other fleets were not allowed to enter the Black Sea, and 
because of this, the USSR deployed Northern fleet submarines in the Mediterranean. 
460 CIA, «THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 19 JULY 1976», 2. 19 July.  
461 CIA, «Prospects for Soviet Naval Access to Mediterranean Shore Facilities», 1-10. 2 August. 
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The majority of the Soviet support ships, including a large storage barge, a small ammunition 
ship, and small support ships were relocated from Alexandria to Tartus.462  
According to a US report, the USSR asked Syria for increased access to port facilities after the 
expulsion from Egypt.463 In mid-July Assad claimed he had refused the Soviet request to use 
Syrian naval facilities and believed a Soviet motivation for its Lebanon policy might be to 
establish new facilities there.464 Prominent Syrian officials said that Egypt went too far in 
letting the Russians extend facilities in Alexandria.465 They claimed that Damascus, in 
contrast to Cairo, only agreed to a Soviet presence that was in their national interests. US 
observers regarded the Russian access as a quid pro quo for political, economic and military 
support. In August, Syria continued to insist on limiting access to bases, still the Soviet 
prospects were considered slightly better there than in Yugoslavia.466 
 
In Tartus, submarines and minor combatant ships were replenished alongside auxiliary ships 
in October.467 The Russians were important in the construction of several new commercial 
docking and warehouse facilities. These would double the port’s berthing capacity. Syria also 
received Soviet assistance in improving the transportation system, rail, road and airports. 
The Soviet lack of influence over Syrian actions in Lebanon did not bode well for future 
pressure on port access.468  
 
Soviet and US nuclear-armed ships collide 
The dangers of the superpowers’ military deployment was demonstrated when a Soviet 
nuclear submarine and a US frigate collided on August 22, 1976 southwest of Greece.469 The 
K‐22 Soviet Echo II‐class submarine was nuclear‐powered and nuclear‐armed, while the US 
frigate Voge is believed to have carried nuclear ASROC anti‐submarine rockets. 470 The Soviet 
                                                          
462 Water and provisions were probably provided in the Syrian ports, but apparently not fuel oil. CIA, «Prospects for Soviet Naval Access to 
Mediterranean Shore Facilities», 7 and 20. 2 August. 
463 CIA, «THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 JULY 1976», 2-3. 16 JULY. 
464 WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING--MESSAGE FROM ASAD «A, 1-2. 17 July. WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING--MESSAGE FROM ASAD « B. 18 July. 
Assad told Hussein that he had rejected a Soviet proposal to use Syrian naval bases. WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING - LEBANON 
DEVELOPMENTS», 1-4. 28 July. 
465 CIA, «Prospects for Soviet Naval Access to Mediterranean Shore Facilities», 1-10. 2 August. 
466 Other options were in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Malta, Lebanon and Albania. CIA, «Prospects for Soviet Naval Access to Mediterranean 
Shore Facilities», 2. 2 August 1976. The USSR increased pressure on Yugoslavian leader Tito for more access after the closure of Egyptian 
ports on 16 April. Soviet naval activity reportedly rose in Yugoslavian waters. WikiLeaks, «SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE/PRESSURE ON 
YUGOSLAVS», 1‐2. 13 August.  
467 CIA, «SOVIET MILITARY POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD», 24. 21 October. 
468 CIA, «Prospects for Soviet Naval Access to Mediterranean Shore Facilities», 7 and 20. 2 August. 
469 CIA, «THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 30 AUGUST 1976», 5. 30 August. 
470 According to Hans Kristensen, the director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, the US Navy had 
been following the Soviet Echo II-class attack submarine for ten days. On 28 August, the Soviet sub surfaced alongside the USS Voge, 
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submarine and the US vessel had been in contact for several days, but not immediately 
before the collision.471 The USSR sent a diplomatic note to the US, however the latter 
disagreed with the conclusions of the note and claimed the Soviet submarine attempted to 
overtake the US vessel.472 The way the Kremlin reacted is interesting. The incident could, 
whoever had the responsibility for it, have been used to try to justify more powerful Soviet 
actions. After the diplomatic note, no more is heard of the incident, indicating Soviet 
restraint. Apparently, Moscow did not want to escalate the situation.  
 
 
A starboard quarter view of the frigate USS VOGE conducting a high-speed evasive maneuver while operating with the 
aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy battle group.473 
 
Syria threatens to deny Soviet access to Tartus 
Syria threatened to deny Soviet ships access to Tartus and in late 1976 or January 1977.474 An 
Israeli report stated that the Syrians actually gave the USSR orders to leave Tartus.475 This 
was yet another demonstration of Assad’s chagrin with the Soviet policy towards Syria, which 
                                                          
turned right and ran into the frigate. The collision caused severe damage to the Soviet submarine to its sail and some to its front hull 
section. The Voge lost its propeller and the hull got punctured. Kristensen estimates there were around 430 U.S. nuclear weapons 
deployed in the Mediterranean at the time. Kristensen, Hans. «Declassified: US Nuclear Weapons At Sea». 
471 WikiLeaks, «COLLISION WITH SOVIET SUBMARINE», 1-2. 29 August. 
472 WikiLeaks, «COLLISION WITH SOVIET SUBMARINE», 1. 2 September. 
473 Kristensen, «Declassified: US Nuclear Weapons At Sea»«.  
474 CIA, «NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN», 6. 13 January 1977. 
475 The Israeli Military Intelligence got the information from a sensitive source who they described as very good. WikiLeaks, «INTSUM 234 - 
JANUARY 17, 1977», 8. 17 January 1977. 
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he knew was their only «respectable» client state in the Middle East.476 By sending this 
signal, Assad made the Kremlin aware that both parties’ opinions mattered. The US Embassy 
in Damascus saw it as a response to the reduced arms deliveries that finally arrived in 
December.477 Another intelligence cable said the Syrians again accused the USSR for 
continued cuts on military shipments and linked this to the threats regarding Tartus.478 
However, the Syrians quickly cancelled the evacuation order. In mid‐January five Soviet 
vessels remained in Tartus and a submarine arrived. This was similar to the situation before 
the evacuation order. 
 
None of the parties wanted further deterioration of their relations.479 The Soviet reaction to 
the threat is not known, but taking into consideration the Soviet need for naval facilities, 
they would have taken the threat seriously. As we have seen, Czechoslovakian arms 
deliveries restarted in January 1977 and the USSR shipped MIG‐fighters in April. This taken 
together with the Soviet need for naval bases suggests that the Kremlin promised to resume 
arms deliveries after the Tartus episode. 
 
Syria rejected Soviet requests for increased naval access  
The USSR needed naval bases for their Fifth Eskadra in the Mediterranean. This was a 
strategic goal as it involved defending the USSR and its shipping lines against the US. After 
the expulsion from Egypt, the Russians requested increased access in Syria, which Assad 
rejected. Assad was aware of the Soviet vulnerability, and to achieve arms supplies he 
threatened to deny them access to Tartus. Both parties needed each other and in April 1977, 
they re-established the pre-conflict level of relations. 
 
Syria and Israel blockade access to the PLO-LNM in Lebanon 
 
The USSR and its Arab clients, Egypt, Libya and Iraq wanted to support the PLO-LNM 
militarily to strengthen them in the fight against the Syrian army in Lebanon. However, the 
                                                          
476 CIA, «NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN», 6. 13 January 1977. 
477 The Israeli Military Intelligence got the information from a sensitive source who they described as very good. WikiLeaks, «INTSUM 234 - 
JANUARY 17, 1977», 8. 17 January 1977. 
478 CIA, «NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN», 2. 21 January 1977. 
479 CIA, «NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN», 3. 21 January 1977. 
106 
 
only way to reach the PLO-LNM in Lebanon was by sea or air, and the Israeli and Syrian 
navies imposed blockades of Lebanese ports.  
 
The Syrian and Israeli blockades 
The Israeli and Syrian navy blockaded the Lebanese coast to stop supplies to the PLO-LNM. 
The Syrians imposed a sea blockade of Lebanon and the Soviet ambassador told Assad in July 
that he wanted to avoid problems with it.480 A US diplomat also noted the Syrian blockade 
saying it was partly successful in reducing arms shipments to the PLO-LNM.481 On 17 August, 
Israeli state television published news of Israeli naval ships stopping boats and confiscating 
arms sent from Egypt and Libya to Lebanon.482 The Israeli newspaper Davar reported that 
the PLO urged the USSR to send a supply ship to break the Israeli naval blockade. Jumblatt 
commented on the blockade complaining about the lack of Soviet support to break it.483  
 
Possibly, as a result of this the Soviet Chargé d’affaires to Washington, Yuli Vorontsov 
actually sent a démarche, a formal diplomatic correspondence, to the US accusing Israel of 
stopping and even sinking ships supplying the PLO-LNM.484 The USSR perceived the US as 
supporting the Israeli moves, and warned of extensive and dangerous implications if this 
continued. Pravda’s Demchenko described the Civil War in Lebanon as not serving anyone 
except Israel, and was bitter towards the US for approving the Israeli blockade of Lebanon.485 
Nonetheless, the First Secretary of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr Zotov was 
unaware of any Soviet plan to try out the Israeli blockade.486 The PLO, was clearly unsatisfied 
with this as Arafat, two months later, in October asked Brezhnev to take a clear stand on the 
Israeli naval blockade.487  
 
                                                          
480 WikiLeaks, «ALLEGATIONS OF SOVIET PRESSURE ON ASAD TO MODIFY HIS POLICY ON LEBANON», 1-2. 21 July. 
481 Talcott W. Seelye, who worked as the Lebanese President’s Special representative reported this after a four-week assignment. 
WikiLeaks, «POLITICAL BALANCE SHEET IN LEBANON AS OF JULY 26, 1976», 2-3. 26 July. Seelye succeeded Murphy as US Ambassador to 
Syria in 1978. The American Presidency Project, «United States Ambassador to Syria Nomination of Talcott W. Seelye».  
482 The daily Israeli Haaretz claimed a Soviet démarche to the US Government demanding a lift of the Israeli blockade. The New York Times, 
«Israel Broadcast Tells Of Lebanon ‘Blockade’», 1. 17 August. The Israel Defense Minister Shimon Peres rejected that Tel Aviv blockaded 
the Lebanese coast. Nonetheless, he admitted that the Israeli navy stopped ships violating Israeli territorial waters. The New York Times, 
«Israeli Official Disavows Any Blockade of Lebanon», 1. 18 August.  The Israeli newspaper Jerusalem Post detailed that the Israeli navy 
had stopped six vessels going to or leaving Lebanon. WikiLeaks, «EXPLANATION OF ISRAELI NAVAL ACTIVITY OFF LEBANON», 1-2. 18 
August. 
483 In general, Jumblatt complained on the lack of Soviet support and doubted that Moscow really wanted to see the development of what 
Jumblatt called a moderate, democratic socialism in the Middle East. Jumblatt, I speak for Lebanon, 24. 
484 The démarche claimed Israel prevented food and medicine to the PLO-LNM, and at the same time sent weapons and munitions to the 
Rightists in Lebanon. WikiLeaks, «SOVIET NOTE ON ISRAEL AND LEBANON», 1-2. 18 August.  
485 WikiLeaks, «SOVIET PRESS SUMMARY - AUGUST 17», 3. 17 August.  
486 WikiLeaks, «AUGUST 27 DECLARATION OF SOVIET AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE ON LEBANON», 1-3. 27 August.  
487 WikiLeaks, «LEBANESE SITUATION OCTOBER 14», 4.  14 October 1976.  
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 A powerful Soviet navy 
So what was the capability of the Soviet navy to break the blockade? A CIA analysis 
concluded that the USSR in general was capable of airlifting and shipping military aid to 
clients during war.488 The new Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev left the Black Sea on 18 July on its 
first voyage outside home waters.489 She conducted antisubmarine warfare operations with 
other ships in the eastern and central Mediterranean for two weeks before leaving through 
the Strait of Gibraltar for Murmansk.490 The fighter aircraft stationed onboard were not 
operational; still the ship posed a formidable threat.491 At the end of July, the US considered 
the Fifth Eskadra could possibly be stronger than the US 6th fleet.492 Therefore, there is no 
doubts regarding the Soviet capacity to supply materiel to Lebanon. 
 
The Syrian navy was small, weak and limited to coastal defense.493 Nevertheless, the Soviet 
note that they wanted to avoid problems with the Syrian blockade shows a clear moderation 
in the activity. The Israeli blockade posed another challenge for the USSR. The Israeli navy, 
although small was stronger than the Syrian one. The main problem for the Russians was 
that the Israelis had US backing. The démarche to the US and some media articles blaming 
the Israeli activities were signals of protest. However, no actions were taken to enforce an 
opening of supply lines to the PLO and leftist in Lebanon. The USSR did not want to have a 
confrontation with the Israeli or the US Navy.  
 
Soviet direct supply to the PLO-LNM 
 
The USSR had provided the PLO with weapons before 1976.494 Most of the arms were 
provided through third countries, and until late 1975, Syria was the main transshipment 
                                                          
488 The US analysts agreed that the Soviet willingness to take foreign policy risks depended on «Moscow’s perception of interest and power 
at the particular time and place». CIA, «NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE - SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES», 67, 13-16. 12 January 
1977. 
489 CIA, «THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 2 AUGUST 1976», 2. 2 August. The Kiev was the first of four ships built of the Kiev-class. To 
circumvent the Montreux Convention’s restrictions on aircraft carriers, the class was designated as heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers.  
490 Two destroyers that escorted the Kiev sailed to refuel from a tanker north of the Azores. They were expected to sail to Cuba, the first 
Soviet naval visit to the Caribbean island since June 1975. CIA, «THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 7 AUGUST 1976», 15. 7 August 1976.  
491 The aircraft were still not operational by April 1977 when the Kiev sailed with the Northern Fleet. She was expected to return to the 
Black Sea at some point. A second carrier was of the Kiev-class was near completion, a third was under construction. WikiLeaks, 
«MEDITERRANEAN REPORT-DECEMBER 1976 - APRIL 1977», Section 3 page 2. 16 April 1977.  
492 WikiLeaks, «EVANS AND NOVACK COLUMN, JULY 23, 1976», 1-3. 23 July.  
493 Global Security, «Syrian Arab Navy».  
494 In November 1974, the Russians reassured Arafat that they would provide enough weapons and equipment to maintain and expand 
commando operations in Israel. They also gave the PLO military training in the USSR. CIA, «SOVIET MILITARY POLICY IN THE THIRD 
WORLD», 24. 21 October. 
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country. At some point, the Russians seemed to directly ship an unknown number of arms to 
the PLO, as well as through Iraq, Egypt and Libya. A leader of a PFLP organization confirmed 
in an interview that the USSR supplied weapons to the PLO by sea. The arms were small 
arms and light weapons like AK-47s, Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) launchers and B-10 
recoilless rifles, not heavy weapons.495   
 
In mid-July 1976, Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Haydar asserted that the USSR had tried to 
smuggle in arms to the PLO-Leftist coalition, but he believed the attempts had been «largely 
unsuccessful».496 Assad also claimed that a Soviet ship brought Russian arms to Lebanon.497 
When a Lebanese Christian-controlled gunboat came to investigate the incident, it came 
under fire from an unknown, presumably Soviet ship. From air reconnaissance and other 
sources, the Syrians were certain there were Soviet naval ships in the area at the time.  
 
About the same time, the Soviet ambassador in Damascus told Assad the USSR would 
support the PLO more openly.498 The ambassador said that Soviet ships with cargo for the 
Palestinians so far had not used the Soviet flag, but from then on they would show the 
Soviet flag. Meanwhile, a US diplomat reported that the USSR increased arms supplies to the 
PLO-LNM.499 In spite of the Syrian sea blockade, there was «evidence in past week that 
several important arms shipments have arrived». Assad asserted that a huge Soviet ship in 
Sidon offloaded large quantities of arms, ammunition and unspecified heavy weapons.500 
Assad told King Hussein that he had clear proof of several Soviet ships delivering arms to the 
PLO and leftists.501 According to Farouk Kaddoumi, the leader of the PLO’s Political 
Department, the USSR augmented arms support to the Palestinians in late July.502 As 
Damascus did not allow these to pass through Syria, Moscow sent them by sea, including 
with the carrier Kiev. The Fifth Eskadra was reportedly more active, and a Soviet ship 
                                                          
495 Interview with Haitham Abdo, head of the Palestinian Youth organization, part of the PFLP, said this in an in Beirut in 6 November 2017.  
496 Haydar said this to the US Ambassador Murphy in Damascus. WikiLeaks, «SYRIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER COMMENTS», 1-4. 16 July. 
497 WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING--MESSAGE FROM ASAD» B, 3. 18 July. 
498 The source of the information was editor of the Syrian Tishreen newspaper, Dr. Ghassan Rifai who spoke to a US Embassy official on 20 
July. WikiLeaks, «ALLEGATIONS OF SOVIET PRESSURE ON ASAD TO MODIFY HIS POLICY ON LEBANON», 1-2. 21 July. 
499 Talcott W. Seelye, who worked as the Lebanese President’s Special representative reported this after a four-week assignment. 
WikiLeaks, «POLITICAL BALANCE SHEET IN LEBANON AS OF JULY 26, 1976», 2-3. 26 July. Seelye succeeded Murphy as US Ambassador to 
Syria in 1978. The American Presidency Project, «United States Ambassador to Syria Nomination of Talcott W. Seelye».  
500 He referred to a message the Syrians had intercepted, which asked whether the heavy weapons were for groups directly subordinated 
to the USSR. Assad said this was part of increased Russian activity. 
501 King Hussein shared the information from his conversation with Assad in a meeting with US Ambassador Thomas Pickering about. 
WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING - CONTACTS WITH ASAD», 1-2. 26 July. Pickering became ambassador in 1974. U.S. Department of State. 
«The Foreign Service: Through Ambassador Pickering's Eyes». May 1999. 
502 WikiLeaks, «SECOND BREJNEV LETTER TO ASAD: QADDUMI CONFIRMS SOVIET SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS», 1-2. 27 July. 
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delivered large numbers of arms and ammunition including heavy weapons in PLO-
controlled Sidon.503   
 
In early August, there were other signs of Soviet arms supplies to the PLO both directly and 
through other countries according to the US State Department.504 Nevertheless, the report 
stresses that the Russians did not do anything that would put their relations with Damascus 
at risk. Meanwhile, Cairo authorized the USSR, Iraq and Libya to send materiel to Lebanon 
through Egyptian ports.505 There were also other reports of USSR sending arms to the PLO 
and Lebanese left through other Arab countries.506 In October, a CIA report asserted that the 
Russians provided the Palestinians with small arms and light weapons deliveries.507 The light 
weapons consisted of machineguns, mortars, 75mm antitank guns and armored personnel 
carriers.508 However, no tanks, artillery or other heavy weapons were reported to have been 
delivered. The Syrian army was well-equipped with heavy weapons and the Soviet supplies 
of small arms and light weapons would not suffice to fight major battles. 
 
In addition, Moscow supported the Lebanese Communist party (LCP). The LCP benefitted 
handsomely during the 16 months of civil war, according to the Syrian Deputy Prime 
Minister Haydar.509 The Mitrokhin files confirm Soviet financial support of the LCP. On 26 
July 1976, the KGB sent a diplomatic car from Damascus to Lebanon providing the LCP with 
US$50,000.510 In September, the KGB delivered another US$100,000. Financial support 
undoubtedly helped the Lebanese Communists, nevertheless these amounts would hardly 
be enough to make Syria withdraw from the country.  
                                                          
503 WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING - CONTACTS WITH ASAD», 1-2. 28 July. 
504 WikiLeaks, «OFFICIAL-INFORMAL», 3. 3 August.  
505 WikiLeaks, «EGYPT VERSUS SYRIA IN LEBANON», 2. 4 August. 
506 WikiLeaks, «ACTION MEMORANDUM: HOUGHTON/MACK VISIT TO LEBANON (S/S NO.7618293) FOR THE SECRETARY FROM DAY», 3-4. 
28 August.  
507 CIA, «SOVIET MILITARY POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD», 24. 21 October. 
508 (a) «Small arms» are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, 
rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns; (b) «Light weapons» are, broadly speaking, weapons 
designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used by a single person. They include, 
inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank 
guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and 
mortars of a caliber of less than 100 millimeters. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, «International Instrument to Enable States to 
Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons», 3.  
509 He did not specify how this happened. WikiLeaks, «SYRIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER COMMENTS», 1-4. 16 July. 
510 Andrew and Mitrokhin. The World was going our way, 206. 
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In addition, Assad claimed that volunteers from Cuba, Eastern Europe and other countries 
were combatting in Lebanon.511 Later he admitted that no Cubans were present.512 A Cuban 
Embassy official in Syria denied the presence of any military advisors, and commented that 
the situation was too complicated to send soldiers the way Havana did to Angola.513 
 
Military supplies through Palestinian airfields in Lebanon 
The Syrians also said the Palestinian and leftists were constructing two airfields in Southern 
Lebanon in mid-July and claimed the USSR presided over the airports in addition to one 
heliport.514 Assad himself repeated these assertions to the US Ambassador Murphy.515  
The PFLP leader said the USSR maybe supplied weapons through Sidon airport and another 
airfield.516 So it is possible that the PLO received some small arms and light weapons by air.  
Less likely are the claims by former Lebanese President Chamoun that French communist 
technicians planned to assemble 16 F-1 Mirage fighters in Southern Lebanon.517 He called 
the Soviet Union’s involvement an intervention and asked for US aid. However, no French 
planes were ever reported over Lebanon, revealing Chamoun’s claims as political 
propaganda. Nevertheless, the statements reveal the Lebanese Christians’ view of the USSR.   
 
Limited Soviet military support of the PLO-LNM 
The several reports, from different sources, show that the USSR did send arms supplies 
directly to the PLO-LNM after the Syrian invasion of Lebanon. Although the quantities are 
unknown, the volume was not enough to enable the PLO-LNM to stand up to the Syrian 
army. The Soviet navy had, as we have seen, the military capacity to break the blockade, so 
                                                          
511 Assad said he believed Soviet interference would increase. WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING - LEBANON DEVELOPMENTS», 1-4. 28 July.  
512 Assad asserted that Cubans and other non-Arabs were actively recruiting, training and supplying volunteers for the PLO-LNM. A large 
group of volunteers entered Tripoli in the beginning of August. In a meeting with Assad, the US Ambassador Murphy repeated that the 
American government had wanted to avoid a Syrian military intervention in Lebanon. However, Syria could not withdraw now, as this 
would give the opponents a victory. Assad appreciated the US support for Syrian independent policy as this was his own political 
principle. Murphy recommended Kissinger to share more information about Soviet activities with Assad. This could be done without 
hinting that the US wanted a Cold War competition with Syria as the prize. WikiLeaks, «AUGUST 7 MEETING WITH ASAD», 1-4. 7 August.  
513 If the situation had been easier they could have sent troops. He further said Cuba did not support any «volunteers» on the ground. 
However, they knew of some «Spanish-speaking fighters, perhaps from Mexico» supporting the leftist. WikiLeaks, «AUG. 4 SYRIAN 
MEDIA REPORTS RETURN OF PLO DELEGATION TO DAMASCUS; CRITICISM OF SINAI ACCORD CONTINUES», 1. 4 August. 
514 Assad thought the 800 and 2,000 meters long runways would soon receive Iraqi, Libyan and maybe Cuban «elements». WikiLeaks, 
«TALK WITH KING--MESSAGE FROM ASAD «b, 3-4. 18 July. WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING - LEBANON DEVELOPMENTS», 1-4. 28 July. 
515 The Syrian president said that he had not believed his own intelligence reporting about runways earlier, but now he did. He claimed that 
the fields were close to completion, and would be able to receive Soviet Antonov transport aircraft. WikiLeaks, «AUGUST 7 MEETING 
WITH ASAD», 1-4. 7 August.  
516 Interview with Haitham Abdo, head of the Palestinian Youth organization, part of the PFLP, said this in an in Beirut in 6 November 2017. 
He also said the US made an agreement with Syria to enter Lebanon. He was young at the time and not present at the weapon shipments 
himself but had been given the information internally in the PLO.  
517 WikiLeaks, «MEETING WITH FRANJIEH AND CHAMOUN», 3. 25 August. 
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this was a political decision. The purpose was probably to try to a certain degree satisfy the 
PLO-LNM and enable them to fight. At the same time it was not enough to threaten Syria on 
the battlefield by a force strong enough to put them on the defensive. 
 
Egyptian and Libyan support of the PLO-LNM 
 
The Egyptian President Sadat wanted to keep the PLO-LNM fighting the Christians and 
Syrians to a standstill. In his plan, an Arab League truce would halt Syrian dominance over 
Lebanon and the Palestinians, and this would be to Egypt’s gain. Consequently, and in spite 
of its tensions with the USSR, Iraq and Libya the Egyptian government authorized these 
countries to send military materiel to Sidon and Tyre through Egyptian ports.518  
 
Around the 10 June, there were unusual Egyptian transportation flights to Dresden, which 
might have carried arms.519 Since mid-June, Egypt, and to a minor degree Libya transshipped 
Iraqi and possibly Soviet and East European arms to the PLO-LNM in Lebanon. The Syrian 
navy prevented some ships from entering Sidon, but several shiploads managed to get 
through the blockade and delivered their cargo at Tyre.520 In July, Assad also said the 
Egyptian government actively cooperated in Soviet arms deliveries.521 He added that 
Palestinian and Libyan volunteers arrived in significant numbers in Lebanon.  
 
A Lebanese pro-Christian radio reported on 30 July that a Libyan ship unloaded 48 armored 
vehicles and 22 amphibious armored troop carriers of Soviet origin.522 US analysts briefly 
stated that Libyan troops and equipment arrived in Sidon, and saw the Syrian offensive 
towards Sidon as a possible reply to the Libyan move. The Lebanese President Frangieh also 
complained that Libyan military units were fighting the rightists in Lebanon.523 According to 
King Hussein, Libya sent military equipment including 60 armored personnel carriers to 
Lebanon.524 The propaganda war between Egypt and Syria increased. Syrian media attacked 
                                                          
518 WikiLeaks, «EGYPT VERSUS SYRIA IN LEBANON», 2. 4 August. 
519 The information was given by Egyptian officials to the US Embassy. CIA, «THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 JULY 1976», 2. 11 July. 
520 The number of vessels and amount of arms was unknown. The arms shipped by the Libyans were of their own stock. 
521 King Hussein shared the information from his conversation with Assad in a meeting with US Ambassador Thomas Pickering about. 
WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING - CONTACTS WITH ASAD», 1-2. 26 July. Pickering became ambassador in 1974. U.S. Department of State. 
«The Foreign Service: Through Ambassador Pickering's Eyes». 
522 A few weeks earlier Arafat had called for volunteers, especially all Palestinians to come and fight in Lebanon. CIA, «THE PRESIDENT'S 
DAILY BRIEF 2 AUGUST 1976», 2. 2 August. 
523 WikiLeaks, «AUGUST 4 AND 5 CAIRO PRESS ON LEBANON», 1. 5 August.  
524 WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING--SITUATION IN LEBANON AND SYRIA», 1. 4 August. 
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Egypt for supporting shipment of Iraqi soldiers to Lebanon.525 Libya received more Soviet 
arms than they could absorb.526 Gaddafi was also reported to host training camps and supply 
small arms to terrorist organizations and guerilla groups in several countries. So Libya was 
able to supply the PLO-LNM with arms. During the Riyad Summit, Sadat pledged to end the 
cooperation with Iraq.527 Egypt probably stopped its own arms transfers to the PLO-LNM. 
 
Egypt and Libya supplying the PLO-LNM 
Egypt had had tense relations with the USSR, Iraq and Libya. However, the conflict with Syria 
was arguably more important than their mutual conflicts. Egypt cooperated with the USSR, 
Libya and Iraq in shipping weapons to the PLO-LNM.  
 
Iraqi conflict with Syria and support of the PLO 
 
The USSR established relations with Iraq after the pro-Western monarchy in Baghdad was 
overthrown in 1958.528 Since then, the two countries officially kept a «strategic partnership» 
for most of the following three decades.529 Iraq became a Soviet client state, usually ranked 
only after Egypt and Syria in the region. Moscow both sought to keep Iraq out of the US 
sphere of influence and to make profits on weapons sales.530 In contrast to Syria, Iraq signed 
a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR.531  
 
Baghdad supported the Palestinians’ armed resistance, but in contrast to the USSR, it 
rejected the UN Resolution 242, negotiations with Tel Aviv, and Israel’s right to exist.532 Iraq 
was ruled by the Baath party, and Vice-President Saddam Hussein was in reality the 
                                                          
525 According to Beirut Radio 150 Iraqi troops had travelled by plane from Bagdad to Cairo and the Egyptians arranged shipment to Tyre. 
The information was allegedly collected from captured Iraqi soldiers in Lebanon. WikiLeaks, «AUG 6 SYRIAN MEDIA REPORT SYRO-
LEBANESE- PALESTINIAN MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE IN SOFAR TODAY; EGYPTIANS AND IRAQIS CRITICIZED FOR JOINT EFFORTS TO 
FACILITATE ENTRY OF IRQQI TROOPS INTO LEBANON», 1-2. 6 August.  
526 CIA, «SOVIET MILITARY POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD», 24. 21 October 1976. 
527 WikiLeaks, «EC,: INTSUM 178…» 26 October. 
528 Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 13. 
529 Kreutz, Andrej. «Russian-Iraqi Relations: A Historical and Political Analysis», 2. 
530 Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, 157. 
531 Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 17. The 15-year agreement was signed in April 1972. Iraq bought TU-22 medium range 
bombers, the first outside the USSR and Eastern Europe, and MIG-23s the most advanced fighter of the USSR. Baghdad also received SA-
3 Surface-to-air missiles and Scud surface-to-surface missiles. In January 1975 an unknown number of armored personnel carriers, 
artillery, Osa patrol boats and P-6 torpedo boats arrived inn Iraq. In the economic field the USSR also made a huge contribution. After 
Iraq nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company in June 1972, the Russians agreed to receive payment of Iraqi loans in oil and in 1973 the 
USSR imported 4 million tons of Iraqi oil. Moscow received the oil at 70% of the price. After the 1973 price-increase of oil, this turned out 
to be lucrative for Moscow as they paid US$3 a barrel for the Iraqi crude and sold it for US$18 a barrel to the West.  
532 Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, 161. 
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strongman in Baghdad from the early 1970s.533 However, Iraq was, much to Moscow’s 
frustration, a bitter rivalry with its in sister-party in Syria. In addition, Saddam suppressed 
the Soviet-friendly Iraqi communist party. Iraq also had a conflict with Iran over the border 
and Tehran supported Kurdish insurgents in northern Iraq. In 1975 Iraq and Iran settled their 
border dispute, and this decreased Baghdad’s need for Soviet arms and political support.534  
 
The Iraqi strategy and collaboration with the USSR in 1976 
Iraq sought, like Syria, to become more independent from the USSR, but was still dependent 
on Soviet arms in 1976.535 This necessarily put limits on Baghdad’s freedom and although 
Moscow wanted Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, it was not hostile to Assad as the Iraqi 
leaders were. At the same time, both countries had coinciding interests in supporting the 
PLO. It turns out that Bagdad had, in vain, pushed Assad to allow Iraqi troops to pass through 
Syria to Lebanon since mid-May.536 After the Syrian invasion, an Iraqi official noted that 
Moscow became more critical of Assad, and Baghdad supported a Lebanese roundtable 
meeting without foreign intervention.537  This was the same position as the Kremlin had.  
 
Saddam’s strategy included several components: To have an Iraqi contingent in the Arab 
Peace-keeping force in Lebanon; increase the Iraqi army on the Syrian border; commit 
attacks inside Syria; and support the PLO politically and militarily. Iraq succeed neither in 
influencing the Arab League’s Lebanon policy, nor to form a part of the Arab peacekeeping 
force.538 In spite of this Baghdad continued the pressure. A pro-PLO-LNM and anti-Syrian 




                                                          
533 Saddam was formally number two in the Iraqi power hierarchy after president al-Bakr, the latter was chronically ill and his health was 
declining. After August 1976, Saddam tried to publically project an image as being a dynamic leader, apparently to prepare the Iraqis for 
Bakr’s early departure as president. CIA, «NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN», 5. 16 November.  
534 Smolansky and Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 25. 
535 WikiLeaks, «ECONOMIST-FOREIGN REPORT ARTICLE ON SOVIET-IRAQ RELATIONS», 3. 2 November. 
536 CIA, «The President’s Daily Brief 10 June 1976», 2. 
537 The official, Ibrahim al-Wali Director General for Political Affairs at the Foreign Ministry was worried Syria might annex Lebanon. 
WikiLeaks, «IRAQI OFFICIAL DENIES THAT IRAQ WILL ATTACK SYRIA», 1. 22 June.  
538 The Iraqi foreign Minister was coldly received in Cairo on 25 July and the supply of Iraqi weapons through Egypt phased out. WikiLeaks, 
«FRUSTRATIONS OF IRAQI REGIME», 1. 27 July. WikiLeaks, «IRAQI OFFICIAL DENIES THAT IRAQ WILL ATTACK SYRIA», 1. 22 June. 
539 President Bakr inaugurated the conference. The delegates, who were invited in a personal capacity, were considered by the Americans 
to be «a motley collection of leftist trade unionists, professional associations, journalists, student organizations, Palestinian 
organizations, intellectuals and political splinter groups…». Arafat, who came to Bagdad, was bitter towards Syria and asked the Iraqis for 
help. WikiLeaks, «POPULAR CONFERENCE IN SUPPORT OF PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE AND LEBANESE NATIONAL MOVEMENT», 1-2. 2 July.  
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Iraqi troop build-up threatens Syria 
On the Syria-Iraqi border region, Iraq normally had 20,000 soldiers deployed.540 In early June 
Baghdad started to send troops to the area. Interestingly the first report appears on 10 June, 
a day after the 9 June TASS statement.541 Damascus in turn sent troops to eastern Syria to 
meet the threat, and King Hussein of Jordan was worried Iraq might intervene in Syria.542 By 
18 June, there was more than 40,000 soldiers in western Iraq.543 This was a considerable 
force compared to the strength of the Syrian and PLA/Sai’qa forces, see the table below. 
 
Table 4: Approximate strength of major troop deployments in June 1976.544 
 Syrian PLA/Sai’qa  Iraqi 
Lebanon 12,000 8,000* - 
Lebanon border area 5,000 - - 
Syrian-Iraqi border area 12,000 - 45,000 
Golan heights 75,000 - - 
Total 104,000 8,000 45,000 
* An unknown number of troops had relocated to Syria the last few days. 
 
Bagdad denied allegations that Iraq would attack Syria.545 However, by mid-July the Iraqis 
had 70,000 men on the border, and the CIA saw two possible purposes behind the increase: 
to relieve pressure on the PLO, or encourage the domestic opposition in Syria.546 Both seem 
credible as Bagdad already instigated attacks in Syria and supported the PLO. The Israeli 
Foreign Minister Yigal Allon thought that the Iraqi moves were arranged with Moscow as a 
threat to intervene if Syria went too far in Lebanon.547 This may well have been the case as 
both parties wanted to limit the Syrian role in Lebanon. However, by mid-July the CIA 
concluded that the Iraqi troop build-up did not work.548 Yet, as they thought Iraq might 
attack Syria with little warning, there was an Iraqi military threat. 
                                                          
540 WikiLeaks, «IRAQI OFFICIAL DENIES THAT IRAQ WILL ATTACK SYRIA», 1. 22 June.  
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President’s Daily Brief 12 June 1976», 3. CIA, «The President’s Daily Brief 18 June 1976», 2. 18 June. 
544 CIA, «The President’s Daily Brief 18 June 1976», 3. 18 June. 
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547 Journal of Palestine Studies, «Syrian Military Intervention in Lebanon and Its Consequences», 135. 




Iraqi support of Syrian armed opposition 
Iraq called for the regime in Damascus to be overthrown, and did its best to stir up internal 
problems against it.549 At its disposal, Baghdad had a strong Syrian exile community willing 
to execute covert operations in Syria.550 A high-ranking Baathist official was assassinated in 
Damascus on 10 July.551 Syrian media accused Saddam of the assassination, and security in 
Baghdad was tightened.552 Attacks in Syria continued throughout the autumn. In early 
August, the Latakia Governorate building was partly destroyed by explosives just before 
President Assad was going to visit it. On 31 August, a bomb went off in front of the 
president’s brother Rif’at al Assad’s house.553 On 2 September, two more bombs exploded in 
Damascus. Two Palestinians attempted launch rockets towards President Assad’s house.554  
 
Iraqi support of the PLO-LNM 
Several reports disclosed Iraqi military support of the PLO-LNM in Lebanon. On 10 June the 
Iraqis began airlifting small arms destined for the Lebanese leftist to Egypt.555 King Hussein 
said the Jordanians had caught truckloads of weapons from Iraq destined for Lebanon, 
suspecting several had got through already.556 At the end of July, Assad asserted that three 
Iraqi battalions were present in Beirut, and Baghdad shipped arms through Egyptian ports. 
Egypt and Libya authorized Iraq to send soldiers and materiel to Lebanon through their 
ports.557 The flow was reportedly not enough to tip the balance of forces in early August, but 
it was possibly enough to undermine the recent ceasefire agreement. More Iraqi volunteers 
                                                          
549 The events of Lebanon were the most important topic in the press and the US analysts called the Iraqi press near-hysterical. WikiLeaks, 
«IRAQI REGIME FRUSTRATED BY COURSE OF EVENTS», 1-2. 13 July. Syrian state-run news agency SANA charged both Iraq and Fatah with 
exploiting the situation on behalf of the US and Israel to distort the Syrian position. WikiLeaks, «JULY 10 SYRIAN MEDIA ON LEBANON», 2. 
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551 Baath National Command member Ahmed al-Azzawi died in a bomb explosion at the headquarters of the Baath Party National 
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«IRAQI REGIME FRUSTRATED BY COURSE OF EVENTS», 1. 13 July. 
553 WikiLeaks, «BOMB EXPLODES NEAR RESIDENCE OF RIF'AT AL-ASAD», 1. 2 September.  
554 They set up rocket launchers in a neighbor house, but were caught and executed in October. In addition, three Alawite majors were 
killed in Hama in October, possibly by the Youth of Muhammad group seeking revenge for the death of their leader Marwan Hadid. The 
Baath Party Deputy Secretary General Abdullah al-Ahmar survived an attempt on his life. A bomb exploded in the car of Ba’ath Party 
Regional Command member Mahud Hadid. WikiLeaks, «RECENT ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST SARG LEADERS», 1. 14 October.  
555 The information was given by Egyptian officials to the US Embassy. CIA, «THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 11 JULY 1976», 2. 11 July. 
556 WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING - LEBANON SITUATION», 2-4. 28 July. Some of the Leftist groups that escalated fighting probably did it with 
Iraqi support according to US analysts. CIA, «Lebanon’s dissolution», 28. 1 August 1976. 
557 WikiLeaks, «EGYPT VERSUS SYRIA IN LEBANON», 2. 4 August. WikiLeaks, «INTSUM 12, - AUGUST 5, 1976», 1. 5 August. 
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were also reported to come into the country.558 A US State Department cable citing a 
«clandestine source», also reported that Iraqi volunteers, mainly from the Iraqi-controlled 
Arab Liberation Force (ALF), were regularly coming by sea through Egypt and Libya.559 
 
Syrian media claimed 500 Iraqi soldiers had arrived in Lebanon with Egyptian assistance.560 
The goal was supposedly to inflame sedition when peace negotiations were concluding 
successfully. The Israelis also claimed that the USSR sent weapons to Lebanon through 
Iraq.561 Lebanese President Frangieh speculated that the PLO wanted to turn Lebanon into a 
Soviet satellite state.562 He and former President Camille Chamoun were worried about the 
help the PLO got from the outside, especially Iraq and Libya. Chamoun said there were 1,000 
Iraqis troops present in Lebanon and that Baghdad aimed to add another 5,000 soldiers. He 
further claimed that the Iraqis used modern Soviet tanks in battles in Beirut. On the other 
hand, a Lebanese military intelligence agent asserted there were 3,000 Iraqis in Lebanon.563 
Some of them being Palestinians who had been living in Iraq might explain this increase.  
 
In October, the Norwegian Ambassador to Lebanon, Tancred Ibsen referred to a report 
about 4,000 Iraqi troops in Lebanon.564 There was also a report about Cuban experts training 
Palestinian commandos in Iraq in guerrilla warfare.565 As we have seen, in Riyad, Sadat 
pledged to end cooperating with Iraq and that seems credible as he reconciled with Assad.566 
 
Soviet influence over Iraq 
The question is not if Moscow supported the Iraqi policy towards Syria and the PLO-LNM, 
but its intention and the level of involvement. In July, Soviet media favourably covered the 
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«EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH SOVIETS ON ALLEGED ISRAEL BLOCKADE», 1-2. 20 August.  
562 WikiLeaks, «MEETING WITH FRANJIEH AND CHAMOUN», 3. 25 August. 
563 WikiLeaks, «LEBANESE SITUATION AUG 28», 1-3. 28 August. 
564 A Christian officer in Southern Lebanon shared the information with a Norwegian correspondent who in turn informed the ambassador. 
As the Iraqis had little combat experience, they had been «slaughtered like sheep» and 1,500 were killed or badly wounded. WikiLeaks, 
«NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR'S REPORT RE IRAQI TROOPS IN LEBANON», 1. 29 October.  
565 WikiLeaks, «ECONOMIST-FOREIGN REPORT ARTICLE ON SOVIET-IRAQ RELATIONS», 3. 2 November.  
566 WikiLeaks, «EC,: INTSUM 178…» 26 October. 
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18th anniversary of the Iraqi revolution.567 However, the USSR did not respond to an Iraqi 
request for modern MIG-25 fighters, showing the limits of support.568 At earlier instances of 
increased Iraq-Syria tensions, the Russians tried to reconcile them as the USSR certainly did 
not want a war between its two main Middle East clients. Now, however, given the USSR’s 
displeasure with Syria, the Kremlin would probably have supported the Iraqi policy to 
pressure Assad and warn him that the USSR had the means to escalate in case they wanted 
to. The Kremlin accepted a limited Iraqi pressure on Assad and support of the PLO-LNM. This 
may have curbed the Syrian pressure in Lebanon somewhat, however, it did not stop it. 
 
Bearing in mind Iraq’s strong independent policies it is not likely that Iraq would do this 
solely to please the Soviet leaders. With the increased oil prices, Saddam had more wealth 
and economic independence from the USSR than Syria had. Iraq did not share a border with 
Israel and did not fear an attack from Tel Aviv to the same degree as Syria did. In sum, Iraq 
led a more independent policy towards Moscow than Assad did, and could act with more 
freedom regarding the PLO and Lebanese leftists. 
 
The Syrian threat perception 
Assad was forced to take into consideration the Iraqi pressure. The Syrian armed forces had 
been increased from 130,000 in 1974 to somewhere between 177,500 and 230,000 in 
1975.569 After such a rapid growth, the quality of the new units would necessarily be limited. 
Moreover, Syria was fighting in Lebanon, needed to secure the frontier with Israel, and 
sought control over the domestic opposition. The 70,000 strong Iraqi border force was a 
threat, though probably not overwhelming as Assad knew the Kremlin would not tolerate an 
Iraqi attack. The Syrian regime met it by increasing its own troop level. The domestic security 
was tightened, and this worked. The Iraqi troops and material support of the PLO-LNM in 
Lebanon seems to have prolonged the conflict without changing the balance of power. In 
sum, Assad probably became more cautious in his moves against the PLO-LNM in Lebanon.  
  
                                                          
567 Central Press published the telegram from USSR leaders who congratulated the Iraqi president al-Bakr. The mouthpiece of the Soviet 
Communist Party, Pravda referred positively to the Iraqi daily «al-Dzhumusiya» article on «Strategic union of Iraq with the socialist 
countries». WikiLeaks, «SOVIET PRESS SUMMARY - JULY 17-19», 4. 19 July.  
568 Baghdad made the request in the spring of 1976. «FRUSTRATIONS OF Iraqi regime», 2. 27 July. 
569 Fitzgerald gives the lower figure derived from The Military Balance 1981/82. Fitzgerald, «The Syrian Army: An activist military force in 
the Middle East», 12. Ramet use the higher figure. Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian relationship since 1955, 102.  
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Chapter 5. Soviet economic and cultural relations with Syria  
 
This chapter analyses to what degree the economic and cultural relations between Moscow 
and Damascus were affected by the Syrian intervention in Lebanon. A country’s vulnerability 
towards another state is influenced by the strengths and weaknesses of its domestic 
economy and international relations. Therefore, it is also necessary to look at Syria’s 
domestic economy, and how other countries who wanted and had the means to influence 
Syria, primarily the Arab oil countries and the US, acted.  
 
Economic relations as a key to Syrian development 1955-75 
 
During the 1950s and 60s the economic aspects of the Soviet-Syrian relations were as 
important as the military features.570 It was only after Assad took power in 1970 that the 
military dimension took predominance. The first trade and payment accord was signed in 
1955, and a large economic agreement was made in 1957 providing Soviet assistance for 
industry and irrigation.571 In the late 1950s a US-German company discovered oil in Syria.572  
However, the Syrian state took over the fields in 1958 and developed an oil industry where 
the USSR later played a decisive role. The Syrian left-wing regime of 1966-70 emphasized 
economic development and increasingly relied on the USSR to achieve their goals. Economy 
became the major theme of cooperation, and the largest Soviet project, launched in 1966, 
was the building of a huge dam and power plant on the Euphrates River.  
 
In the late 1960s, Hafez al-Assad, defense minister at the time, criticized the economic policy 
claiming that it had a negative impact on the armed forces.573 Apart from blaming the policy 
for the defeat against Israel in the 1967 Six-day War, he resented the economic dependence 
on the USSR. Assad wanted to liberalize the economy and after taking power, he encouraged 
development of the private sector.574 The goal was to accomplish a strategic balance with 
Israel, not just in the military, but also in the economic, cultural and social spheres. The 
                                                          
570 Karsh, Soviet Policy, 52. 
571 Ramet, The Soviet-Syrian Relationship  since 1955, 219.  
572 By 1972 Syria actually supplied the Soviet Union with oil Karsh, Soviet Policy, 55. 
573 Karsh, Soviet Policy, 52. 
574 In 1971 private companies were allowed to import goods with certain restrictions. The next year transit-trade and tourism was 
introduced and in 1974 foreign capital including Arab oil money was welcomed. 
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strategy was to modernize the economy and achieve rapid growth by giving the bourgeoisie 
and merchant class a more extensive role.575 However, to Moscow’s relief, the state 
maintained the leading role in the economy accounting for over 75% of the industrial 
production.576 Arab petrodollars financed a vast public investment program. 
 
In spite of Assad’s proclaimed bias against the USSR, he did not just keep up the economic 
relations with the USSR, but strengthened them. New economic and technical assistance 
agreements for oil industry, railways and water resources were signed in 1972. After the 
1973 Yom Kippur War, Moscow tried to pre-empt US-Syrian cooperation and on a visit to 
Damascus the Soviet foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko offered a $2,2 billion economic-
military agreement in 1974. By the mid-70s, fifty projects were in progress and the economic 
relations were closer than during the left-wing regime of 1966-70.  
 
Trade and aid 
Trade was another tool Moscow used to strengthen the Soviet-Syrian relations. The trade 
between the two countries grew from next to nothing in 1955 to $65 million in 1970.577 (See 
table below). Under Assad’s rule, by 1975, it more than tripled to $233 million. In addition, 
East-bloc countries purchased 22,4% of the Syrian exports and supplied 16,6% of the imports 
in 1975. Nonetheless, the Russians were somewhat worried about Syria’s substantial 
commerce with Western Europe which purchased 53,8% of the Syrian exports and supplied 
49% of the imports in 1975.578 On the positive side, Syrian trade with the US was small.  
 
In January 1976 the USSR and Syria signed a five-year trade agreement regulating Syrian 
exports of crude oil, cotton products and wool, and imports of Soviet machinery and 
industrial equipment.  The groundwork was laid for increased Soviet-Syrian economic 
relations, but how did the Syrian invasion of Lebanon impact them?  
 
  
                                                          
575 The economic policy became known as infitah. Perthes, «The Syrian Economy in the 1980s», 38. 
576 Karsh, Soviet Policy, 54. 
577 In 1955 the USSR only exported for $0,3 million to Syria, and did not import anything. Karsh uses Vneshnyaya Torgovlya SSSR as a 
source. Karsh, Soviet Policy, 56. 
578 On the other hand, the trade with Western Europe dated back to the early 1960s, so it was not seen as a new threat. 
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The writers’ views on the economic problems of 1976 
 
Of the authors investigated, it is primarily Karsh who writes about Syria’s economy and 
relations with the USSR. He describes a worsening domestic situation and gives figures for 
increases Soviet-Syrian trade. However, he gives no information about Soviet aid or the 
parties’ mutual statements and reactions. According to Karsh, the Syrian intervention in 
Lebanon led to a steep increase of the military expenditure, from $450 million in 1974 to 
$900 million in 1976-77.579 At the same time, the Arab countries’ economic contributions to 
Syria declined. After years of increase, oil exports stagnated between 1975-78. On top of 
this, the rising number of Lebanese refugees in Syria, lost remittances from Syrians working 
in Lebanon, and a halt of transshipment of goods through Lebanon, resulted in an economic 
downturn. The government responded by tightening its 1976 budget and cancelling many 
projects.  
 
Still, the Soviet-Syrian trade increased during 1976, and the USSR’s net trade surplus 
increased. During Assad’s Moscow visit in April 1977, an extensive economic and technical 
agreement including Soviet assistance in irrigation, land reclamation and railway expansion 
was signed.580  
 
Table 4: Soviet trade with Syria in US$ millions.581 
Year Soviet exports Soviet imports Net Soviet trade 
1955 0,3 0 0,3 
1970 46,4 19,2 27,2 
1975 137,5 95,6 41,9 
1976 183,7 128,5 55,2 
 
Syria’s economy worsens in 1976 
 
By investigating the sources it becomes clear that Syria experienced increasing economic 
problems in 1976. The Arab oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf had pledged to give 
                                                          
579 Karsh, Soviet Policy, 57. 
580 Ibid, 54. 
581 Ibid, 56.  
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Syria US$581 million a year.582 However, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were pressuring Assad and 
Sadat to reconcile their conflict, and by May 1976 the two Gulf states had not paid the yearly 
subsidies to Damascus.583 In addition the conflict with Iraq had an economic effect. Before 
1976 an oil-pipeline had transported crude oil from Iraq through Syria to Mediterranean 
ports. Because of the Iraqi-Syrian conflict, Baghdad closed the pipeline, and transit revenues 
fell from US$138 million in 1975 to zero in 1976.  
 
It is quite clear that the Lebanese Civil War did, as the earlier writers say, cost Syria extra in 
military expenditures. In May it cost 3 million Syrian Pound (US$770,000) a day. In 
September, after the invasion, it increased to 10 million (US$2,6 million) a day.584 In addition, 
500,000 to 1 million Lebanese fled to Syria and this created strains on the economy.585 High-
level corruption was also a serious problem.586 Consequently, the Syrian budget was 
reportedly cut, possibly as much as by half to 8 billion Syrian Pound (US$2 billion), and the 
launch of the upcoming five-year plan was delayed.587 All of this led to increased inflation 
and a lack of some consumer goods in Syria. Considerable price increases on food, fuel and 
construction materials in July indicated that inflation was out of control.588 The increased 
costs of living led to a rising popular discontent. In July, it was not considered to be a major 
problem by US analysts, still, it came on top of the political unrest, and constituted an 
growing internal threat to the regime. 
 
Soviet increases its aid 
In spite of political, diplomatic and military pressure, the Soviet economic activity in Syria 
remained at the same magnitude as before, and in some instances increased. In 1974 the 
USSR provided US$100 million in economic aid to Syria, but in 1975 no new aid was given.589 
During Kosygin’s 1976 visit, Moscow pledged US$300 million in aid to oil-, irrigation- and 
                                                          
582 The pledges were made at the Arab League summit in Rabat in 1974. Egypt was promised the same amount as Syria, while the PLO 
would get US$27 million and Jordan US$175 million. WikiLeaks, «RABAT SUMMIT AND ARAB LEAGUE CONTRIBUTIONS», 1.  
583 WikiLeaks, «POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SYRIAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS», 2-6. 21 May.  
584 Assad informed the Ba’ath Party Regional Command about the figures. WikiLeaks, «SYRIAN STRATEGY IN LEBANON FOLLOWING 
INSTALLATION OF SARKIS», 1-4. 22 September. 
585 WikiLeaks, «SARG ECONOMIC TROUBLES AND USG ASSISTANCE», 2. 26 October.  
586 Deputy Prime Minister Haydar and the president’s brother Rifa’t al-Assad were rumored to regularly request 5-25% commissions for 
approving contracts. The gains were split and shared with other officials. WikiLeaks, «POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SYRIAN ECONOMIC 
PROBLEMS», 2-4. 21 May. 
587 WikiLeaks, «POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SYRIAN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS», 1. 21 May. 
588 The inflation was possibly over 30%, which the US Embassy estimated it had been in 1975. WikiLeaks, «INFLATION IN SYRIA», 3. 14 July.  
589 CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1975», 28 and 33. July. 
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power development.590 This amount was the double of any previous agreement which up to 
1975 had summed up to US$468 million. It constituted more than a third of the US$875 
million Soviet aid given to all Third World countries in 1976.591 This was a significant increase 
and a clear expression of how the Kremlin prioritized Syria. Necessarily it was planned before 
Moscow knew about the Syrian intervention in Lebanon, but it was not reduced afterwards. 
This demonstrate that the Kremlin’s main economic policy continued undisturbed.  
 
The aid stimulated the Syrian economy. With the help of Russian exploration, new oil 
reserves of 9 billion barrels were discovered and Syria became a net oil exporter.592 In 
addition, a refinery at Homs, which had been built with Czech credits of US$40 million, was 
expanded in 1976. The production in Homs to a large degree met the national demand for 
petroleum products. The USSR also carried on reconstruction of the railway system. 
 
The Euphrates dam had been the focal point of the Soviet program and Moscow had given it 
US$185 million in credits.593 The first stage of the dam was planned to be completed in 1977 
with a capacity of 800MW. As it neared its completion, the Soviet contribution was naturally 
reduced, and the Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Haydar commented that the economic 
relations with the USSR were probably smaller than those with the US.594 Still, more power 
generators were installed, and new power lines from the dam continued to be built in 
1976.595 Water from the dam was planned to irrigate 1 million hectares of land, and the 
project included the building of a new city, Tabqa, and 15 villages housing 40,000 agricultural 
workers.596 Moscow could have reduced its contributions, but chose not to, indicating a 
willingness to continue to support Syria economically. 
 
  
                                                          
590 CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 6. September 1977. 
591 CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 45 and 59. September 1977. 
592 Soviet technicians were perhaps less capable than their Western counterparts, but came to a third of the cost . Oil exports were 
estimated to reach US$500 million in 1977. CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 
32. August 1977. 
593 CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 32. August 1977. 
594 Haydar did not believe the rumors of a Soviet threat to cut economic support. WikiLeaks, «DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER HAYDAR 
COMMENTS ON LEBANON; DOWNPLAYS REPORTS OF SOVIET PRESSURES ON SYRIA», 1-3. 22 July. 
595 The capacity increased to 500 MW by 1976. CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 
32. August 1977. 
596 The Russians had built training-facilities that had already graduated 12,000 technicians for the power industry. CIA, «COMMUNIST AID 
TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 45. September 1977. 
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The USSR starts to pressure economically 
 
However, in July 1976 the USSR began to constrain the economic relations, and continued to 
do so during the autumn. The Kremlin put some economic pressure on Syria when Khaddam 
visited Moscow in July, although no details were specified.597 Then the USSR rejected a 
Syrian request for emergency financial assistance to support the Lebanese invasion.598 Assad 
notified that a Soviet economic delegation, which was supposed to come to Damascus on 14 
July, was cancelled, and he feared a cut in economic aid. 599 The economic coercion was 
upheld during August and September, when the Russians postponed several contracts.600  
Khaddam said that in spite of a reduced public Soviet criticism of Syria, the «material 
pressure» had actually increased, though the Syrian leaders did not want to publicize this.  
 
Dispute of Soviet oil technicians 
The Soviet oil technicians became another contested topic between Moscow and Damascus. 
In early September, the Syrian Deputy Minister of Petroleum, Nader Nabulsi informed that 
the USSR had threatened to withdraw Russian oil technicians.601 However, they had not 
done it yet «because they need Syria as much as we need them». Three weeks later the 
situation changed completely as the Syrians let the contracts for Soviet oil technicians run 
out without renewing them and this continued in October with some outright refusals to 
renew contracts.602  
 
Soviet-Syrian trade 
Another measure was the Soviet demand for cash payment for goods and services that 
earlier had been provided by a so-called Clearing agreement avoiding cash transfers.603 In 
addition to payment for arms and military spare parts, the USSR demanded cash payment in 
Pound sterling for commodities and equipment to the Homs refinery and a fertilizer 
                                                          
597 WikiLeaks, «EGYPTIAN POLITICAL COUNSELOR ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS». 19 July. 
598 CIA, «THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 16 JULY 1976», 2-3. 16 JULY. 
599 WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING--MESSAGE FROM ASAD «a, 1-2. 17 July. WikiLeaks, «TALK WITH KING--MESSAGE FROM ASAD « b. 18 July 
Asad asked King Hussein to convey the message to the highest level of US government, the Shah of Iran and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia.  
asked him. 
600 WikiLeaks, «MEETING WITH KHADDAM SEPTEMBER 17», 2. 17 September.  
601 WikiLeaks, «SOVIET PETROLEUM TECHNICIANS IN SYRIA», 1. 10 September. The Deputy Minister said the Soviet were less competent 
than Western technicians were, nevertheless they came at a third of the price. 
602  The information was shared by the Italian Counselor in Damascus. WikiLeaks, «SYRIAN/SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS; SYRIAN 
PETROLEUM TECHNICIANS», 1. 30 September. WikiLeaks, «SYRO-SOVIET RELATIONS», 3. 26 October.  
603 The Syrian Minister of Economy told this to the US Ambassador. WikiLeaks, «MORNING SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT REPORTS», 1-2. 19 
October 1976. The Syrians had a clearing agreement with the USSR. A clearing agreement is designed to force a balance of trade with 
exports being offset by imports and the use of cash remittances minimized. Merriam -Webster. «Clearing agreement».  
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factory.604 However, the impact of cash demand was relatively small as the USSR was only 
the seventh biggest trading partner providing 3,2% of imports to Syria and buying 5,9% of its 
exports. In addition, Syria countered the Soviet measure by delaying the approval of a 
protocol detailing how to set the conversion rate of payments in rubles. Moreover, the 
Minister of Economy Imadi underlined that Syria still had access to commodities of the 
Soviet Bloc countries. So the demand for cash payment was not really a big concern. 
 
Arab oil states pressure and the US supports Syria economically 
 
Saudi Arabia worked to reconcile Egypt and Syria, and both Assad and Sadat seemed willing 
to talk.605 King Khalid of Saudi Arabia discussed the events in Lebanon with Sadat and Arafat 
in Riyad on 21 June.606 Then the Syrian and Egyptian Prime Ministers met in Riyad on 22-24 
June.607 They continued to disagree over the Sinai II agreement and Lebanon, but took some 
steps to reduce the gap. James Collins writes about Moscow’s misgivings to this, and claims 
that this was the reason for inviting Khaddam to Moscow on 5-7 July.608 Whatever the case, 
the Saudi-Syrian relations improved after the meetings in Riyad, and Saudi Arabia pledged 
Syria a US$200 million grant and increased a loan from US$75 to US$101 million.609 On the 
other hand, Kuwait did not restore its aid to Syria, probably because of Palestinian 
opposition to this. In spite of this achievement, Syria needed a further US$250 million in 
assistance for 1976. 
 
However, in early August, things did not seem to go as planned. King Hussein was going to 
ask King Khalid of Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Arab heads of state to pay the yearly 
subsidy to Syria, Jordan and Egypt.610 And in September, Khaddam said the Saudi aid to Syria 
was interrupted.611 On the other hand, Saudi Arabia continued to support the PLO with 
US$700,000 a month. Khaddam asked the US ambassador Murphy for Washington to 
                                                          
604 WikiLeaks, «SYRO-SOVIET RELATIONS», 1-3. 26 October.  
605 Bannerman, «Saudi Arabia», 129.  
606 The New York Times, «SADAT, SAUDI KING AND ARAFAT MEET». 22 June.  
607 Bannerman, «Saudi Arabia», 129. 
608 Collins, Lebanon in crisis, 220.  
609 The information was shared by the Syrian Minister of Culture, Fawzi Kayyali WikiLeaks, «RENEWAL OF SAUDI FINANCIAL AID TO SYRIA», 
1. 10 July. CIA, «NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN». 13 July. The Minister of Economy Muhammad al-Imadi confirmed that Saudi aid 
had been restored. 
610 WikiLeaks, «FINANCIAL TIMES INTERVIEW WITH KING HUSSEIN», 2-3. 9 August.  
611 WikiLeaks, «ACTION MEMORANDUM: KHADDAM'S REQUESTS», 2. 18 September. 
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counsel Gulf leaders to restore aid to Syria and stop helping the PLO-LNM.612 Kissinger 
promised to talk to the Saudis and the other foreign ministers.613 These are new findings 
showing Assad had a strategy to reduce the external economic threats to Syria.  
 
The Syrian government invited the US to make investments in the country and Damascus 
and Washington signed an agreement of Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) on 
9 August.614 This facilitated American private investments in Syria by making US investors 
eligible for insurance and guarantees.615 Later, in October, the US studied different ways to 
support Assad economically.616 Clearly, the accord with the US would not be to the Kremlin’s 
liking as it opened up for more economic links with the Americans and less dependence on 
Moscow. Nevertheless, the economic difficulties Syria experienced, seemed to be serious 
and combined with some of the political unrest we have seen, could make the regime 
nervous. Therefore, the Russians would have had mixed feelings about the Syrian economic 
problems. A situation with real instability would sooner or later make Damascus more 
susceptible to Soviet pressure, but could also make Assad vulnerable and possibly seek help 
from the Arab Gulf states or the US.  
 
It is not clear how serious the lack of Arab aid was for the Syrian domestic economy, as 
reports give divergent views. On one hand, the Syrian Minister of Economy said the Syrian 
state was bankrupt in October because of the combination of extra expenditures spent in 
the Lebanese Civil War and the Gulf states withholding money.617 In contrast to this, a 
French assessment described the economic situation as healthy because of Saudi and 
Kuwaiti payments in July and August. As long as Damascus obeyed Saudi Arabia, the Arab aid 
was coming and there was no currency shortage. The Syrian transit revenues for goods had 
increased significantly after the Lebanese ports closed and tourists from the Gulf travelled to 
Syria instead of Lebanon. The political dangers to Syria were far more important than the 
economic threats. After the Russians had completed the Euphrates dam, the Soviet 
economic projects were not critical to the Syrian economy. However, as Khaddam and King 
                                                          
612 WikiLeaks, «MEETING WITH KHADDAM SEPTEMBER 17». 17 September.  
613 WikiLeaks, «ACTION MEMORANDUM: KHADDAM'S REQUESTS», 2. 18 September. 
614 U.S. Government Printing Office, «United States Treaties and Other International Agreements», Volume 28, Part 6 1976-77, 7141.  
615 One of the US enterprises involved was Ford motor company to produce tractors.  
616 WikiLeaks, «SARG ECONOMIC TROUBLES AND USG ASSISTANCE», 1-4. 26 October.  
617 WikiLeaks, «MORNING SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT REPORTS», 1-2. 19 October. 
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Hussein raised the issue of the Arab subsidy, and asked for help on several occasions to 
restore it, the subsidy was important to Syria. This gave the Arab oil exporting countries 
leverage over Damascus, and this was likely the main reason for Assad to make an 
agreement at the Riyad mini-summit. 
 
Signs of Soviet-Syrian and Saudi-Syrian reconciliation 
 
After the Riyad agreement, there were signs of reconciliation in the Soviet-Syrian 
relationship. President Assad congratulated the Soviet leadership on the anniversary of the 
1918 October Revolution.618 The short cable was a standard form of praise for the Soviet-
Syrian cooperation. More importantly, a delegation of the Soviet-Syrian friendship society 
led by the Soviet Minister for Light industries arrived in Damascus on 8 November. The 
delegation held meetings with Ba’ath officials and discussed next year’s cooperation. 
Actually, the Minister for the Euphrates dam received so many Soviet officials that he was 
unavailable in October-November. The Syrian People’s council (Parliament) ratified the 
Soviet-Syrian economic agreement and the accord on Ruble-Sterling conversation rate which 
regulated the repayment of loans.   
 
However, the problems for Damascus were far from over. In December, the Kuwaiti 
economic support for Syria was still delayed because of Kuwait’s relations with the PLO.619 It 
was not until April 1977 that Syria seems to have overcome the economic problems caused 
by the intervention in Lebanon.620 The sanctions Iraq had imposed were overcome by Saudi 
Arabian financial assistance. The Soviet leadership offered Syria a Rubles 65 million (US$ 
86,7 million) grant or loan on advantageous conditions.621 In addition a five-year Rubles 1 
billion loan (US$ 1,33 billion).622 By June 1977, in contrast to the military issues, all the 
economic requests Damascus made to Moscow were met.623 These focused on completion 
of existing aid projects.  
                                                          
618 WikiLeaks, «SYRIAN MEDIA PUBLICIZE ARRIVAL OF SOVIET MEMBER OF SYRO-SOVIET FREINDSHIP SOCIETY», 2. 10 November. 
619 At the 1974 Rabat summit, Kuwait promised to make a yearly contribution of $US180 million to Syria. Damascus also claimed a large 
loan had not been approved yet. WikiLeaks, «SYRIAN FONMIN'S VISIT TO KUWAIT», 1-2. 3 December. 
620 WikiLeaks, «MEDITERRANEAN REPORT-DECEMBER 1976 - APRIL 1977», Section 4 page 2. 16 April 1977. 
621 The Romanian embassy in Damascus which was often used by the Russians to divulge stories they wanted to come out passed on the 
information. Syrians had asked US officials for details about the performance of MIG-25s, and this gave credence to the information 
given by the Romanian Embassy. WikiLeaks, «REPORTS OF SYRO-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON MILITARY ITEMS IN MOSCOW», 1-3. 4 May 
1977.  
622 Rubles have been converted to US$ with an exchange rate of US$ 1 = Ruble 0,75. U.S. Department of the Treasury, «Treasury reporting 
rates of Exchange as of March 31 1977», 4. 31 March 1977. 
623 WikiLeaks, «INTSUM 330 - JUNE 3, 1977», 3. 3 June 1977. 
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The Saudi economic pressure was stronger than the Soviet 
In conclusion, the Syrian regime had survived an economic turbulent period. Moscow had 
the opportunity to pressure Assad economically, but chose to only make some limited 
measures. Damascus on the other hand reacted by taking measures that deflected the Soviet 
policies. It seems like the parties needed each other, they both knew it and set limits to the 
reductions of economic relations. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf oil states on the other hand 
flexed their economic muscles more clearly and coerced Assad to negotiate. The Saudis 
achieved what they wanted, a Syria-Egyptian reconciliation and an agreement over Lebanon.  
 
Increased tensions in Soviet-Syrian cultural relations 
 
Receiving students from the Third World was another way Moscow used to extend its 
influence. Syria had sent students to the USSR and Eastern Bloc countries since 1956.624  
 
Table 5: Syrian students studying in the USSR and Eastern Europe. 
 1956-75 625 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
In the USSR 4,955 707 n.a. 548 447 514 550 
In Eastern Europe 3,340 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 400 
 
However, also in this area the Russians sent signals of dissatisfaction with the Syrian policy in 
Lebanon, and Assad retaliated. The Soviet Ministry for Higher Education informed Syrian 
authorities in early October 1976 that they would cut the number of scholarships for Syrian 
students in the USSR.626 Assad interpreted this as pressure to change the policy on Lebanon 
and responded by cancelling all 1.300 students that were supposed to go to the Eastern bloc 
countries.627 It was not informed how many would have gone to Moscow, but based on the 
recent years’ statistics, the US analysts thought it would have been about half the total of 
1,300 students, meaning 650. Instead, the Syrian President ordered the Ministry of Higher 
Education to arrange studies in Western Europe.628  
                                                          
624 All numbers except the first column is from an October 1976 report. WikiLeaks, «SYRO-SOVIET RELATIONS», 3. 26 October.  
625 CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 68. September 1977. 
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In the end, 550 Syrian students went to the USSR in 1976.629 The figure is probably lower 
than the planned figure, still it was higher than in 1975.  Another 400 students departed for 
Eastern Europe during 1976. A total of 950 Syrian students left for the Eastern Bloc, 350 or 
27% less than planned.  
 
In conclusion, there was a reduction in the number of Syrian students in the East Bloc 
countries, though not dramatic. As we have seen with the other issues in question, the 
parties came up with statements and threats. However, the topic of Syrian students in the 
USSR and East Bloc was not crucial neither for Moscow, nor for the Syrians. That is probably 
why it was not a theme for more controversy and debate between the two countries. 
Therefore, in reality the implemented policy was more modest. 
 
  
                                                          
museums, research and teaching institutions; exchange of books, periodicals, publications etc. and cultural events. WikiLeaks, «SYRIAN 
INITIATIVE ON "FULBRIGHT" PROGRAM», 2. 5 February.  
629 We do not know if they left before or after the mutual threats of reduction occurred. At the end of 1976, there were 2,100 students in 
the Soviet Union and 1,320 in Eastern Europe. CIA, «COMMUNIST AID TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1976», 
68. September 1977. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
The Soviet-Syrian type of patron-client relation 
 
Now we will look at the findings of this thesis in relation to the patron-client theory 
introduced in Chapter 1 and Freedman’s question about the Soviet Middle East goals.630 As 
for the patron-client theory, it stipulates that the Soviet Union had three types of goals: 
Ideology, international solidarity and strategic advantage. For the client, Syria, the perceived 
threat level was the important factor for determining how much it would give in to the 
Soviet goals.  
 
The Soviet Union’s goals in the Middle East 
Ideology  
The Soviet media continued to speak about anti-imperialism and the struggle against Israel 
in its rhetoric. This was intended to win the Arabs and liberation movements around the 
world over to the Soviet side. Anti-imperialism was not a clear idea restrained to the 
Western powers, for instance Sadat accused the USSR for being imperialist. Neither was it a 
very strong unifying concept. Several Arab states were against Israel and the US; however, 
they had conflicts among themselves that split them more than anti-imperialism could unite 
them. In addition, the USSR recognized Israel as a state, while the Arab governments did not.  
 
There are no indications that Moscow, as in the rest of the world, used any arguments of 
communist ideology in its direct relations with neither the PLO nor Syria. Syria under Assad, 
although it had certain socialist features with a strong state and public sector, was highly 
nationalistic and guarded its independence. As we have seen, Assad simply stated that 
Brezhnev, asking Syria to pull out of Lebanon, had a different view that did not coincide with 
the Syrian national interests.  
 
                                                          
630 See pages 15-19 in Chapter 1. 
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The PLO, a nationalist liberation movement, was an umbrella organization with a wide 
specter of political and religious tendencies. Fatah was the largest group in the PLO and its 
leader Arafat and most of its members came from the petite bourgeoisie. He was not a 
socialist and even less a communist, still, the Russians were, as we have seen, outspoken in 
their support of Arafat. They did so because he was PLO Chairman and leader of the largest 
and most powerful PLO-group, which could be used in the anti-imperialist struggle. Assad’s 
intents to replace Arafat with a pro-Syrian leader would have weakened the PLO’s 
independence and consequently the Soviet influence over it. The Marxist groups in the PLO, 
PFLP and DFLP, were not strong enough to challenge Fatah.  
In conclusion, anti-imperialism was used rhetorically, but it had in practice too little unifying 
appeal to be important for the Kremlin. Communism had little support in the Arab world and 
it was not an important Soviet goal to promote it. 
 
International solidarity 
Moscow wanted to have more political influence in the Middle East. One of the goals was to 
win Syria’s support to reconvene the regional peace conference in Geneva. This was 
important to the Kremlin, as it would put the Soviet Union on par with the US in the Middle 
East. Moscow accepted and guaranteed the existence of Israel, and did not support the 
Palestinian goal of winning back all of the historical Palestine. The Russians also wanted to 
make a united Arab front opposing the US, its Arab allies and Israel. The USSR hoped Syria, 
Iraq, Libya, Algeria, Jordan, the PLO, Egypt and other states would take part in this Arab 
front. The Kremlin needed Assad to achieve both of these objectives and was willing to go to 
lengths to accomplish these goals.  
 
Assad was certainly aware of the Soviet objectives, and at the same time they were not so 
important to him. He certainly would like to be a part of, and preferably lead, a united Arab 
front against Israel, but he was in conflict with several of the Arab states. He would not 
accept an agreement with Israel on the same terms as Moscow did. For Syria, it was 
paramount to get the Golan Heights back and it was also important to appear as the 
Palestinians’ champion. In 1976, Assad wanted to dominate the PLO and cooperate closely 
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with Jordan. The first goal was clearly not shared by Moscow, so the Syrian and Soviet goals 
regarding the PLO were incompatible.  
 
Strategic advantages  
The Soviet Cold War struggle with the US was on a strategic level. In a zero-sum-game, the 
loss of a client was considered as a win for the other superpower. As we have seen, the US 
enjoyed good relations with Syria, and the Kremlin was suspicious about Syria-US collusion 
against the PLO-LNM. The USSR could simply not afford to lose Syria, an important Arab 
state, as a client. The Kremlin would not like to lose the PLO either, but in the larger 
perspective, Syria was more important. 
 
In addition, the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean, the Fifth Eskadra, protected the USSR 
militarily against the US Sixth Fleet, and secured access for the navy and commercial 
shipping to the Mediterranean and beyond. After the Fifth Eskadra’s expulsion from its 
Egyptian bases, the need for similar naval facilities in the Mediterranean became a priority. 
The Soviet navy could sustain itself for periods of peace-time operations, but for long-term 
maintenance and warfare, it depended on access to resupply and maintenance facilities in 
the region. Consequently, vital military interests were at stake for the USSR. Syria was one of 
the best options to achieve bases, and the Kremlin made repeated requests for expanded 
access to facilities in Tartus. Syria depended on Soviet arms, ammunition and spare parts. 
However, the Soviet interests were not that important to Damascus and its influence over 
Moscow increased as the Soviet dependence of its client incremented.  
 
Syria’s threat level 
Assad faced possible threats on three levels: Domestic, regional and international. There was 
internal opposition within the Syrian regime to Assad’s Lebanon policy, but he had enough 
political and military support and control to overcome this.631 The assassinations of Ba’ath 
Party officials and bomb attacks in Syria had Iraqi and PLO backing. However, the Syrian 
regime tightened security, and managed to hinder an escalation that could have threatened 
                                                          
631 As we have seen, internal opposition to Assad voted down the Prime Minister in 1975. Assad was strong enough to change the Prime 
Minister in 1976 and replace him with a pro-Assad officer. 
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it. In sum, there was a domestic political opposition and a tense security situation, but the 
threat level was manageable for the regime in Damascus.  
 
Syria had several rivals in the Middle East. Israel, which had fought three wars against Syria 
and was its regional nemesis, had very powerful armed forces. Assad was afraid that if the 
PLO-LNM came to power in Lebanon, Israel would possibly invade the country to eliminate 
the threat from another hostile state. Israeli troops occupying parts or all of Lebanon would 
constitute an increased danger to Syria. Therefore, by invading Lebanon and supporting the 
Lebanese Christians, Syria reduced the Israeli threat. Another goal was to gain dominance of 
the PLO. By controlling the PLO, including its ability to attack Israel from Southern Lebanon, 
Syria’s power in negotiations with Israel and the US would increase.  
In addition, the US convinced the Israelis that it would be to their advantage that Syria 
defeated the PLO-LNM. Tel Aviv set a red line for Assad in Lebanon, and as long as he kept it, 
the Israelis would not attack Syria. This enabled Assad to move Syrian army units, facing the 
Israelis on the Golan Heights, to Lebanon. In conclusion, the Israeli threat was low. 
Of the Arab states, Iraq was the militarily most dangerous to Syria. Iraq had strong armed 
forces and shared a border with Syria with no geographical obstacles to invade. However, 
Iraq was a Soviet client, and its military was dependent on resupplies of arms, spare parts 
and ammunition from the Russians. The Kremlin would never have tolerated an Iraqi 
invasion of Syria, its main Arab client, as it would have seriously weakened the Soviet 
position. In any case, by Assad’s tacit understanding with Israel, he was able to strengthen 
the Syrian military forces on the Iraqi border. In conclusion, the Iraqi threat was low. 
Egypt and Libya supported the PLO-LNM in Lebanon politically and with limited military 
supplies. Nevertheless, this support was not enough to change the balance of power, and 
Syria could use its militarily superior forces when they found it appropriate and defeat the 
PLO-LNM. Egypt and Libya did not have sufficient military strength to deploy an adequate 
force across the Mediterranean to challenge the Syrians directly.  
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states had even less military force to project, but on the other 
hand, they were strong economically. Their goal was to reconcile Syria and Egypt, and to 
achieve this they pressured both countries by withholding the yearly subsidy. As Syria had a 
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difficult economic situation, the Saudi policy was perceived as an economic threat in 
Damascus and this was the measure that finally halted the Syrian army in Lebanon. 
 
On the international level, the only two states with enough power and interest to threaten 
Syria were the two superpowers. As we have seen, the US accepted Assad’s intervention in 
Lebanon. The USSR could have deployed a strong military force and threatened or attacked 
Syria, in spite of certain limitations on resupplying such a force. However, a direct 
confrontation with Syria would certainly have led to losing it as a client, so this was not an 
option for the USSR.  
 
In sum, Syria’s threat level was low, and this gave Assad influence over Moscow’s policies.  
 
In conclusion, the USSR had political and strategic goals in Syria. At the same time the Syrian 
threat level was low, and the US was making bids to Damascus. Consequently, the type of 
patron-client relation was a mix of number V Client prevalence, and VI Client centric.632 The 
patron has important international political and even strategic interests at stake, and is 
willing to invest many resources in the relation. The client, Syria does not face a major 
threat, and negotiates from a position of strength. For the international community this was 
a dangerous kind of conflict as it had the potential to escalate into a superpower 
confrontation. Having gone through a series of superpower conflicts in the 15 years 
preceding the Lebanese Civil War, both the USSR and the US were aware of this. Détente still 
prevailed between the superpowers, and their crisis management implied to avoid 
escalation of a conflict. This gives an additional explanation to why the Kremlin limited its 
pressure on Syria and only gave a measured support of the PLO-LNM in Lebanon.  
 
An offensive and unsuccessful Soviet strategy 
 
Robert Freedman discusses whether the Soviet strategy was offensive-defensive, and 
successful-unsuccessful.633 The Kremlin attempted to win clients to its side in the Middle East 
by supporting Syria, the PLO, Iraq, Libya and trying to win back Egypt. The overall strategy 
                                                          
632 See Pages 18-19 in Chapter 1. 
633 See page 38 in Chapter 3.  
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was political as the USSR sought to form a pro-Soviet united Arab front and reach an overall 
settlement in Geneva. Military and economic aid were key measures to establish and 
maintain the relations with the Arab clients. The combined support of the PLO-LNM was 
meant to change Lebanon into becoming a pro-Soviet state, not to keep the status quo. In 
this sense, the Soviet policy was offensive.  
 
So how successful was the Soviet policy? The Syrian intervention hindered the PLO-LNM 
alliance from possibly winning the Lebanese Civil War. The Soviet response seems to have 
been based on two major goals; to pressure Assad to withdraw without losing Syria as a 
client, and to sufficiently satisfy the PLO to keep it as a client. The USSR did not have enough 
influence over Syria to coerce it into following Moscow’s line, and in the end gave in to 
Assad’s policy. The limited support Moscow gave to the PLO-LNM, was not sufficient for it to 
defeat both Syria and the Lebanese Christians. Even though the PLO survived as an 
organization and Arafat kept on as its leader, the USSR ended up with a weakened 
Palestinian client and a more self-confident and independent client in Damascus. Moscow 
did not win back Egypt, on the contrary Sadat moved closer to Saudi Arabia and the US. All in 
all, the USSR did not succeed with its offensive strategy. 
In conclusion, after the Syrian 1976 invasion of Lebanon, the USSR balanced its diplomatic, 
political, military and economic policies towards Syria and the PLO to keep both as clients. 
The Kremlin did not understand Assad’s goals and political abilities in time to save the PLO as 
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